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Under what conditions and why do the state elites change their policies toward 
nationhood? In this research, I intend to develop a nuanced analytical framework with an 
aspiration toward a theoretical proposition on the institutional change of state policies 
toward nationhood. The dissertation takes the cases of imperial citizenship reform in the 
Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, the shift from Ottoman identity to 
Turkish identity in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and the state promotion of 
minority languages in Turkey after the 2000s. Methodologically, I carry out a 
comparative historical research through the analysis of official documents such as 
constitutions, parliamentary proceedings, and speeches by political leaders. I explore the 
patterns of change within my proposition of the four ideal-type nationhood structures that 
states can adopt: hierarchical, asymmetrical, hyphenated, and monolithic. While the 
dissertation emphasizes the notion of ontological security in terms of the logic of the state 
elites in revisiting state policies toward nationhood, it explains the conditions under 
which the policy changes occur by looking at the contingencies of the international 
context, domestic elite competition, and domestic nonstate actors.
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INTRODUCING THE STATE OF NATIONHOOD 
 
POLICIES AND THE QUESTION 
 
OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION 
Statement of the Problem 
Under what conditions and why do the state elites change their policies toward 
nationhood? Canada has shifted to two official languages after the concerns over the 
French-speaking Québécois and uses an ethnic classification in its population census to 
reflect the cultural diversity of the nation. The United States has no official language, but 
started to exercise affirmative action in the 1960s in order to overcome the historical 
discrimination toward those groups who were excluded from American national identity. 
The United States also embraces an ethnically/racially classified population census 
system. France has only one official language and there is no classification of ethnicity in 
the census and there is no affirmative action based on ethnicity or race. France also bans 
religious symbols such as veils in public schools. Turkey has only one official language 
and there is no ethnic question in the census but Turkey has recently begun promoting 
minority languages through its official state television channel.  Sri Lanka has shifted to 
two official languages after conflict with the Tamils. The Australian state officially began 
to define the nation as multicultural in the 1970s. After centuries of a hierarchical and 
confessional-based autonomy system, the Ottoman Empire first introduced the 
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overarching Ottoman nationhood beyond ethnic and religious affiliations in the 
nineteenth century. After decades of ethnic-based imagined ‘German-ness’, the German 
state has begun to grant citizenship to the children of Turkish worker migrants, the largest 
non-German community in Germany. These policies represent a diversity of nation-
building and nationhood policies that states adopt, internalize, and reconsider over time in 
which the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are set. While some of these policies 
were embraced in the beginning of the social engineering projects of state- and nation-
building, many others were adopted gradually in the historical evolutions of nations. In 
other words, despite being persistent, nation-building and nationhood policies are rarely 
conclusive but rather they are subject to change. Thus, while some states largely 
remained loyal to their historical nation-building projects and the boundaries of 
nationhood, many others moved away from them and changed their path-dependent 
policies, especially with regard to the historical position of minority groups. Why do 
some states change their nationhood policies that reconsider and reorganize their ethnic 
and religious social world, while some states show resistance to such changes? In 
general, the question is about the policy change in the institutional design of the state and 
its nation-building raison d’être over time.  
The challenge for this research is to come up with a theoretical argument in order 
to explain the policy changes from a comparative-historical perspective. Under what 
conditions and why do states change their policies toward nationhood and minorities?  
These questions not only aim to explain why the policy change occurs, but they also 
consider the issue of the approximate timing of the change.   
The state attempts to make societies ‘legible’ and simplified through social 
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engineering tools such as an official language in order to consolidate its routine functions 
such as taxation and the prevention of rebellion.1 The idea of a modern nation congruent 
with its state has been part of the simplification processes in which a homogenous 
cultural community has been the ultimate goal. Yet, the idea of a homogenous nation 
with a monolithic national identity has remained an ideal type in most cases within which 
assimilation has been the social engineering tool of the state. While some states have 
been successful in building relatively homogenous nations with a motivation for an 
unrivaled ethnicity and nationhood, others have encountered alternative identity claims 
both from within where the peripheral ethnic groups have become politicized and from 
outside as new immigrants have challenged the institutionalized national identities. 
Moreover, some other states have practiced the options of accommodation or exclusion 
rather than assimilation. In cases where assimilation policies have failed, the nation-state 
as an ideal project has found itself in an identity crisis. At that point, the option of 
cultural pluralism in the public sphere for political contestation has come to the front. The 
politics of cultural pluralism,2 multiculturalism,3 and the politics of difference4 have 
become the new policy options for the states, especially in liberal democratic ones. These 
debates question the state as a culturally-neutral entity in general and the assimilative 
state policies toward minorities in particular. If states take these arguments into 
consideration and political reform occurs, the puzzle, then, is to explain under what 
                                                 
1 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).  
2 Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1979).  
3 Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, eds., Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).  




conditions the path-dependent policies of the founding nation-building motivations and 
the boundaries of nationhood encounter critical junctures. Thus, the research concern 
here is not just about why the change occurs, but it is also about when the change occurs 
since path dependency and critical junctures are important in comparative-historical 
research.  
I choose three cases of paradigmatic shifts in state policies toward nationhood 
from the late Ottoman imperial context until contemporary Turkey. These cases can shed 
light on the contemporary identity issues that many post-Ottoman states encounter in the 
Middle East in general and Turkey in particular. The rise of the Ottomanism project 
based on constitutional patriotism and its reflections on the Ottoman Nationality Law of 
1869 that redesigned power relations of its historically underrepresented ethno-religious 
communities vis-à-vis the Ottoman state, the policy shift from the Ottomanist project of 
nationhood toward a monolithic Turkish nationhood through the 1920s, and the policy 
shift toward ethnically plural notions of Turkishness in the 2000s, especially with the so-
called ‘Kurdish openings’ raise theoretical as well as empirical questions of why and 
under what conditions the state policies toward nationhood change.  
Focus of the Study 
In this research, my purpose is to explain the state policy changes in historically 
institutionalized policies toward the boundaries of nationhood in relation to ethnicity and 
minorities. Simply put, the state might shift its policies from discrimination to 
nondiscrimination or from ethnic blindness to ethnic pluralism. What is at stake here is 
that the state-framed national identities are challenged by rival alternative identities and 
changing international norms on the state of minorities and the states seek various ways 
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of containing, accommodating, and integrating these claim-makings. There is a growing 
literature on identity-related policy changes within and across states such as on bilingual 
education, ethnicity-based censuses, constitutional recognition of multiculturalism, 
affirmative action clauses, state recognition of minority languages, to name but a few. 
Yet, the trends in minority policy change do not always lean toward accommodative 
configurations. For instance, Russia lifted its nationality section in its internal passports 
in 1997 which seems to be a step back from the multiethnic mindset of the state.5 If state 
policies toward nationhood change, we need to understand and explain the variations in 
the degree of change across cases and the conditions that lead the state toward such 
changes.  
My research mainly involves the state of minorities and their relationship with the 
state within which the state might reconsider the boundaries of nationhood. Thus, this is 
not a study on changing citizenship policies that regulate the legal boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion, but it is more a study on nationhood that regulates not just the 
legal but also the cultural boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.  
Rogers Brubaker in his seminal study looks at the traditions of nationhood in 
France and Germany. He argues that “if the French understanding of nationhood has been 
state-centered and assimilationist, the German understanding has been Volk-centered and 
differentialist.”6 In other words, German nationhood is based on ethnocultural 
understanding while French-ness is based on territorial and political understandings. This 
                                                 
5 Sener Akturk, Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
6 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 1. 
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dichotomous approach—territorial or ethnocultural, civic or ethnic, Western or Eastern—
has been widely adopted in the studies on nationalism and citizenship. But this 
dichotomous approach is seen as problematic in recent studies. For instance, Sener 
Akturk argues that civic and ethnic nationalism are not mutually exclusive.7 He states that 
“civic is a vague, empty category; moreover ethnic and civic are derived from different 
roots.”8 In this study, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, I develop four ideal-type institutional 
structures of nationhood (see Figure 1) which go beyond civic versus ethnic or state-
framed or counter-state nationhood.9 By doing this, I have two goals. The first is to 
introduce a more sophisticated conceptual variation in the practices of nationhood. The 
second is to problematize the conceptual confusion between citizenship and nationhood 
or state identity and national identity which I find to be analytically different concepts. 
Rogers Brubaker et al. also highlight this problem. They state that “Nationhood and 
nationality are not, however, necessarily understood as congruent with state and 
citizenship” and “this point needs to be underscored, since ‘nation’ and ‘state’, 
‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are often used interchangeably in the United States and 
some Western European contexts.”10 For this reason, I highlight that this study is not 
about citizenship per se, but it is about nationhood which I see as a more overarching 
category than citizenship (see Chapter 3). An individual may be a citizen of a state, but 
may still lack a membership in the imagined nationhood. I will discuss the conceptual 
                                                 
7 Akturk, ibid., 2012. 
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
9 The four ideal-type institutional structures of nationhood demonstrate: (1) legal exclusion-
pluralism (hierarchical nationhood), (2) legal exclusion-assimilation (asymmetrical nationhood?), (3) legal 
inclusion-pluralism (hyphenated nationhood), and (4) legal inclusion-assimilation (monolithic nationhood). 
See Chapters 2 and 3.  
10 Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox and Liana Grancea, Nationalist Politics and 
Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 14. 
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framework and typological dimension of this study in Chapter 3. 
Research Questions 
There are two trends of change here as I will elaborate on more in the analytical 
framework section: (1) why and when the states move from assimilation to pluralism (or 
vice versa) and (2) why and when the states move from legal exclusion to legal inclusion 
with regard to the issue of minorities (or vice versa).  
The issue of approximate timing is essential here. Why didn't the Turkish state 
start broadcasting in minority languages during the 1990s or 1980s rather than in the 
2000s? Or why the Ottoman state elites did not adopt Turkishness in the 1850s but in the 
1920s before the establishment of the Republic? Or why did the Ottoman state adopt 
Ottomanism in the 1850s but not in the 1800s? Overall, I plan to explore these questions 
in a systematic fashion within a specific analytical framework (see Figure 1) that 
 





provides four ideal–type institutional designs of nationhood (in relation to minorities) that 
I will elaborate on more in Chapter 3. For introductory purposes, the legal exclusion and 
inclusion axis is about the degree of citizenship and the pluralism-assimilation axis looks 
at the ethnic recognition aspect in the institutions of the states. 
Key Concepts: Nationhood, Ethnicity, and Minorities 
This study seeks to unpack the political change from one institutional setting of 
nationhood to another as shown in Figure 1. As Rogers Brubaker has shown,11 if France 
would shift from its historical and institutional view of nationhood that is assimilationist 
and unitarist toward either an ethnocultural form as in Germany or a pluralist and multi-
ethnic form as in the United States, how would we able to explain this political change? 
What would be the necessary and sufficient conditions that would lead to such a political 
change? As this study traces the notion of nationhood from the late Ottoman Empire 
through contemporary Turkey, the goal is to explain the changes in state policies toward 
nationhood over time in three specific cases of change. In this comparative historical 
account, this study also explains the continuity in the policies of nationhood as well as 
where there is no change. Thus, the research design is based on not only positive cases 
but also negative cases as well. I provide further explanations on the methodology and 
research design in Chapter 2 but it would be helpful to introduce the key concepts earlier 
and explain how these concepts are approached. In Chapter 3, I discuss how I 
problematize the notions of citizenship and nationhood, and take the concept of 
nationhood as a combination of the legal and cultural practices. I also provide an in depth 
                                                 
11 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 1992. 
  
9 
discussion of how I build my four ideal-type nationhood structures in Chapter 3.  
In institutional perspectives, the state has been one of the most important engines 
of such a ‘wide range of forms’ of ethnicity and nationhood.12 “The state monopolizes, or 
seeks to monopolize, not only legitimate physical force but also legitimate symbolic 
force, as Bourdieu puts it” states Brubaker and “this includes the power to name, to 
identify, to categorize, to state what is what and who is who.”13  Incorporating these 
insights on ethnicity and nationhood, this study also follows an institutional perspective 
on understanding the dynamics of political change in state policies toward nationhood. 
Brubaker et al. also emphasize the statist perspective on nationhood and ethnicity:  
Institutionalist and organizational perspectives on ethnicity have focused on the 
state, analyzing the ways in which states count, categorize, and identify their 
populations through censuses, identification cards, passports, and the like; the 
manner in which states are constituted, expressly or implicitly, as nation-states 
(or, in a few cases, as multinational states); and the forms of state recognition—or 
nonrecognition—of ethnic heterogeneity.14 
Overall, the way I encounter the dialectial relationship between ethnicity and nationhood, 
and the way the state organizes the legal-institutional structure of this relationship is not 
independent from the role of minorities. Further elaboration of the conceptual framework 
will be discussed in Chapter 3.   
Case Selection 
Based on comparative-historical research, I aim to explain the patterns of 
nationhood policy persistence and change through both a within-case longitudinal 
                                                 
12 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
13 Brubaker, p. 42. 
14 Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox and Liana Grancea, Nationalist Politics and 
Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 359. 
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analysis (Turkey) and a cross-case process tracing (Turkey and the Ottoman Empire). I 
choose three cases for my research. The first case is the rise of Ottomanism and the 
Ottoman Nationality Law in 1869 that introduced patriotic Ottoman nationhood across 
ethnic and religious lines to all the subjects of the Ottoman Sultan. The second case is the 
adoption of the ethnically blind but religiously selective Turkish nationhood in the 1920s. 
Thirdly, I chose the Turkish state’s initiative that began in 2003 to promote minority 
languages through official television channels and elective courses in public schools 
which can be considered a paradigmatic shift in a historically ethnically-blind state.   
I choose these cases, differing in time and direction of change, for three specific 
reasons. First, the reason for choosing the Ottoman Empire is that minority policies are 
not limited to the modern nation-states. Both in an imperial state and in a nation-state, 
patterns of change in nationhood policies take place and the causes behind them entail in-
depth analysis. The confessional-based Ottoman millet system that gave autonomy to the 
Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews is considered to be antiassimilative and a unique 
system of managing diversity in a non-Western context.15 On the other hand, although 
Turkey’s nation-building project began based on firm assimilation, the state-framed 
nationhood has been gradually deconstructed. An explanation over the similar raison 
d’être of states’ changing policies toward nationhood and minorities regardless of 
imperial or nation-state setting is likely to take the research agenda beyond nation-states 
and their discontents.  
Secondly, the comparison between the late Ottoman Empire and contemporary 
                                                 
15 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
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Turkey is likely to shed light on the two different social worlds of the governing diversity 
and nationhood. Thirdly, the differences in the historical periods when policy changes 
take place might be another gain for the sake of this research design. Although contextual 
analysis is an emphasis in this research, explaining policy changes similar in nature 
beyond certain historical contexts and time periods can provide insights for 
understanding the general conditions that make states change their policies toward 
nationhood. This can make this research less descriptive and more explanatory.  
Conclusion and Organization of the Dissertation 
States rarely change the boundaries of their nationhood in relation to the position 
of minorities. As new institutionalist scholars argue policy feedback and path dependency 
make the status quo less costly for political elites.16 Yet, despite the costs, political elites 
do still reconsider the boundaries of nationhood and change the lines of inclusion and 
exclusion if certain conditions force them to do so. The aim of this study is to shed light 
on this question of political change. In a nutshell, I argue that states are more likely to 
change their policies toward nationhood under three interrelated conditions: favorable 
international context, the pressure of the domestic nonstate actors, and the elimination of 
the status-quo elites by the new proreform political elites.   
In Chapter 2, I discuss the weaknesses of existing approaches in the literature and 
provide the methodological approach embraced in this study. In Chapter 3, I elaborate on 
my typological framework of nationhood within which I seek to analyze the patterns of 
change. In Chapter 4, a brief historical background of the late Ottoman and early Turkish 
                                                 
16 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).  
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Republic political context is discussed. In Chapter 5, I introduce the formation and 
anatomy of modern Turkish nationhood. While Chapter 6 deals with the transition from 
the Ottoman millet system to Ottomanism, Chapter 7 discusses the pattern of change 
from Ottomanism to Turkishness. Chapter 8 shows path dependency of Turkishness 
throughout the twentieth century and how it has shifted to hypnenated framework of 
nationhood after the 2000s. Chapter 9, which is the conclusion chapter, provides the main 
arguments of the dissertation in relation to the historical patterns of change within the late 









AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
Introduction 
My goal in this study is to understand and explain under what conditions and why 
state elites change their policies toward nationhood. By nationhood, I mean the legal-
institutional and cultural boundaries of belonging to a particular state. Thus, nationhood 
differs from citizenship since citizenship particularly relates to legal-institutional binding 
to a specific state. A state can change the boundaries of nationhood by redesigning the 
relationship between the majorities and minorities through certain policies such as ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious reforms that alter the boundaries of belonging (see Chapter 3 for 
my typological design).  
In this chapter, I lay out a general survey on the studies of nation-state, 
nationalism, and the question of nationhood, and then I critically discuss the existing 
literature on state policy changes toward nationhood and minorities. I categorize two 
approaches in the studies of policy change toward national identity and minority policies: 
(1) endogenous approaches that mostly refer to social movements and public policy 
making, and (2) exogenous approaches that focus on international context and 
international institutions. While these approaches provide great insights in explaining 
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when states are more likely to change their identity policies, they tend to overemphasize 
one dimension (i.e., endogenous or exogenous) over the other. My analysis incorporates 
both approaches together within which I integrate the literature of institutional change 
informed by historical institutionalism into the literature of state policy changes toward 
nationhood and minorities. Thus, in a way, I categorize nationhood as one of the essential 
institutions of the state.  
A General Survey on Nationalism, Nationhood, and the 
Question of Homogeneity 
Since the nineteenth century the modern world polity of nation-states has been 
enlarged and consolidated, and nationalism has been one of the most important political 
forces for groups who seek to secure their states and for groups who seek autonomy and 
self-determination. While the origins of nationalism are not in the primary scope of this 
study,17 what nationalism does and how it functions in relation to the dimensions of 
assimilation and cultural diversity needs attention. For instance, seeing nationalism as a 
function of industrialization, Ernest Gellner argues that the state fosters a high and 
standardized culture which becomes “the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or 
perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone members of the 
society can breathe and survive and produce.”18 Nationalism, then, functions as “a 
cultural blueprint for various features of social and political organization in the modern 
                                                 
17 The debates revolve around modernist and primordialist/essentialist approaches to nationalism. 
Modernist approaches include separate theoretical stances among constructivists and 
functionalists/instrumentalists. For further information on nationalism in general, see John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith, eds. 1994. Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press; Umut Ozkirimli. 2010. 
Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.     
18 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 37. 
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world.”19 In fact, this notion of high culture or cultural blueprint that nationalism 
produces in modern societies manifests the idea of national identity and nationhood as a 
“deep horizontal comradeship.”20 Functions such as political centralization, 
bureaucratization, mass education, conscription, a standardized language, and taxation 
are the building blocks of bridging the state with a cultural blueprint, high culture, and 
‘deep horizontal comradeship.’ As a toolbox, these features refer to the idea of 
simplification as the basic logic of the modern state that rejects complex heterogeneity 
among the members of the society. Homogenization of diverse cultures, languages, 
norms, and ethics is the means to this simplification which incarnates itself in a nation 
and a national identity.  
Yet, nationhood does not constitute a fixed and static notion. Rather, it is a site of 
“a continuous process of struggle over the legitimacy of the state and the meaning of 
popular sovereignty.”21 In this process, resistance to political integration into a common 
national state, compliance to the rules and cultural norms of the state, and the assimilation 
of all or dissident groups into the majority or common culture and language are various 
stages of nation-building, which does not necessarily evolve in a linear fashion.22 These 
processes, in fact, are slow-moving and complicated. When the social-cultural and 
psychological amalgamation and integration of diverse identity groups are unresolved, 
peaceful and stable nation-building is unlikely. In other words, “the feelings of alienation 
                                                 
19 Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood, “National Identity,” in Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 
259. 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1983. 
21 Justin Wolfe, The Everyday Nation-State: Community and Ethnicity in Nineteenth Century 
Nicaragua (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), p. 13. 
22 Karl Wolfgang Deustch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the 
Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).  
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and political apathy engendered in political subculture” disrupt the consolidation of the 
nation-state.23 To that point, Lloyd A. Fallers argues that the assumption that a nation is 
socially and culturally homogenous and thus politically unified has diminished. Because 
“either to wipe out the diversities that are a residue of history or to prevent new ones 
from developing through migration or internal differentiation” is less likely.24 In addition, 
social constructivism has gained leverage in the postmodern and poststructuralist 
approaches as national identities are considered artificial rather than natural or given. 
This has led to the possibilities of hyphenated identities and multicultural understandings 
of the nation and the state. Nationalism as a force of cultural unity and cultural 
homogeneity in general and the nation-state as a monocultural entity in particular has 
been challenged by pluralist understandings such as ‘multicultural citizenship.’25 As 
David Miller states, “even nations that originally had an exclusive ethnic character may 
come, over time, to embrace a multitude of different ethnicities.”26 Overall, the state’s 
exclusive social engineering projects of nation-building in the past do not mean that the 
state will stick to those initial policies and not break the path dependence.27  
The ‘differentialist’ turn that rejects the view of monolithic and homogenous 
nationhood reflects the asymmetrical power relations between the majority groups—that 
tend to control the state and determine the cultural norms and rules—and the minority 
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groups—that tend to feel culturally and politically alienated from the social and political 
institutions of the society. This, of course, makes the question of minority identity 
relevant across many societies today. Political theorists and philosophers have 
extensively encountered the diversity question in the age of nation-states. There has been 
an ongoing debate on how to accommodate the political claims of minority identities that 
tend to contradict the national identity or the national culture of the state, particularly in 
liberal democratic nation-states. Political theorists and philosophers have defended 
various stances from classical liberalism and liberal democracy to communitarian, 
consociation, recognition and difference-based forms of nation-states. These debates 
largely revolve around normative concepts such as equality, justice, liberty, and 
democracy.28 There is a double trend within states both toward a postnational discourse 
and toward self-determination based minority nationalism mobilizations. The 
reconciliation of the two is not an easy task.29  
The State, Nationhood, Minorities, and the Question of 
Inclusion/Exclusion 
The era of nation-states based on monolithic nationhood built on a single 
language, a single historical memory, and a single cultural framework is in decline. The 
story of assimilation and homogenization belongs to the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, not to the twenty-first century. The incongruence and the paradox between the 
state-framed nationhood and counter-state discourses of nationhood have made 
                                                 
28 Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires, eds. Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority 
Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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discourses of multiculturalism more conventional where once diversity and heterogeneity 
were challenges to the conventional wisdom of national identity.30 The twenty-first 
century will witness a shift from a practice of assimilation to an official state policy 
promoting minority identities and languages.31  
In the United States, the civil rights and affirmative action policies adopted in the 
1960s changed the nature of Americanhood;32 in various Latin American countries such 
as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico multicultural constitutions have been 
adopted;33 bilingualism and multiculturalism became an official state policy in Canada ;34 
some post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe have been reconsidering their ethnic policies 
and accommodation projects,35 and other countries such as Turkey and Germany have 
recently taken steps to become more accommodative toward groups who have 
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historically felt like outsiders of the German and Turkish national identities.36  
If states can and are likely to change their nationhood structures, the challenge is 
to explain why and under what conditions these policy changes occur through a 
theoretically informed and a historically sound analysis. As this study incorporates a 
comparative-historical analysis, the three cases that I select are neither necessarily 
contemporary cases nor examples of policy shifts toward pluralist understandings of 
nationhood. In other words, the goal is to both explain the inclusionary and exclusionary 
policies toward nationhood and national minorities by the state elites in a comparative-
historical perspective in order to see the big picture: the logic of the state elites in policy 
change. Thus, this study also seeks to understand and explain why state elites reconsider 
changing the status quo nationhood structures in the first place. If when and why 
questions are not taken into consideration collectively, one cannot understand and explain 
the overall mentality in changing the boundaries of nationhood.  Although political 
theorists have been debating extensively on the normative issues of minority identity 
status in the age of nation-states, a systematic and comparative explanation of policy 
changes toward national minorities and nationhood has been under-theorized. This is 
where this study aims to make its scholarly contribution by combining the literature on 
policy and institutional change with the literature on ethnicity and nationalism.  
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State Policy Changes Toward Nationhood and Minorities: 
Under What Conditions Do Such Changes Occur? 
As stated previously, my intention is not only to explain the inclusionary policy 
changes toward national minorities but also to explain the exclusionary trends as well. 
One of my cases where the shift occurs from Ottoman identity toward Turkish 
nationhood in fact is an example where the political elites decided to be more 
exclusionary toward any alternative identities. Inclusionary policy shifts might include 
“rights of sovereignty for the group, exemptions from laws that disproportionately 
disadvantage the group’s members, aid for the group’s cultural institutions, and support 
for the group’s cultural survival.”37 Then, the retreat of the state from such policies 
constitutes an exclusionary path. Further conceptual clarifications will be provided in the 
next chapter where I will provide my methodological and analytical framework. 
In his analysis of ethnic policy changes in Turkey, Germany, and Russia, Sener 
Akturk classifies seven types of policy changes toward nationhood and ethnicity: “(1) 
recognition of more than one ethnicity in the constitution, census, and other key official 
documents, (2) official territorial ethnic autonomy (e.g. autonomous ethnic republics), (3) 
citizenship of ethnic minorities, (4) linguistic rights of ethnic minorities, (5) single versus 
multiple official languages, (6) affirmative action for ethnic minorities, and (7) the basis 
of immigration (ethnic or not).”38 Such policy alternatives refer to the question of 
whether the state leans toward multiethnic social and political order that “focuses on 
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special protective and redistribution regimes that benefit individuals through national 
policy on the basis of group membership.”39 What is actually common across such policy 
options is that alternative identity paradigms other than the one defined by the state 
become visible in the public sphere. The real concern for identity categorizations other 
than the state’s categorization such as religious or ethnic minority identities is not that 
they are oppressed or discriminated against but the fact that “they are ignored, treated as 
nonexistent entities whose legitimate complaints do not merit attention.”40 Therefore, 
states’ identity policy shifts refer to either making alternative identities such as those of 
minorities visible in the public sphere as an official policy or making them invisible and 
nonexistent in the public space. Overall, either inclusionary or exclusionary policy 
alternatives for the state tend to create different institutional settings of nationhood. But 
when do the state elites decide on such policy shifts? What kind of conditions lead to the 
state deciding toward exclusionary or inclusionary policy adoptions? Last but not least, 
why in the first place are state elites willing to change the boundaries of nationhood?  
What is the logic of the state in that matter?  
There are several existing perspectives that seek to explain persistence and change 
in state policies toward nationhood. Some scholars argue that state collapse or border 
change can lead to a different institutional structure of nationhood and ethnicity.41 This 
approach finds nationhood change within a state that has stable borders unlikely. Yet, 
nationhood policies do change in the absence of state collapse (e.g., the 1960s Civil 
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Rights era in the U.S.; granting citizenship to nonethnic Germans in 1999; Turkey’s 
inclusive policies toward the Kurds since 2002).  
Exogenous approaches emphasize the international context and institutions such 
as the European Union conditionality as a cause of state policy changes. This argument is 
in tandem with the convergence approach within which international norms are 
considered to be pushing states in a similar direction toward more inclusionary trends for 
minorities. Yet, some states are still reluctant to adopt international norms and even 
practice policies which would contradict the international norms (e.g., minaret ban in 
Switzerland, headscarf ban in France). Jeffrey Checkel has shown how Germany has 
been reluctant to adopt the Council of Europe's norms on minority identities.42 Moreover, 
Anthony Marx demonstrated how the security concerns might lead to exclusion through 
the U.S. case in which the need for white unity was achieved through the exclusion of the 
blacks.43 Overall, the perspectives include nationalist ideologies, international norms, 
ethnic mobilization, and threat perceptions.44 For the sake of simple organization, I 
categorize the existing literature in two sections from a perspective of whether the policy 
shifts are seen as mostly a result of domestic processes or whether they are 
interconnected with external factors such as regional or international institutions.  
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There is a growing literature on official policy changes toward an alternative 
nationhood paradigm other than the state’s historical definition of it. The roles of 
minorities, indigenous peoples, and historically marginalized communities that revolve 
around the issues of national identity, ethnicity, and nationhood have received significant 
scholarly attention.45 For instance, in various Latin American cases, scholars emphasize 
the role of indigenous activism and the claim-making of subnational cultures as the 
engine of change in the state perceptions of national identity and adopting various 
policies recognizing cultural diversity within the nation-state. In her anthropological 
analysis of the Mayan ethno-linguistic identity in Guatemala and the policy change of 
National Languages Law by the Guatemalan Congress in 2003, Brigittine M. French 
(2010) argues that indigenous activism, ethno-national movement, and international 
support have all promoted multicultural democracy in the Guatemalan nation-state.46 
Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood put emphasis on the political activism of sub-
national cultural groups in their analysis of the reformulation of the national identity in 
Ecuador.47 Similarly, Jeffrey Lesser analyzes the change in the Brazilian national identity 
and emphasizes the endogenous role of immigrants and their descendants in manipulating 
Brazil’s political and cultural leaders.48 In the case of Mexico, Danni Wallis argues that 
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“an increase in indigenous organizations and later social movements, pressures from 
below in combination with the declining state capacity and resources in the 1980s, caused 
a constitutional amendment in 1991 recognizing the Mexican nation as multi-ethnic.”49 
What seems to be common across these cases is the emphasis on the agency of the non-
state actors such as the indigenous communities as the transformative force of policy 
change.  
In a comparative analysis of Germany, Turkey, and Russia which might be 
considered as largely a European context, Sener Akturk argues that there are three 
conditions within which states reconsider and change their policies toward ethnicity: 
counter-elites, new discourse, and hegemonic majority.50 He states that “If ‘counter-
elites’ representing the constituencies with ethnically specific grievances come to power, 
equipped with a ‘new discourse’ on ethnicity and nationality, and garner a ‘hegemonic 
majority,’ they can change state policies on ethnicity.”51 For Akturk, these three factors 
are separately necessary and jointly sufficient to cause either an exclusive or inclusive 
state policy change toward nationhood. Although Germany and Turkey have been within 
the influence of the European Union along with various European minority rights 
charters, Akturk does not emphasize external factors in his analysis of policy change. In 
his perspective, domestic factors are the main drivers for state policy changes toward 
nationhood and minorities.  
Overall, while some scholars emphasize the role of social movements by 
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indigenous or minority groups as the engine of change especially when these movements 
have the organizational capacity and resources to create influential pressure on state 
elites, other perspectives highlight the role of new elites with their new discourses of 
nationhood. Are these explanations insufficient since they assume that political change 
becomes possible and independent from the dynamics within the regional or international 
political environment? Are internal actors free from structural constraints or opportunities 
in transnational contexts? Some scholars emphasize the external factors more than the 
domestic factors.  
Exogenous Perspectives 
In the post-Soviet context, Judith G. Kelley asks, “why did governments in 
eastern Europe sometimes accommodate ethnic minorities while at other times restricting 
their rights or ignoring them?”52 She emphasizes the significance of European institutions 
such as the European Union and the Council of Europe through both membership 
conditionality and normative pressure. These factors, she argues, have been largely 
effective in suppressing the domestic opposition to ethnic concessions. In other words, 
international institutions become the domestic policy actors. The role of ethnic minorities 
in affecting any policy change has little place in Kelley’s argument. Rather, domestic 
political elites are constrained in their policy alternatives within the transnational context 
of the European Union. This argument is also relevant in Turkey’s recent accommodative 
policy changes toward Kurdish identity such as state television broadcasting in the 
Kurdish language and public universities offering Kurdish as elective courses. Many 
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scholars conclude that the Turkish state has adopted these policies due to pressure from 
the European Union and its conditions for full membership which Turkey has been 
pursuing since their candidacy status in 1999.53 Would Turkey not change or delay its 
policies further toward the Kurds if it were not a candidate for European Union 
membership?  
In the North American context and from a perspective of ethnic selectivity on 
immigration policies, Christian Joppke argues that the United States has shifted from 
ethnically exclusive immigration policies toward a nondiscriminatory policy between 
1924 and 1965.54 Although he specifically looks at policy shifts on immigration, Joppke 
argues that Anglo-European dominance in all domestic policies was lifted after 1965. He 
largely considers group conflict in domestic society as the main bottom-up pressure on 
public policy change toward minorities. Yet, he also mentions the foreign policy interests 
of the United States during the Cold War era as one of the dimensions of ‘race-neutral’ 
public policy making. Would the U.S. government’s policy change toward various 
minority groups be unrealized or delayed if the Cold War were not the international 
context? In a similar fashion, John D. Skrentny emphasizes the geopolitical role of World 
War II and the Cold War in his analysis of the minority rights revolution in the U.S. 
between 1965 and 1975.55 These international contexts, he argues, pushed the U.S. 
government to adopt human rights and nondiscrimination policies for national security 
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purpose in the fight against Nazism and global communism. While this context fostered 
bipartisan support for enacting nondiscrimination and affirmative action policies and 
made the civil rights era inevitable, “the black civil rights movement helped make the rest 
of the revolution possible—and rapid.”56 Overall, the U.S. federal government passed 
minority rights reforms during the 1960s under two conditions: (1) the perceived needs of 
national security, and (2) the various legacies of the black civil rights movement, as John 
D. Skrentny elaborates. If there hadn't been a civil rights movement but the Cold War 
context was still present, would the U.S. government still have changed its policies 
toward nonwhite minorities? Or would it have happened earlier or later than the 1960s? 
Although Skrentny and Joppke emphasize the internal sources of policy change from 
assimilation to pluralism, they pay extensive attention to the international context of the 
1960s and how such a context was effective in the policy shift in the U.S. 
Moreover, there are scholars who combine theoretical insights from international 
relations with the policy change debates in the field of comparative politics. For instance, 
in his comparative-historical study, Harris Mylonas looks at the postimperial Balkan 
states such as Greece and Albania and explains why some political elites chose one 
policy option of nation-building over the others (accommodation, assimilation, or 
exclusion).57 His main theoretical perspective is primarily informed by the realist 
paradigm in international relations where the states are seen as the main unitary actors 
and that they are primarily concerned with their survival and security. From this 
theoretical framework, geostrategic and security concerns are the primary drivers behind 
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the political elites’ policy changes toward noncore ethnic groups. Thus, his argument 
“builds on existing explanations but focuses on the importance of international and 
geostrategic concerns for nation-building policies” and “it accounts for the variation in 
nation-building policies as a result of the interaction between host states and external 
powers rather than non-core groups and host states.”58 Rather than those scholars who 
look at the demands and political activism of minority groups, Mylonas does not give 
agency to these groups. Interstate rather than intrastate dynamics constitute the conditions 
behind state policy changes toward nationhood in relation to minorities.  
Existing Perspectives on the Selected Cases 
The shift of the Ottoman millet system toward a policy of Ottomanism is mostly 
associated with the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) in which the Ottoman state put various 
modernization efforts forward in order to catch up with the European military and 
bureaucratic efficiency. The discourse of an overarching Ottoman identity took root 
during the Tanzimat reforms and became the official policy of the state that would bring 
hierarchically-ordered autonomous-confessional communities (i.e., Greek Orthodox, 
Jews, Armenians, and Muslims) of the empire under a patriotic Ottoman identity. Many 
historians see this policy shift as a top-down process mostly imposed by the European 
Great Powers that were concerned about the conditions of Christian communities in the 
Ottoman Empire.59 However, a prominent Ottoman historian, Ilber Ortayli, argues that 
policy changes were not only imposed by the external powers but also consciously 
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adopted by the Ottoman political elites. On the other hand, others such as Sukru Ilicak 
point to the secessionist movements, especially the Greek Independence in 1832 that 
pushed the Ottoman state to reconsider the boundaries of belonging to the Ottoman 
state.60 Despite these historical accounts, there is no systematic analysis that particularly 
deals with the conditions that led to the rise of Ottomanism in the early and later 
nineteenth century.  
In the formative years of the Republic of Turkey before its establishment in 1923, 
the founding political elites, especially the founding father Mustafa Kemal, emphasized 
the Islamic unity of the Anatolian communities against the foreign invaders. He also 
mentioned the brotherhood of the Turks and the Kurds and how the new state would 
protect the Kurdish identity and culture with a system of local rule.61 However, this 
discourse by the leading political elites was out of the political agenda after the 
establishment of the Republic in 1923 and the abolishment of the Islamic Caliphate in 
1924. The 1924 constitution defined the nationhood of the state as based on monolithic 
Turkishness (see Chapter 5).62 While the political elites were concerned about the British 
support for a potential independent state for the Kurds, the Islamic solidarity among the 
Kurds and the Turks was emphasized to build a broader domestic coalition among the 
Anatolian communities.63 Yet, after the Republic was established, any alternative identity 
                                                 
60 Sukru Ilicak, “A Radical Rethinking of Empire: Ottoman State and Society during the Greek 
War of Independence, 1821-1826,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2011.  
61 Andrew Mango, “Ataturk and the Kurds,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 
1999), pp. 1-25. 
62 88th Clause of the Constitution: “Regardless of race and religion, everyone is called Turk in 
terms of citizenship” [Madde 88- Türkiye’de din ve ırk ayırdedilmeksizin vatandaşlık bakımından herkese 
“Türk” denir]. Retrieved from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm on October 16, 2014.   




claims other than Turkishness defined by the state were rejected. Homogenization of the 
society under Turkishness became the state policy. Again, other than descriptive 
historical narratives, there is no systematic and theoretical analysis that traces the causal 
mechanisms behind such a policy shift. This study seeks to incorporate historical analysis 
of these cases into a theoretical proposition of nationhood policy change.  
Last but not least, the so-called ‘Democratic Opening’64 in Turkey under the 
political hegemony of the Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish acronym) has 
deconstructed monolithic Turkishness into a nationhood which recognizes and 
acknowledges the ethnic diversity in Turkey. As discussed previously, this case has been 
systematically analyzed by Sener Akturk, and he developed a theory of ethnic regime 
change driven by domestic factors. Although I tend to agree with the internal dynamics of 
change in Akturk’s analysis, the downplaying of external factors and no agency given to 
the Kurdish mobilization seem to be problematic and needs further elaboration. If the 
state as a conceptual variable was taken in this analysis, the international and regional 
system within which states are embedded cannot be ignored. The way I approach this 
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case embraces a state-centric explanation which is discussed further below.  
As some scholars show that the international context should be taken into account 
in order to understand and explain domestic policy changes toward nationhood as 
opposed to emphases on the internal forces of change, both perspectives still fall short in 
various capacities. Firstly, the major weakness of the existing theoretical perspectives is 
black boxing the state. The state is assumed as a taken-for-granted concept which is 
presupposed to be automatically responding to the external or internal pressures for 
policy changes. As the state is black boxed in many studies on policy changes on 
nationhood and national minorities, variables such as social movements, international 
norms, or external pressure are seen as sufficient explanatory conditions. The state is seen 
as a fixed and a unitary actor that does nothing but automatically adopt the policy 
demands of the external and internal actors. Would states automatically change their 
policies toward nationhood when there are counter-identity mobilizations and discourses? 
I think one cannot assume as such if one does not look inside the dynamics of the state. 
Rather than black boxing the state, further analysis is necessary where the state should be 
taken as a variable rather than a fixed entity. While variables such as counter-status quo 
domestic social movements, international norms, and other forms of external pressure 
might be necessary for state policy change, I think they do not constitutively become the 
sufficient condition for change. In order to understand and explain policy change, the 
internal dynamics of the state and the logic of the state elites should be significantly 
considered. The state needs to be studied and should become the object of analysis in 
understanding and explaining the policy changes toward nationhood. The state tradition, 
particularly in the Ottoman/Turkish political context, is thus very important in laying out 
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the patterns of identity politics.  
Secondly, the existing studies tend to look at policy changes that are one-
directional, and that is the inclusionary policy adoptions by the state. As my study both 
looks at the exclusionary and inclusionary policy changes in a comparative-historical 
perspective, I will be able to explain the conditions behind the multidirectional policy 
changes. Could the conditions behind the policy shifts toward inclusion be similar to the 
policy shifts toward exclusion?  
Thirdly, existing theoretical perspectives and case studies fall short in connecting 
the agency-driven and structure-driven conditions and explaining transnational and 
domestic dynamics in leading to the state’s nationhood policy change. Fourthly, since the 
agency-driven and structure-driven conditions are not taken into account constitutively, 
the existing perspectives are limited in explaining the conditions behind the policy 
changes. For instance, they are insufficient in explaining why some states are late-comers 
in accommodative policies under similar transnational contexts that push for 
accommodation. Finally, existing literature lacks a systematic and comparative analysis 
of policy changes in imperial and national settings which would show the continuity, 
variation, and change in state policies toward nationhood and minorities. In other words, 
my study offers an analysis across different time periods within a similar political and 
cultural context from the late Ottoman Empire to contemporary Turkey.  
Overall, this study seeks to demonstrate a more comprehensive analysis of 
nationhood policy changes across time in three innovative ways: (1) By bringing the state 
back in; (2) By taking the transnational context and how it influences state elites into 
account; (3) By combining the theoretical perspectives of historical institutionalism and 
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institutional change—which I frame the changes in the cases under study as such— into 
the literature of nationhood and ethnic politics. Historical institutionalism has been 
mostly studied within the policy area of welfare policies but rarely applied to ethnic 
policies. I believe that incorporating the theoretical perspectives of historical 
institutionalism into the study of nationhood and minority policies would inform and 
contribute to the existing debates with nuanced understandings such as the issue of policy 
change timing, path-dependency on the institutional foundations of nationhood, and the 
multidirectional policy changes across time. Overall, I argue that states are more likely to 
change their policies toward nationhood under three conditions: 1) a favorable 
international context for change; 2) the influence of domestic nonstate actors in 
increasing the leverage for change; and 3) the antistatus quo elites controlling the state by 
eliminating the prostatus quo veto players. 
First, in the next section, I sketch out the approaches on studying the state within 
the context of the Ottoman/Turkish tradition, and then proceed with the essentials of 
historical institutionalism and institutional change. 
Understanding the Essentials of the Modern State 
and How to Study the State 
During the 1950s and 1960s, society-centered explanations of politics and state 
actions were widespread in pluralist and structural-functionalist perspectives in political 
science and sociology.65 The state as a conceptual tool and an explanatory variable was 
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seen as old-fashioned due to its lack of autonomy. In other words, the state was not 
considered to be an autonomous body. While liberal-pluralist perspectives emphasized 
the interest groups and competition among them as the arena for state action, Marxist 
perspectives focused on class relations, modes of production, and the world capitalist 
system within which the state would not be autonomous but be in the hands of the 
bourgeois.66 Yet, through the mid-1980s, scholars such as Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol turned attention to the state as an independent 
explanatory variable in understanding the dynamics of social and political change.67 The 
historical context of the rise and fall of the Keynesian state, decolonization and non-
Western experiences of state-building, and the rise of ethnic conflicts and nationalist 
struggles paved the way for considering the state as an object of analysis. The 
significance of the state as an object of analysis is still an ongoing debate among 
scholars.68 
Although the state-centric explanation is the common premise for scholars who 
view the state as an object of analysis, the ways in which the state itself is studied varies. 
For instance, while historical-institutionalists (e.g., Theda Skocpol) focus on a specific 
institution such as trade regimes, rational choice institutionalists (e.g., Margaret Levi) put 
                                                 
66 Barkey, Karen. Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
67 An edited piece, Bringing the State Back In by these scholars in 1985 had an important impact 
in reconsidering the state as an explanatory variable in analyzing political and social change.  
68 Tuong Vu has an insightful historical review on the study of the state and how perspectives on 
studying the state have evolved over time: “Studying the State through State Formation,” World Politics, 
Volume 62, Number 1, January 2010.  Also see “The State of the Study of the State” by Margaret Levi in 
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rational individual actors as the engine of the state actors.69 On the other hand, the state-
in-society approach led by Joel Migdal emphasizes the role of societal forces in shaping 
the policies of the state rather than seeing the state as powerful enough to be completely 
autonomous from the society.70 The state and the society both have the capacity to 
transform each other.71 Tuong Vu puts another approach forward that he calls ‘the state 
formation approach’ that has common characteristics with the former approaches such as 
an emphasis on historical focus. Yet, the state formation approach does not narrow the 
analysis to the mesolevel or microlevel institutional structures but rather employs a 
macrosociological perspective where the elites and the masses are considered jointly.  
Despite different methodological perspectives on how to study the state, the 
approaches listed are not necessarily mutually exclusive in articulating the state as a 
conceptual tool. In fact, all have important shared interests in history, institutions, and 
society. In other words, as Wael B. Halleq argues, the state is “an ontologically 
meaningful and analytically viable entity.”72 In this study, I intend to reveal the official 
mindset of the state in the Ottoman/Turkish political context in a comparative-historical 
perspective. As Crawford Young has stated, “there is an ‘official mind’ in the upper 
reaches of state bureaucracies that shares a number of assumptions and historical 
                                                 
69 Tuong Vu, Studying the State through State Formation,” World Politics, Volume 62, Number 1, 
(January 2010), pp. 148-175.  
70 A collection of articles in State Power and Social Forces, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and 
Vivienne Shue provides a theoretical framework of the state-in-society approach and is complemented with 
case studies from different historical and geographic contexts (Cambridge University Press, 1994).   
71 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
72 Wael B. Halleq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 19. 
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understandings setting parameters to policy debate.”73 Thus, understanding the essentials 
of the state in the Ottoman/Turkish context is especially significant due to its very state-
centric socio-political context. According to Metin Heper, the state tradition in the 
Ottoman/Turkish context is based on a strong state and a weak civil society: 
The Turkish Republic seems to have inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong 
state and a weak civil society. As in the Ottoman period, so during the Republic, 
the bureaucratic elite continued to perceive the state as vital for holding together 
the community.74 
The historical origin of the strong state tradition in Turkey is a legacy of the 
imperial foundation of the Ottoman Empire, as the leading Ottoman historian Halil 
Inalcik puts:  
Within the Islamic community of peoples Turks have had a special tradition from 
the time they entered and controlled the Islamic world in the eleventh century. 
Originated in the steppe empires, this tradition can be defined as recognition of 
the state’s absolute right to legislate on public matters.75 
However, the strong state tradition and the high confidence of the ruling elites in the 
material and immaterial power of their state began to shatter when the forces of 
modernity empowered the European states to the extent that they would infiltrate the 
domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century. The 
political and military rise of European imperial states not only led to the insecurity of the 
Ottoman Empire in the international system, but also others as well such as Russia and 
Japan .76 “In the nineteenth century, the elites in these empires came to see themselves 
                                                 
73 Crawford Young. 2012. The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–
2010 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press), p. 43.  
74 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Eothen Press, 1985), p 14. 
75 Halil Inalcik, “Turkey between Europe and Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 7, 1980.  
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and their countries through European eyes, even if they did not necessarily agree on any 
specific course of action vis-à-vis Europe.”77 As the rapidly modernizing European states 
were establishing the hegemonic state system in global politics, the almighty Ottoman 
Empire and its ruling elites began to question the limit and the capacity of the state in the 
early nineteenth century. This is why the imperial state “went through numerous reforms, 
restorations, revolutions, reactionary backlashes, and wars, all of which were primarily 
motivated by the goal of catching up, competing, and standing equal with the core powers 
of the modern state system.”78 Internal challenges to the state from various peripheral 
communities on the one hand and external challenges from other states in the region led 
to a serious crisis of ontological security within the Ottoman state.  
By ontological security of the state, I refer to a condition and a question of 
existence and survival which is widely used in the theories of international relations. For 
instance, Kenneth Waltz argues that “survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that 
states may have.”79 Although the meaning of security is primarily associated with the 
concept of survival, some scholars particularly embrace the concept of ontological 
security as ‘security as being’ in the sense of routinizing everyday practices that 
institutionalize order and continuity.80 When such order and continuity of ‘security as 
being’ is challenged internally and externally, fear and anxiety emerge as a response to a 
specific threat. For instance, as Brent J. Steele puts it: 
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78 Ibid., p. 29 . 
79 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 129.  
80 See the theoretical contributions of Brent J. Steele on the concept of ontological security, 
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An agent is ontologically secure when they choose a course of action comfortable 
with their sense of self-identity. When critical situations become frequent, agents 
feel insecure because their routine is incapable of accommodating such 
circumstances. An agent must therefore reform behaviour to accompany them. 
This explains why agents [states] change behavior.81     
Thus, ontological security of the state should be framed not just in the sense of its 
physical security but in the sense of its psychological security as well. The state is 
ontologically secure as long as its physical and psychological condition of being is not 
under a constant internal and/or external threat that would challenge its existence and 
survival. If not, such state should be considered a weak state. Thus, I analyze the identity 
politics of the state in the Ottoman/Turkish political context within a security perspective 
since the quest of the political elites for ‘proper’ nationhood structure and state identity 
cannot be well grasped without the dimension of ontological security. In a way, I 
consider “identity” a security asset for the state elites. As Kemal Karpat states, “in the 
Ottoman Empire, modernization was essentially a drive to strengthen the state, as well 
expressed by its slogans: Bu devlet nasil yasar? (How can this state survive?) or Bu 
devlet nasil kurtulur? (How can this state be saved?), and initially it involved mainly the 
ruling institutions and their bureaucrats—a status group.”82  This psyche of state survival 
continues to exist in modern Turkish polity, especially surrounding the state policies of 
identity.  
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Nationhood as an Institution: Historical Institutionalism 
and Institutional Change 
The state policy changes toward minorities in fact manifests an institutional 
change in the state’s configuration vis-à-vis the minorities. As will be discussed in the 
next section covering my analytical, theoretical, and conceptual framework, I propose a 
four-ideal-type institutional configuration of the state toward minorities within which I 
aim to explore the policy changes. Thus, bringing the literature of institutional change in, 
I will contribute to the ongoing discussion of minority reforms by the state through 
explaining the necessary and sufficient conditions which would shed light on the issue of 
timing.  
Rooted in the critique against the ‘grand theorizing’ of the behavioralism in the 
1950s and 1960s, the new institutionalists have been concerned with midlevel theories in 
which institutional factors are considered to be shaping the goals of political actors and 
their distribution of power among them .83 As opposed to the rational choice 
institutionalists, historical-interpretive institutionalists analytically emphasize the 
historical context in which institutions, ideas, and interests are shaped from within.  
Among the scholars of historical institutionalism, institutions are seen as the 
legacies of concrete historical processes in which timing and temporality are at the center 
of the analysis.84 What makes historical institutionalism scholarly attractive is that it 
provides the theoretical framework for understanding policy continuities within countries 
                                                 
83 Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, Eds. Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
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and the policy variation across countries. Thus, compared to rational choice and 
sociological institutionalists, macrosociological and power-oriented approaches are more 
likely to be embraced by scholars of historical institutionalism.85 It is assumed that there 
is an uneven distribution of power in which an individual's preferences are not efficiently 
represented at the highest level of political milieu such as in constitutions and state 
apparatus. The reason is that institutions tend to favor various social groups more as 
compared to other social groups. The analysis of such institutional construction entails 
deconstructive historical analysis in which path dependency is one of the central 
conceptual and theoretical approaches to understand the historical evolution of certain 
institutions. According to Kathleen Thelen, path dependency in historical institutionalism 
has two arguments:  
The first involves arguments about crucial founding moments of institutional 
formation that send countries along broadly different developmental paths; the 
second suggests that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing 
environmental conditions and ongoing political maneuvering but in ways that are 
constrained by past trajectories.86  
Thus, path dependency can reflect how certain institutional forms are constructed 
in the first place and how they can evolve over time under different contextual settings. 
The specific institutional form that I am interested in for this research is the interplay 
between the state formation, the nation-building and the conditions for minorities. I argue 
that a state might take the institutional form of pluralism-legal inclusion (hyphenated 
nationhood), pluralism-legal exclusion (hierarchical nationhood), assimilation-legal 
inclusion (asymettrical nationhood), and assimilation-legal exclusion (monolithic 
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nationhood) as far as the state, its imaginary boundaries of the nation and the minorities 
are put forward. In this regard, how such institutional forms took place in the past and 
how they are subject to change under certain conditions are the challenges in this 
research. Yet, if institutionalism is more about endurance or ‘stickiness,’ then how can 
we explain change?  
Ellen Immergut discusses the interpretive notions in historical institutionalism 
that open a space for explaining change in ways that sociological or rational choice 
institutionalism might not be able to do.87 She argues that historical institutionalists never 
see equilibrium between power and institutions in which behavior is not determined by 
institutions per se, but rather institutions provide certain contexts for action. Under such 
conditions, self-reflective actors are able to create their competing definitions of interests 
and identities that might contradict the existing institutional setting. This gap provides 
analytical leeway for explaining institutional change.  
Yet, Mahoney and Thelen argue that historical institutionalism is still more 
concerned with continuity rather than change and they critically approach the 
explanations of institutional change through exogenous shocks.88 They argue that 
endogenous sources of institutional change are under-theorized. Seeing certain 
institutional forms and their rules of compliance as open to interpretation, Mahoney and 
Thelen argue that “institutional change often occurs precisely when problems of rule 
interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in 
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new ways.”89 Thus, both the political context and the characteristics of an institution may 
lead to an institutional change. 
 Peter A. Hall summarizes that “explanations for institutional change must take 
into account the availability and character of the instrumental beliefs pertinent to the 
changes under consideration, as well as a range of conditions that might affect the 
character of those beliefs.”90 As I sketch out my own analytical framework to the 
institutional forms of the state with respect to the relationship between nation-building 
and minorities, my research question in regard to nationhood policy change also refers to 
the degree of institutional change.  
Methodology and Research Design 
In this section, I elaborate more on the cases and lay out the within-case analysis 
(Turkey) and across cases (Turkey and the Ottoman Empire). In order to understand the 
real-world events regarding my research questions, I conduct a comparative historical 
study across and within cases which is theoretically informed by historical 
institutionalism. This study follows a case study approach informed by comparative-
historical research in social sciences. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett define the 
case study approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to 
develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”91 They 
also argue four strengths of case study methods that would be useful for theory 
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development: “their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong 
procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely 
examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; 
their capacity for addressing causal complexity.”92 In light of the case-study approach, 
this research follows a comparative-historical analysis.  
The comparative method is one of the basic scientific methods93 and comparative 
historical analysis is one of the methodological approaches within the comparative 
method. Comparative historical analysis is defined “by a concern with causal analysis, an 
emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized 
comparison.”94 In other words, history matters in order to understand particular cases. In 
contrast, large-N quantitative studies tradeoff between contextual analysis and law-like 
generalizations in order to offer grand scheme theories. Afterwards, the law-like 
propositions, through quantitative-formal model analysis, come up with predictions about 
the future. Yet, comparative historical research puts more emphasis on the contextual 
analysis where ‘thick descriptions’ are more likely.  
In other words, “comparative historical researchers do not typically seek universal 
knowledge about all instances of ahistorically constituted populations of cases.”95 In my 
research, I employ the comparative historical analysis where contextual analysis has more 
priority than law-like generalizations. As Peter Evans argues, “as long as we care about 
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particular cases, we are compelled to do history, to try to understand specific sequences 
of events and to acquire the ideographic knowledge that understanding specific sequences 
of events entails.”96 In conclusion, “every significant phenomenon lives in history, and 
requires historically grounded analysis for its explanation.”97 Bringing these features 
together, my study will be a comparative and historical analysis.  
Although my aim is to explain particular cases, I want to come up with an 
analysis that would speak to other cases as well. Peter Evans indicates that “the general 
ideas I derive from a particular case may or may not fit other cases, but they should at 
least seem worth applying.”98 Following Evans, my goal is to conduct research that 
would resonate with other cases, if not having a potential to explain some other cases as 
well. In Figure 2 and 3, I demonstrate the institutional design of nationhood within the 
cases and their patterns of change. 
There has been an enormous amount of scholarly work on nation-building, 
nationalism, minority rights, and human rights conducted with normative and empirical 
intentions. Yet, research that considers the time and sequence of state policies toward 
nationhood with a robust analytical framework and with an intention of proposing a 
theoretical premise has been relatively weaker.  
This is where I seek to understand the logic of state elites in nationhood change 
and I ask: Under what conditions do states change their policies toward nationhood? I  
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Figure 2. Four Structures of Ottoman and Turkish Nationhoods 
 
Figure 3. Three Cases of Change from the Late Ottoman Empire to Modern Turkey 
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aim to understand and explain my inquiry within the analytical framework that I outlined 
in the introduction. In my typological framework (see Chapter 3), my goal is to explain 
when a state shifts from one type of institutional form into another one. This constitutes 
the institutional analysis of my research that takes endurance and change into 
consideration. Moreover, the question of how these institutional forms were built, with 
what intentions, and whether they evolved over time brings the historical analysis into my 
research. Finally, investigating different cases as the states being the unit of analysis 
makes the comparative dimension of this research. I rely on two different sources: (1) 
primary documents: legal and political documents such as higher court decisions, 
legislative discussions and debates, parliamentary proceedings, speeches given by key 
political actors such as prime ministers and presidents. The Library of Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey, of which most of the sources are available online, is the main site 
for archival research on official documents. (2) secondary sources:  I also extensively 
reviewed the contemporary and historical secondary sources related to my research 
question both in relation to my cases and beyond my cases. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter where the existing theoretical perspectives on policy changes 
toward nationhood are introduced, I see the major limitation in black boxing the state and 
its taken for granted adoption in various studies. Secondly, the state policies toward 
national minorities are rarely studied through the insights of institutional analysis, most 
particularly historical institutionalism. By adopting an institutional analysis, this study 
also seeks to demonstrate the continuity, change, and variation in ethnic policy adoptions 
of the state over time. Since there is a lack of comparative case study across time and 
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across specific state configurations such as imperial and national settings, this study 
would provide more insights on the nature of the state and its policy shifts toward 
minorities beyond a specific historical context. Such a research design would also put the 
state at the center of the analysis. Rather than a sole bottom-up approach on policy 
change through analyzing the nature of social movements, bringing the state to the core 
of the analysis would offer a theoretical comprehension on how states across the cases 
view minorities and when the state sees a policy shift as appropriate. There is already a 
good amount of scholarly analysis on when, how, and what minorities demand from 
states. Yet, there is little research on when and how states change their perceptions 
toward nationhood, especially in relation to minorities and change certain policies. In the 
next chapter, I introduce the four ideal-type institutional settings of nationhood within 





PATTERNS OF LEGAL AND ETHNIC INCLUSION/EXCLUSION: 
 
A TYPOLOGICAL STUDY OF NATIONHOOD 
Introduction 
In the contemporary politics of citizenship, minority issues, and immigration 
questions, there is hardly any nation-state that would keenly claim to be ethnically-biased 
toward its citizens or ethnically-selective towards the citizens-to-be in its legal-
institutional structure, especially in Western Europe and North America.99 Rather, in the 
political discourses of governing elites, there is mostly an attribution to the ‘civic’ nature 
of the nation and the state along with the values of liberal universalism where every 
individual member of the state and the nation are equal before the law. Such attributions 
to ‘civicness’, of course, are articulated on the basis of the nation-state being ethnically-
neutral or ethnically-blind. This ‘race to the civicness,’ in the public and political 
discourses, has been a product of the protracted conventional typology of civic versus 
ethnic in identifying the nation-states. Can a state be ethnically-neutral? If yes, can the 
civic and ethnic dichotomy be analytically sufficient? If a state cannot be ethnically-
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neutral, what would be the use value of the civic-ethnic typology? Would the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy hold its explanatory strength in imperial and transnational forms of 
belonging? By addressing these questions, I seek to achieve two goals in this chapter. The 
first goal is to show the analytical insufficiencies of the civic-ethnic dichotomy along 
with their adjective value in qualifying the concept of nationhood. The second goal is to 
propose a new typology which would go beyond the nation-state paradigm of the civic-
ethnic dichotomy.  
Despite criticisms, the civic and ethnic dichotomy in identifying the structures of 
citizenship and nationalism regimes of nation-states remains the most conventional 
typology in the studies of immigration,100 citizenship and nation-building101 and 
nationalism.102 Although this dichotomy is widely accepted as ‘ideal-types’ and thus less 
likely to be mutually exclusive in the legal-institutional practices of the nation-state, 
analytical and conceptual progress which would dissect this dichotomous typology into a 
more sophisticated classification has been steady. Moreover, while the conceptual focus 
has been on the adjectives such as ethnic and civic that complete the concepts such as the 
state, citizenship, nationhood, and nationalism, the problematization of these nouns has 
been understudied. For instance, despite the fact that they refer to analytically two 
different categories, citizenship and nationhood are widely used interchangeably in many 
contexts.103 Finally, the civic-ethnic dichotomy is built upon and adopted within the 
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nation-state paradigm which completely neglects the practices of citizenship and state 
policies toward nationhood in the transnational and imperial context.104 In light of these 
issues, this chapter first articulates the analytical and conceptual issues between 
citizenship and nationhood and demonstrates how nationhood is a more overarching 
concept than citizenship along with overlapping areas. Secondly, by demonstrating the 
conceptual insufficiencies of the civic-ethnic dichotomy, I propose a new typology of 
nationhood that incorporates both the nation-state and imperial contexts. Based on the 
axes of legal and cultural boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, I develop four ideal-type 
nationhood structures: 1) hierarchical, 2) asymmetric, 3) monolithic, and 4) hyphenated.  
In the first section of this chapter, I briefly discuss the civic-ethnic dichotomy in 
the studies of nationalism and argue why this typology is both analytically and 
conceptually insufficient. In the second section, I discuss the problematic synonym 
approach to citizenship and nationhood and demonstrate how they are analytically 
different concepts. In the final part, I introduce a new typology of nationhood structures 
on the basis of the weaknesses in the ethnic-civic dichotomy.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Town (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).  
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The Civic-Ethnic Debate: An Insufficient Conceptual 
Dichotomy  
Although the idea of forming and becoming a nation across space and time has 
gradually become the undisputed political paradigm of the twentieth century, there has 
been a great variation in the form and content of nations, which all, one way or another, 
seek unity and homogeneity. Hans Kohn, in his seminal study, the Idea of Nationalism, 
was the premier work that showed the variation in the formation of nations.105 For Kohn, 
Western nations such as England and France came into being with the pre-existing state 
structures that equated national membership with equal political status (i.e., citizenship). 
Thus, common heritage was not the primary engine behind nation-building but rather the 
will to become a part of the nation based on citizenship was the main boundary of the 
insiders and outsiders. However, in the experiences of Eastern nation formation, nations 
preceded the state formation and thus state-seeking nationalism was mostly based on 
common heritage such as blood, culture, and language such as in the cases of state-
seeking nationalist mobilizations in the contexts of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
empires.106 Overall, Hans Kohn’s seminal analysis well established the variation among 
nations: political nations on the one hand and cultural nations on the other.  
This framework of categorization has become conventional among scholars of 
nationalism with slight modifications. The main dichotomous typology that scholars 
often embrace and refer to is ‘civic’ or ‘political’ that constitutes the Western nationalism 
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and ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ that form the Eastern nationalism.107 While the civic ideal type 
of nationhood is mostly regarded with characteristics such as territorial, political, liberal, 
individualistic, universalistic, voluntarist, and constitutional, the ethnic ideal type is 
considered to be illiberal, collectivist, particularistic, organic, exclusionary, and such.108 
Rogers Brubaker has shown these two categories on the cases of France and Germany in 
his comparative-historical study.109 While the French nationhood is based on territory, 
universality, and assimilation, the German case is mostly bounded on the particularistic 
traits of German blood, thus being ‘differentialist’ or ‘segregationist’.  
Under this assumption, civic nationhood is often assumed to be nonethnic but 
various scholars such as Sener Akturk argue that the civic and ethnic dichotomy is 
insufficient because they are not mutually exclusive. Akturk states that “civic is a vague, 
empty category; moreover ethnic and civic are derived from different roots.”110  Even 
Rogers Brubaker later preferred to use state-framed nationhood versus counter-state 
nationhood because he finds the ethnic-civic dichotomy ambiguous and analytically 
insufficient.111 He states that: 
In the former, ‘nation’ is conceived as congruent with the state, and as 
institutionally and territorially framed by it. In the latter, ‘nation’ is imagined as 
distinct from, and often in opposition to, the territorial and institutional frame of 
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an existing state or states.112  
Moreover, Christian Joppke, in his analysis of shifting immigration policies in liberal 
states such as the United States and Germany, adopts the civic-ethnic dichotomy as ideal-
types but he cautions the reader that all nations one way or another have a composition of 
both.113 Then, the civic-ethnic typology fails to become black/white categories but rather 
inevitably falls into the area of the gray zone. Let me articulate this further through the 
debates on whether a state can be ethnically neutral—that is the underlying principle of 
‘civicness.’ 
Ethnically-Neutral State and Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy 
The implicit assumption in civic nationhood is that the state is a neutral institution 
which is impartial to any ethnic identification which is often called an ethnically-blind 
state or ‘the benign neglect’. The French case is often shown as an example of this 
category. Yet, this begs the question of whether a state can be agnostic in terms of 
ethnicity. For Will Kymlicka, it is not likely: 
It is possible for a state not to have an established church. But the state cannot 
help but give at least partial establishment to a culture when it decides which 
language is to be used in government; what language and history children must 
learn in school; what language and history immigrants must learn to become 
citizens; whether sub-unit will be drawn to create districts controlled by national 
minorities, and so on…so the idea that ‘civic nations’ are neutral between 
ethnocultural identities is mythical.114  
Amy Gutmann also raises the question of neutrality in the modern democratic 
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states that claim to have principles of civic equality, liberty, and opportunity. Her 
approach is also critical of the belief that states can be culturally-neutral: 
The democratic state protects the dominant culture, whether intentionally or not, 
through the language it uses, the education it accredits, the history it honors, and 
the holidays and other customs it keeps. The state and the dominant public culture 
it supports, both indirectly and directly, cannot be culturally neutral in this 
sense.115 
This is why Kymlicka argues that the myth of civic nation does not prevent the 
political aspirations of minority groups:  
The myth that the state can simply be based on democratic principles, without 
supporting a particular national identity or culture, has made it impossible to see 
why national minorities are so keen on forming or maintaining political units in 
which they are a majority.116  
Well, Kmylicka’s claim of ‘the neutrality myth’ has not been uncontested. For 
instance, Clare Chambers' challenge to Kmylicka’s idea is that the official language in 
any state would violate the principle of cultural neutrality: 
Any state that promotes an ofﬁcial language (whether de jure or de facto) violates 
liberal neutrality only if that decision is based on the view that ways of life 
conducted in other languages, or the languages themselves, are inferior to the 
ofﬁcial language and/or its attendant culture…From a normative point of view, 
therefore, there is no reason to think that liberal neutrality is rendered mythical by 
the promotion of an ofﬁcial language.117 
Yet, for Elke Winter, “bureaucratic structures and rules can never be entirely neutral; 
otherwise they would not provide citizens with a sense of loyalty and cohesion.”118 As 
this debate goes on, what is crucial here for the sake of this paper is that the idea that 
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neutrality is an ideal or an expected phenomenon rather than being a strict reality as many 
practices of the states demonstrate a combination of civic and ethnic characteristics. In 
other words, states being ethnically neutral might not necessarily be a myth as Kmylicka 
argues, but it is definitely not an absolute reality. This is why the category of ‘civic’ with 
claims of neutrality is not necessarily mutually exclusive from its ethnic counterpart. 
Alternative Typology? 
Sener Akturk also develops a competing ideal-type structure that is more 
sophisticated and insightful than the civic-ethnic dichotomy. Akturk proposes three ideal-
type states which he calls ‘ethnic regimes’: (1) antiethnic (e.g., Turkey before 2004, 
France), (2) monoethnic (e.g., Germany before 2000, Japan), and (3) multiethnic (e.g., 
the United States after the 1960s).119 His categorization is based on membership to the 
state (citizenship) and the expression of ethnic identities within the state: 
(1) If a state seeks to restrict membership in the nation to one ethnic category 
through discriminatory immigration and naturalization policies, then it has a 
monoethnic regime, and the expression dimension becomes irrelevant because 
ethnic diversity is minimized through the construction of a monoethnic 
citizenry.120   
(2) If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as citizens 
(membership), but discourages or even prohibits the legal, institutional, and 
public expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has an antiethnic 
regime.121 
(3) If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as its citizens 
(membership), and allows, encourages, or even participates in the legal and 
institutional expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has a multiethnic 
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Although I consider Akturk’s tripartite ideal types superior to the ethnic-civic 
dichotomy, the main shortcoming is the slippery slope between antiethnic and 
monoethnic regimes. The antiethnic regime, as he frames the French case, is based on the 
implicit assumption that the state can be neutral or ethnically blind. As I discussed 
previously, the idea of the state being ethnically blind or ethnically neutral neglects the 
fact that such states can and do embrace, either intentionally or not, certain ethnic 
characteristics such as prioritizing the majority language over others. Although Akturk 
thinks that the civic-ethnic dichotomy is not and cannot be mutually exclusive, he 
assumes that the antiethnic regime can be mutually exclusive with the monoethnic regime 
in the sense that the antiethnic regime is not built on ethnic traits such as any selected 
language, memory, or a teaching of history. Thus, he assumes that the antiethnic regime 
is independent of any ethnic traits. However, Anthony D. Smith has shown how modern 
nations are not detached from any ethnic origins.123 Smith’s ethnosymbolic analysis 
demonstrates how modern nations are not a creation ex nihilo. Rather, modern nations are 
constructed upon pre-existing myths, memories, and symbols that Smith calls ‘ethnies’. 
Yet, Akturk’s antiethnic regime assumes that states can create nations ex nihilo within 
which the state is impartial or neutral to any ethnic identities. This is a false assumption 
and again does not incorporate the possibility of antiethnic and monoethnic regimes as 
mutually constitutive rather than mutually exclusive.  
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Further Shortcomings in Existing Typologies 
The incapacity of being mutually exclusive in the civic-ethnic typology is not a 
new idea, so the conceptual insufficiency in this dichotomous typology needs further 
analysis. Thus, I want to highlight three additional shortcomings in this typology. First 
and perhaps the most significant one is that the civic-ethnic dichotomy is developed, 
adopted, and practiced in the nation-state paradigm. However, the idea of nationhood 
precedes the formation of nation-states. Ethnically diverse imperial states also encounter 
the question of inclusion/exclusion in the aim of forming an imperial nationhood. The 
civic-ethnic dichotomy does not capture the complexities of imperial systems of 
nationhood and belonging to the state. It is often neglected that empires, especially after 
the French Revolution of 1789, pursued and established various structures of belonging 
by defining the boundaries of nationhood and setting the criteria for citizenship.124 
Moreover, immigration was also an important phenomenon in the age of modern empires 
as well such as the forced migration of Crimean Tatars in the Russian Empire to the 
Ottoman Empire or the Muslim immigration from the Balkans to the Ottoman Analia 
during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.125 What would these examples tell us about the 
imperial nationhood structures in the Ottoman and Russian empires? Would the civic-
ethnic dichotomy be sufficient to explain these examples? Since I argue that the civic-
ethnic dichotomy is a product of the nation-state paradigm, this dual typology is less 
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likely to explain the different trends of belonging in empires. 
Moreover, there is a growing literature on transnational and postnational forms of 
memberships beyond the sovereignty of nation-states. Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, 
and Gokce Yurdakul highlight the significance of this trend: 
Although states matter, they are increasingly constrained by international law and 
human rights, making a narrow; state-deﬁned citizenship increasingly 
illegitimate…The European Union is one site in which a certain postnational 
citizenship might be coming to fruition.126 
If the supranational institutions such as the EU are likely to alter the forms of 
membership and belonging to nation-states, would the civic-ethnic dichotomy preserve 
its explanatory value? I argue that since this dichotomy is a product of the nation-state 
paradigm, it is less likely to be explanatory in the nonnation-state paradigms such as in 
empires and postnational political organizations. For instance, as Karen Barkey states, 
imperial systems “are complex political formations that do not form one ‘national’ 
community, but rather multiple networks of interaction, different communities with 
varying institutions and state-domain compacts.”127 Overall, due to the reductionism of 
the civic-ethnic dichotomy into the nation-state paradigm, categorization of different 
membership and belonging structures beyond the nation-state is necessary for 
comparative understandings. As I will propose my four quadrant typology in the final 
section of this chapter, I aim to show that new categories of nationhood structures can 
provide deeper analytical tools which can go beyond the nation-state paradigm.   
The second shortcoming in the civic-ethnic dichotomy is that it does not capture 
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the dimension of ethnic pluralism as a state policy. This is especially the weakness of the 
‘civic’ category which implies ethnic neutrality through assimilation as a state policy. 
However, not all states pursue a strict assimilation model such as the French case. Rather, 
“since the 1970s, a number of liberal democracies have recognized their multi-ethnic 
populations as political categories in the assumption that public policies based upon 
ethnicity are the effective way to address social disadvantage and to achieve fairer wealth 
distribution goals.”128 For instance, if a state creates ethnic categories in its census 
system, it means that that state leans toward pluralism rather than assimilation.129 This is 
why counting ethnic groups is against the French republican tradition in the sense that 
“any official categorization is discriminatory and runs the risk of politicizing identities 
and weakening the cohesion of the French political nation.”130 This was the case for 
Canada as well before official multiculturalism took effect with the idea that “any 
allegiance to a particularistic, collective status founded on historical, cultural, and 
territorial legitimacy was rejected.”131  
Then, if the French case is a civic case—thus assimilationist—as the state is 
considered to be neutral, what can we say about the official multiculturalism in Canada? 
The state is not neutral but recognizes and provides legal-institutional spaces for the 
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protection and advancement of different ethnic identities, particularly with the autonomy 
of Quebec. The Canadian case can be categorized as civic but it is insufficient to 
incorporate the state policies of ethnic pluralism. Sener Akturk rightly categorizes such 
states as ‘multiethnic’ rejecting the category of civicness,132 but his typology fails in 
‘antiethnic’ versus ‘monoethnic’ differentiation as I discussed previously. Besides, there 
is significant uncertainty on what is referred to with these typologies. Is it the state, 
nation, or citizenship? What is civic or ethnic or multiethnic? While scholars have 
focused on the feasibility (or lack thereof) of these adjectives, the problems of 
interchangeable use among the nouns of state, citizenship, or nationhood are not 
addressed to a large extent. Do we talk about the same categories when we say civic state, 
civic nationhood, or civic citizenship? Are citizenship and nationhood synonyms? I 
address these issues in the next section which comes to my third critique. 
Adjectives without Nouns: Civic and Ethnic What? 
The interchangeable use of citizenship and nationhood (or nationality) is 
particularly relevant here for the sake of clarifying the analytical categories that I try to 
build my typology on. As I approach the interchangeable use of nationhood and 
citizenship as a false synonym, Rogers Brubaker and his colleagues also emphasize this 
problematic practice of interchangeable understanding between citizenship and 
nationhood. They state that “Nationhood and nationality are not, however, necessarily 
understood as congruent with state and citizenship” and “this point needs to be 
underscored, since ‘nation’ and ‘state’, ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are often used 
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interchangeably in the United States and some Western European contexts.”133 This is 
why I underline that civic/ethnic adjectives are loosely used on vague nouns such as state, 
citizenship, and nationhood. If we cannot clearly draw the conceptual boundaries among 
analytically distinct nouns/conceptions, then we are less likely to build explanatory 
adjective typologies. When civic or ethnic adjectives are used loosely and vaguely on the 
concepts of citizenship and nationhood, first they lose their explanatory strength and 
second they blur the categories of analysis. This is the reason why the concepts of 
citizenship and nationhood should be analytically distinguished from each other.  
Citizenship “is usually defined as a form of membership in a political and 
geographic community” and it has dimensions of legal status and rights.134 Citizenship 
gives individuals “the right to vote, to run for office, and to participate in public 
activities, while also requiring the obligation of paying taxes and possibly serving in the 
military.”135 In a way, citizenship refers to a legal status which demonstrates membership 
to the state. Yet, as Peter J. Spiro argues, “membership in the state is no longer the only 
game in town.”136 For instance, despite holding citizenship, “people grant American 
identity to Whites more easily than to Blacks, Asians, and Latinos even if they were born 
and raised in the United States.”137 Thus, ethnically driven understandings of who counts 
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as a member of the nation might differ among the citizens of the same nation state.138 To 
rephrase George Orwell’s allegorical statement, all French, American, or British citizens 
are equal, but some are more French, American, or British than others.139 Overall, what I 
try to emphasize here is that understanding citizenship and nationhood as synonymous 
concepts is likely to lead scholars to false categorizations and misleading explanatory 
typologies. I consider nationhood as a more overarching concept than citizenship and 
seek to build my typology on nationhood.   
As I discussed the conceptual insufficiencies of the civic-ethnic dichotomy 
previously, I build my typologies as adjectives completing the concept of nationhood 
which I see as a more overarching category than citizenship. An individual may be a 
citizen of a state, but may still lack a membership in the imagined nationhood. For 
instance, the Kurds have been citizens of Turkey but their inclusion under the nationhood 
category of Turkishness has always been problematic.140 Nationhood and citizenship are 
not mutually exclusive but they are two different categories with overlapping areas. The 
minority Russian population in Estonia can be imagined as part of the Russian nation but 
they do not have to be citizens of Russia. On the other hand, the Estonian citizenship of 
the Russian minority in Estonia does not necessarily make them Estonian. Moreover, the 
Turkish minority in Greece and Bulgaria who do not hold Turkish citizenship are more 
likely to be considered as part of the Turkish nationhood than the Kurdish minority in 
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Turkey who hold Turkish citizenship. For instance, Turkishness in Azerbaijan and 
Turkey are depicted as ‘one nation, two states.’141 Then, in a way, citizenship is legally 
binding to the identity of the state but not necessarily to the nation. Nationhood, on the 
other hand, is a more overarching concept than citizenship.  
I take the notion of nationhood as a combination of legal and cultural practices 
that forms an institutional structure within states. Legal membership per se does not make 
one a part of nationhood. For instance, would the notion of Muslim American citizens be 
an oxymoron for the United States as the historical foundation of American nationhood is 
based on an Anglo-Christian framework? If Benedict Anderson’s notion of nationhood as 
imagined community is right,142 Elizabeth Theiss-Morse states, “we might agree that 
everyone with U.S. citizenship is American, but some U.S. citizens might not be 
imagined in the national group.”143 Or since the French government bans headscarves in 
public schools, a category of Muslim French citizens would not be acceptable for the 
state as it promotes secular and unitarist Frenchness. These nationhood structures are, of 
course, the results of state policies that over time define the insiders and outsiders who 
are not solely based on citizenship. When the Turkish state followed the French model of 
the assimilationist and unitarist notion of nationhood after the 1920s, the Kurds as 
‘Kurds’ became the outsiders of Turkish nationhood despite their citizenship. As 
Brubaker states, outsiders “are excluded not because of what they are but because what 
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they are not—because they are not recognized and acknowledged as insiders.”144 This is 
why I approach nationhood as analytically a different category from citizenship since the 
state not just legally but also culturally constructs social closures by adopting certain 
policies. If the state does not legally and institutionally recognize, acknowledge, or even 
promote different ethnic categories, the nationhood structure will be different from the 
one in which the state consciously acknowledges ethnic pluralism. Thus, ethnicity and 
nationhood should not be understood as independent from each other.  
Following the Weberian tradition of ethnicity which Max Weber defines as a 
“subjective belief in common descent,”145 Andreas Wimmer defines ethnicity as “a 
subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common 
ancestry” and “this belief refers to cultural practices perceived as ‘typical’ for the 
community, to myths of a common historical origin, or to phenotypical similarities.”146 
This approach sees various cultural markers such as religion, race, language, and even 
nationhood as a subtype of ethnicity. I do not necessarily disagree with this approach and 
see ethnicity as an overarching concept that is inclusive of other categories. But the 
relationship between ethnicity and nationhood entails an understanding of political 
project that states tend to adopt and construct identification. Seeing nationhood and 
ethnicity as constructed in a common place, Brubaker and his colleagues argue: 
Ethnicity is not a thing, an attribute, or a distinct sphere of life; it is a way of 
understanding and interpreting experience, a way of talking and acting, a way of 
formulating interests and identities. Nationhood, similarly, is not an ethnocultural 
fact; it is a frame of vision, a cultural idiom, and a political claim. Understood in 
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this, ethnicity and nationhood exist in a wide range of forms.147 
The way I encounter the dynamic relationship between ethnicity and nationhood includes 
the concept of citizenship as I demonstrate in the legal dimension of exclusion and 
inclusion in my typology below. Since both immigrant and autochthonic minorities might 
affect the relationship between ethnicity and nationhood, the state policies in determining 
the legal and cultural structure of nationhood can be altered by either. Overall, I believe a 
more sophisticated and explanatory typology of nationhood is necessary to incorporate 
both the legal and cultural axes of inclusion and exclusion. By doing this, such typology 
would not suffer from the nation-state paradigm that the civic-ethnic dichotomy is 
embedded in but instead would be able to apply to nonnation-state contexts such as the 
imperial and postnational forms of belonging. In the next section, I introduce my 
proposition of a typology of nationhood. 
Beyond the Nation-State Paradigm: Four Ideal-Type 
Nationhood Typologies 
As I laid out the analytical distinctions between the concept of citizenship and 
nationhood previously and discussed the weaknesses of the ethnic-civic dichotomy, in 
this section I propose and discuss four ideal-type nationhood structures. I demonstrate 
four ideal–type institutional structures of nationhood: (1) pluralism–legal exclusion 
(hierarchical nationhood), (2) assimilation–legal exclusion (asymmetric nationhood), (3) 
pluralism–legal inclusion (hyphenated nationhood), and (4) assimilation–legal inclusion 
(monolithic nationhood) (See Figure 1).  
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In the vertical axis between pluralism and assimilation, the question of cultural 
recognition is crucial. This axis speaks to the cultural dimension of identifying the 
nationhood structure in the sense of whether state-defined nationhood is singular 
(assimilation) or plural which is likely to promote diversity and cultural pluralism. In 
other words, by pluralism, I mean “an approach that encourages the recognition of ethnic 
diversity and its expression within the public space.”148 Under pluralism, the state pursues 
official policies such as bilingual education, ethnic questions in the census, affirmative 
action, constitutional recognition of ethnic pluralism, and in some cases even the state 
promotes ethnic pluralism. In other words, a pluralist state does not insist on a monolithic 
nationhood where all members are deemed to belong to a specific ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious group. On the other hand, I use assimilation as the opposite of pluralism. By 
assimilation, I mean the state policies and programs that seek to make its population 
similar against their will.149 This refers to state policies where a singular culture and 
language are promoted as the core of nationhood in which other groups that do not share 
the state-imposed identity are subject to assimilation into the dominant culture. 
Assimilation and homogenization policies represent the backbone of many nation- and 
state-building projects of the twentieth century. 
The horizontal axis relates to the question of legal recognition of minority groups 
(either immigrants or national minorities) by the state. Legal exclusion does not 
necessarily mean an exclusion from citizenship. A citizen of a state might be legally 
excluded from using a nondominant language and culture or a person might be a citizen, 
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but may not have a right to vote. Thus, legal exclusion refers to the condition where 
citizen or noncitizen minority groups are subject to legal restrictions in the public space 
while state-favored majorities are not. On the other hand, legal inclusion points to the fact 
that the public space is legally open to diverse cultures, languages, and religions and are 
not subject to any judicial penalty. In other words, the scale of legal inclusion and 
exclusion might range from exclusion from full or no citizenship at all to a restricted 
citizenship based on discriminatory judicial penalties. Overall, according to these 
dimensions of cultural and legal recognition, I build four ideal-type nationhood structures 
that states can adopt.  
Hierarchical nationhood is under the quadrant of pluralism–legal exclusion. In 
hierarchical nationhood, the state is not ethnically blind and the state does not see its 
every citizen as constituting ‘a horizontal comradeship’ as Benedict Anderson referred to 
for nations.150 Rather, the state pursues legal-institutional policies to favor one ethnic 
identity over another such as through segregation or official discrimination. For instance, 
in the Ottoman millet system, the ruling Muslim community was at the top of the social 
strata within which other communities such as the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were 
considered not members of the ‘horizontal comradeship’ but as the subjects of ‘vertical 
partnership.’151 In my typology, the hierarchical and asymmetric nationhood structures 
can be illuminating in understanding many imperial systems of belonging since many 
empires ruled over the diverse ethnic and religious demography with different systems of 
governing. The Ottoman millet system, for instance, has been acknowledged as anti-
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assimilationist and respectful to religious diversity.152 However, as I stated previously, 
this does not mean that the Ottoman case can be categorized as civic due to the 
complicated structure of belonging to the state and the nation. Rather, I identify it as a 
system of hierarchical nationhood based on my four ideal-type typology since recognition 
of religious diversity and autonomy did not mean that the non-Muslim communities were 
given equal status of representation and participation to the ruling Muslim elites. In fact, 
non-Muslim communities were subject to a different legal structure than the Muslim 
communities. This is why civic-ness or ethnic-ness loses its explanatory power in 
imperial systems of belonging which show a greater variation than the nation-state 
systems.  In hierarchical nationhood, the state does not discourage or prohibit the 
expression of ethnic diversity, but it hierarchically categorizes different ethnic 
communities in the sense of ‘the ruling ethnic group’ versus ‘the ruled ethnic groups’. 
The Apartheid regime in South Africa is also an example of a hierarchical nationhood in 
which the white minority ruled over the black majority.  
Asymmetric nationhood is under the legal exclusion-assimilation axis. 
Asymmetric nationhood is different from hierarchical nationhood because the state 
claims to be ethnically blind and pursues assimilation. Under asymmetric nationhood, the 
state does not necessarily pursue an official policy of segregation or discrimination, but 
seeks to integrate certain ethnic communities that are considered anomalies to the state-
framed nationhood without granting them full citizenship rights. Thus, the state deprives 
certain rights from minority groups that they would enjoy with full citizenship such as 
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through restrictions on voting rights and political representation. Yet, the state also 
attempts either directly or indirectly to assimilate them into the public schools of the 
state-framed nationhood. For instance, Native Americans in the United States can be 
considered as being under asymmetric nationhood. The Federal Indian policy aimed to 
assimilate native Indians into the mainstream American culture. According to Joanne 
Nagel, “beginning in the nineteenth century, federal Indian policy was designed to 
assimilate American Indians into the Euro-American cultural mainstream (e.g., through 
forced English language acquisition, Anglo-centric education in Indian boarding and day 
schools, and reservation land reduction programs).”153 Yet, Native Americans were not 
granted citizenship until 1924 and could not enjoy civil rights until the 1960s. Another 
example of asymmetric nationhood is the new immigrants in Europe who are not citizens 
of the state but still are incorporated into the various aspects of the social and political 
system of the host states. These groups, Yasemin Soysal argues, “participate in the 
educational system, welfare schemes, and labor markets” and “they join trade unions, 
take part in politics through collective bargaining and associational activity, and 
sometimes vote in local elections.”154 Seeing this as a form of postnational citizenship, 
these groups are “empirical anomalies with regard to predominant narratives of 
citizenship.”155 Accordingly, the state legally excludes but at the same time directly or 
indirectly imposes the assimilation process since these noncitizen groups get involved in 
every aspect of social and political life in these states despite their noncitizen status. I 
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believe this is also an example of asymmetric nationhood since legal exclusion prevents 
the establishment of ‘horizontal comradeship’. Turks in Germany before the 1999 law 
that began to grant them citizenship would be under this category.156 Although they were 
not granted citizenship, second-generation Turkish immigrants have been subject to full 
assimilation as if they are Germans.   
Monolithic nationhood is the ideal-type for legal inclusion-assimilation. This 
nationhood structure would be the one within which the state offers universal citizenship 
regardless of ethnicity or religion. Yet, at the same time, particular group rights are seen 
as detrimental to the national unity. The state strictly holds on to the monolithic but 
inclusive nationhood. The French model would be under this axis. The idea of ethnic 
pluralism is strictly rejected by the state which is seen as divisive for the sake of ‘the one 
and indivisible French nation’. The immigrant-citizens from the Maghrep would be 
considered French by the state but without any recognition of group rights. Turkey has 
been an important example of monolithic nationhood as well. The state still identifies 
every citizen of Turkey as Turks, which includes minority groups such as the Kurds and 
the Arabs. Thus, Turkishness is inclusive but singular. In other words, it welcomes non-
Turks to become Turks but without any recognition of group differences. Perhaps this has 
been the case in Turkey until the state promotion of minority languages, most particularly 
Kurdish, after 2003.157 Despite legal recognition of every citizen as a Turk, the cultural 
recognition of pluralism may be shifting Turkey toward hyphenated nationhood.  
Hyphenated nationhood refers to the pluralism-legal inclusion dimension in which 
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the state recognizes ethnic diversity of the nation where minority groups can be subject to 
special protective rights such as affirmative action. This creates a structure where people 
can identify themselves with dual belonging such as in the United States after the 1960s. 
Policies such as ethnic questions in the census and affirmative action create the 
possibilities of being African-American, Mexican-American, or Indian-American. Thus, 
American belonging does not contradict African descent. Or being Mexican is not 
mutually exclusive with being American. Two types of belonging in hyphenated 
nationhood become mutually constitutive rather than exclusive. In hyphenated 
nationhood, the state does not impose a monolithic belonging to its citizens but creates 
the legal-institutional structure where dual belonging becomes possible. Hyphenated 
nationhood then disintegrates the organic nature of the nation-state and can differentiate 
belonging to the nation on the one hand and the state on the other. A citizen of the United 
States is attached to the state through being American, and attached to an ethnicity such 
as by being an Indian, Mexican, Japanese, African, etc. Jeffrey Lesser argues that the 
immigrants of Brazil have also led to the rise of “hyphenated Brazilians” who 
“incorporated many elements of majority culture even as they endured as distinct.”158 The 
case of the European Union and an overarching European identity as a context of the 
postnation-state paradigm can be under the category of hyphenated nationhood as well. If 
the EU is likely to head towards being the United States of Europe, dual belongings such 
as German-European, French-European, and Austrian-European would be possible forms 
of belonging. Hyphenated nationhood has the voluntary dimension that is free of the 
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state's imposition on choosing the individual’s belonging category. For instance, in the 
United States, an individual can either say he/she is Mexican-American or just American.  
Conclusion 
The civic-ethnic dichotomy in identifying nations, nationalisms, citizenship 
regimes, and nation-states remains a strong conventional typology that many scholars 
tend to adopt as ideal-types despite the recognition that they are less likely to be mutually 
exclusive. In other words, it is acknowledged that one way or another, many cases that 
we study have ethnic and civic characteristics at the same time. However, the 
parsimonious nature of this dichotomy continues to appeal to many scholars in the fields 
of immigration, nationalism, and citizenship. As I previously acknowledged the problem 
of this dichotomous typology not being mutually exclusive, my underlying initiation to 
develop and propose a more comprehensive typology specifically for nationhood 
structures that stem from the neglect of imperial systems of belonging on the one hand 
and the postnational structures of belonging on the other in the civic-ethnic dichotomy 
which is mostly built within the nation-state paradigm.  
Moreover, the civic-ethnic debate has a paradoxical nature in the sense that the 
state elites’ theoretical construction of nationhood and the way it is perceived by the 
different communities within that state would likely show variations and inconsistencies. 
This is why we even witness minority questions and ethnic problems in a state that 
structures its nationhood on the claims of civic-ness. For instance, American nationhood, 
despite being one of the most inclusive nationhood structures, at least in terms of its 
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capacity,159 does not prevent certain communities from monopolizing Americanness 
within the boundaries of specific cultural criteria such as speaking the English language 
and having Protestant values.160 This is why new immigrants who do not fit into such 
cultural criteria of becoming American are seen as a threat to the American 
nationhood.161 Another example would be the debates over Turkish nationhood within the 
framework of the civic-ethnic typology. While many Kurdish citizens of Turkey tend to 
perceive Turkishness as an ethnic identity, thus excluding the Kurds, the state elites have 
historically claimed that Turkishness has been inclusive due to the ‘civic’ definitions of 
Turkishness in the constitution.162 In other words, the civic-ethnic classification of 
nationhood structures are inconclusive and unproductive due to the variation and 
inconsistencies of how the state structures it and how it is perceived by the inhabitants of 
that state. However, on the other hand, my four ideal-type approach to nationhood is 
more likely to grasp the complicated dimensions of legal and cultural memberships to the 
nations. While it grasps how nationhood can be structured as hierarchical or asymmetric 
rather than simply ‘horizontal comradeship’, it also pays attention to the 
singularity/plurality dimension of forming nationhood within the categories of the 
monolithic and hyphenated nationhoods.  
In conclusion, my proposition of nationhood typology provides a more 
sophisticated framework than the civic-ethnic dichotomy and I believe it has greater 
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explanatory power in identifying the different nationhood structures which go beyond the 
nation-state context. In the upcoming chapters, I will discuss the patterns of identity 
change within the late Ottoman and modern Turkish contexts within the nationhood 
typology that I discussed in this chapter. The next chapter will discuss the brief historical 





IMPERIAL OTTOMAN INTO A REPUBLICAN TURK: 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSITION 
“I want to distinguish the religious differences of my subjects only when 
they enter their mosques, synagogues and churches” 
Sultan Mahmud II (1789-1839)
163 
Introduction 
Imperial and national states are analytically distinct categories in terms of ruling 
over their territories and governing the masses. “Empires are large political units, 
expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain 
distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people.”164 Nation-states, on the other 
hand, seek congruence between a particular national culture and a political unit.165 
Nation-states are more centralized than empires; Michael Hechter frames this distinction 
as a matter of direct rule versus indirect rule.166 In this transition from indirect to direct 
rule, argues Hechter, the idea of nationalism and nation-state came into being. The 
monopoly of violence and power is more territorially concentrated in nation-state 
governance within which the state seeks regulating all aspects of daily life in order to 
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make societies “legible.”167 Yet, Karen Barkey states that:  
The imperial state does not have complete monopoly of power in the territory 
under control. It shares control with a variety of intermediate organizations and 
with local elites, religious and local governing bodies, and numerous other 
privileged institutions. To rule over vast expanses of territory, as well as to ensure 
military and administrative cooperation, imperial states negotiate and willingly 
relinquish some degree of autonomy.168 
As the empires stayed away from top-down social engineering projects of forming 
one national community and uniformity of rule, the possibility of managing diverse 
populations through conquest and expansion became the engine of imperial survival for 
centuries until the idea of nationalism and popular sovereignty was born on the European 
continent. Overall:  
Unlike nation-states, empires were or learned to be less committed to constructing 
an encompassing collective or to making political relations uniform. Moreover, 
empires did not have constitutions to regularize rights until they moved into a 
mixed political mode between empire and nation-state. It was the diversity of 
peoples, communities, and territories, as well as the diversity of rule, that made 
empires.169  
Accordingly, the story of the Ottoman imperial system was not unique despite its 
distinct socio-cultural and religious amalgamation that formed the Ottoman way of ruling 
over and managing diversity. In this chapter, I first introduce a general depiction of the 
political and socio-cultural foundations of the Ottoman imperial system. Then, I explain 
the historical context of the state of the late Ottoman imperial structure that was subject 
to a comprehensive reform project in the nineteenth century. Finally, I briefly narrate the 
domestic and international processes within which the transition to the foundation of the 
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Turkish Republic took place in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The goal of this 
chapter is to briefly present the historical context of the broader political and socio-
cultural trends within which the cases under study were incarnated. By doing this, the 
study of specific cases in the further chapters can be historically situated in the broader 
sense.  
The Philosophical Foundation of the Ottoman Empire 
Founded in 1299 near western Anatolia by a tribal family under the leadership of 
Osman Bey,170 the House of Osman as the Ottoman state managed to survive, expand, 
and rule over transcontinental regions of the Balkans, Middle East, and North Africa for 
more than six centuries until its demise in 1923.  The empire functioned as the vanguard 
of Islam that “the political legitimacy of the Ottoman state was based on its ability to 
defend the ummah and maintain its welfare within the Abode of Islam.”171 The concept of 
justice was at the center of the imperial foundation of the Ottoman state that emphasized 
law and order rather than equality. Status quo—in which each community was expected 
to remain in their own borders and not trespass on the rights of others—“entailed a 
basically conservative political outlook, in which any change in the social order had 
negative connotations.”172 The leading Ottoman historian, Halil Inalcik, puts the idea 
behind the Ottoman philosophy of justice well: 
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The values of social order and justice constituted the basic political philosophy of 
the Ottoman Empire summarized in the formula of the ‘Circle of Equity’: ‘a ruler 
can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money 
without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without 
justice.’173 
The Ottoman state under this philosophy of justice was based on three sources of 
legal authority: the Sultan and his power to issue laws and decrees, the Islamic law, and 
customs.174  As the empire expanded its territories through successful conquests of the 
‘infidel’, the management of diversity as understood within the confessional paradigm 
became central in the Ottoman system. The Ottoman state was successful in establishing 
loyalty structures that the non-Muslim communities—who were hierarchically in the 
lower strata of the Ottoman society—would adhere to. Kemal Karpat  argues that four 
institutional practices survived the system of allegiance in the empire: (1) the 
amendments in the Qur’an that reject assimilation and language imposition, (2) the 
Islamic protection of the People of the Book (dhimmis) for free practice of faith in 
exchange for a special tax (cizya), (3) the millet system that institutionalized the 
confessional-based autonomy for the non-Muslim communities, and (4) local 
governments preserving local languages and ethnic attachments.175 However, the millet 
system was the backbone of the Sultan’s ability to legitimately rule over diverse 
communities from which even contemporary political theorists of multiculturalism seek 
to gain insights.176 
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The Millet System: The Ottoman Way of Pluralism 
Millet, etymologically, refers to a religious community in Arabic.177 Yet, today 
millet is used as a synonym of nation in the Turkish language which was subject to 
semantic transformation over time.178 However, millets in the Ottoman polity referred to 
religious communities where the ruling Muslim millet and the state had the responsibility 
to protect the non-Muslim millets (i.e., Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews). They 
were protected by the Ottoman state (e.g., right to life, property, religious freedom, and 
security). In turn, they had to pay a special tax (cizya). The goal was not to assimilate, but 
to ensure and flourish the faith-based and linguistic features of each community. Thus, 
they had the right to establish foundations, the right to education, and the right to 
communicate in their own language.179 Yet, Berdal Aral states that legally and 
institutionally, the ruling Muslim millet and non-Muslim millets were subject to different 
codes and practices:  
the  house  of  a  non-Muslim  could not  be higher than  that  of  a Muslim;  non-
Muslims  were  banned  from living in certain neighborhoods;  they were  not  
allowed  to dress  like Muslims;  they could  not carry arms  without special  
permission;  they could  not  serve  in the army; a  non-Muslim  man  could  not  
marry a Muslim  woman;  non-Muslims could  not  take  up  employment in the  
public  sector;  they could  not witness against a Muslim  in a  court  of law;  and  
it was  forbidden  to  toll  the  church bell  loud enough to  be  heard  from  
outside.  All  these examples indicate that  difference  of  status  between  
Muslims  and  non-Muslims  was  institutionalized  under  Ottoman  rule  in  favor  
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of  Muslims.180  
Despite these distinct legal and institutional practices, the Ottoman rule toward 
the non-Muslim communities was not so arbitrary that it would seek repression. Rather, 
the millet system provided confessional-based autonomy to each community, within 
which the leaders of the millets were responsible for collecting taxes, resolving private 
disputes in courts, and setting up schools. Yet, unlike the modern state, the Ottoman 
polity was interested in collective communities, not individuals. An additional caution 
here is that millets are different from what we think of as minorities in the modern sense. 
Thinking of the Ottoman millet system through a lens of the majority versus minority 
framework would be both reductionist and anachronistic. Elie Kedourie lays out the 
foundation of the concept of the minority as originated in the European historical-cultural 
context which did not have any political meaning in the Ottoman political context.181 
Despite possible regional variations in practice, the millet system functioned in 
various capacities: “allowing an important degree of local autonomy (especially in 
everyday matters), keeping urban centers religiously segregated and eliminating local 
aristocracies (instead of using them to control local peasants.”182 This system opted out of 
the option of assimilation by the state and rather facilitated and flourished the continuity 
and preservation of many cultural practices and languages. Thus, it would be misleading 
to label the Ottoman Empire purely as a Muslim-Turkish state. “The cosmopolitan 
structure of the Ottoman Empire—Islamic tradition, Turkish heritage, the background of 
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Byzantium and also numerous ethnic and religious cultures—was a synthesis.”183 Thus, 
the Ottoman state did not construct a purely ethnic state identity but Islam was at the 
center of the philosophy of the state. The concept of Devlet-i Aliye (Sublime State) 
constituted the state identity.184 The ‘Turk’ label to the Ottoman state was European 
discourse: 
The name of Turkey has been given to Turkish-speaking Anatolia almost since its 
first conquest by the Turks in the eleventh century—given, that is, by Europeans. 
But the Turks themselves did not adopt it as the official name of their country 
until 1923…In the Imperial society of the Ottomans the ethnic term Turk was 
little used, and then chiefly in a rather derogatory sense, to designate the 
Turcoman nomads, or rather the ignorant and uncouth Turkish peasants of the 
Anatolian villages. To apply it to an Ottoman gentleman of Constantinopolis 
would have been an insult.185  
Turkishness did not gain any national definition until the early twentieth century. 
Yet, similarly, Ottomanness was not a widespread social identity in the empire either. 
Being an Ottoman was associated with the ruling elites (askeri), not the ruled masses 
(reaya). Asli Ergul states that “in order to be an ‘Ottoman’, one should work in the 
military or any other service of the state, should be a good Muslim who obeyed Islamic 
doctrine, should know the Ottoman way of life which absorbed the high Islamic 
culture.”186 However, non-Muslims could become ruling Ottoman government officials 
by converting to Islam. Despite occurring intermittently, this is why many Armenians 
and Greeks served as grand viziers and high-rank generals in the Ottoman state. Again, 
this did not entail an assimilation of cultural practices and traditions of any ethnicity, 
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but just required full faith in Islam among the ruling elites.187 There was neither a 
widespread societal consciousness of Ottomanness nor an ethnic consciousness of 
Turkishness. The millet system kept different confessional communities as separate as 
possible so that any idea of common belonging to a nation or a state was not widely 
present. This policy of separation along with an absence of assimilation—within which 
the Islamic philosophy of justice of the Ottoman state guaranteed the life, property, and 
cultural traditions of the People of the Book—lasted centuries.   
However, when the ideas of popular suffrage and nationalism—originated in 
Europe—were disseminated to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the 
Islamic-based philosophy of justice which was incarnated in the millet system began to 
shatter (see Chapter 6 for further elaboration on this).188 In the midst of nineteenth 
century power politics among the major powers of Europe such as France and Great 
Britain, “the Europeans attached particular importance to the abolition of the millet 
system, which most saw as a discriminatory and barbarous system that denied the very 
basic rights of humanity and wanted replaced by the western European concept of 
political citizenship.”189 Thus, the survival and persistence of the institutional structure of 
the millet system became politically less feasible and socially less acceptable in the 
changing political environment of norms, ideas, and rights.  
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The Nineteenth Century: The Age of Ottoman Reform 
The idea of reform in the nineteenth century was not a new phenomenon for the 
centuries-old Ottoman polity. In fact, the Ottoman state initiated many military and 
political reforms before the nineteenth century as well.190 However, what was novel and 
original about the nineteenth century reforms was that they were holistic and 
comprehensive in nature not just targeting a single policy area or a single institution of 
the state, but these reforms sought to transform the overall ontological nature of the 
Ottoman polity at the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres. In other words, 
this holistic approach of reforming the overall Ottoman state and society was a 
paradigmatic shift from one ontological horizon to another.191 The increasing awareness 
of the ruling elites—that the Ottomans were in relative decline vis-à-vis the European 
rival states since the seventeenth century’s military defeats, resource contraction, and 
technological deprivation—inflamed the idea of holistic reform (military, administrative, 
legal, societal, economic, etc.) in the empire.  
Bernard Lewis states that “the decline in alertness, in readiness to accept new 
techniques, is an aspect—perhaps the most dangerous—of what became a general 
deterioration in professional and moral standards in the armed forces, parallel to that of 
the bureaucratic and religious classes.”192 This stagnation in military and economic 
development of the Ottomans vis-à-vis the Europeans and the inability to catch up with 
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the rival powers is well summarized by Stanford J. Shaw:  
The great nation states and empires of Europe were using their political unity to 
develop tremendous power; developments in science and technology during and 
after the Renaissance and Reformation were enabling them to build armies with 
weapons far more efficient than any known before; and the great gold and silver 
discoveries in the New World and the development of imperialism and 
international trade and commerce on a large scale were giving them the economic 
strength to support their new-found political and military power. In all of this 
activity the Ottoman Empire took no part. At best it remained stagnant, with a 
vast government unable to lead, hardly able to rule.193  
The Ottomans were financially bleeding by 1800. The vibrancy of the Ottoman 
trade routes from Europe to East Asia diminished after the European overseas 
expeditions. The Ottoman state was also limping in tax collection since extracting 
resources from the peripheral provinces. The notables (ayan)—powerful provincial 
families with financial and troop capabilities—were becoming a challenge to the 
authority of the Sultan as well.194 Under these circumstances, the Ottoman ruling elites 
came to think of adopting the European way of modernization in order to prevent the 
further weakening of the Ottoman state.  
Before and After the Tanzimat (Reordering) 1839-1876 
The Ottoman military was the engine of Ottoman political and economic growth 
as the ultimate protector of the state. The decline of the Ottoman military meant the 
decline of the Ottoman state. Increasing military defeats throughout the eighteenth 
century, the declining efficiency of the once powerful Ottoman troops, and the dialectical 
relationship with the external conditions of increasing European military and technology 
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might put the Ottoman military and the state at a disadvantageous position. As Carter 
Findley states, “during the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire lived through 
wars and defeats that opened a new epoch in the empire’s history” and “simultaneous 
with revolutionary change in Europe and the Americas, these crises expressed, at the 
regional level, global forces that tightened spatial interlinkages and accelerated 
change.”195 Seeing these capacity and efficiency crises of the military and the 
organization of the state, Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) put forward the first attempts of 
‘defensive modernization’ vis-à-vis the might of the European military. The discourse of 
reform and change was first seeded in Sultan Selim III’s reign.  
According to Eric J. Zurcher, Sultan Selim III followed Louis XVI of France as 
his role model.196 In his reform package, Nizam-i Cedid (the New Order), the Sultan 
aimed to empower the state both internally toward the unruly and powerful notables 
(ayan) in the provinces and externally toward the aggression of the other regional states 
(especially Russia). The first function of empowering the state was reforming the 
military, especially the Janissaries—the traditional elite military troops—that had 
autonomy from the Sultan’s reign. The declining war capacity of the state was attributed 
to the corruptness and idleness of the Janissaries. After consulting with the French 
military advisers, 30,000 new men were trained for establishing a new military troop. 
Besides this dimension, Erik J. Zurcher emphasizes the role of Sultan Selim II in 
introducing the European ideas of military and government to the Ottoman Empire that 
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later in the nineteenth century infiltrated into the minds and hearts of the Ottoman 
statesmen and intellectuals:  
More important, perhaps, than Selim’s actual measures, were the increased 
opportunities he created for the flow of Western ideas into the Ottoman 
Empire…French instructors were the interlocutors of new ideas in the first phase. 
Their students learned both the French language and new ideas that were 
becoming wide-spread in Europe. The second channel of communication was the 
new Ottoman embassies in Europe. Permanent embassies were opened in London 
(1793), Vienna (1794), Berlin (1795), and Paris (1796)…Many of the later 
reformers of the empire had their first experience of Europe while serving as 
secretaries at these Ottoman missions.197  
Although Sultan Selim III’s attempts at reform stirred opposition from the 
Janissaries who did not want to lose their privileged status and the Islamic clergy (ulema) 
who were bothered with the increasing influence of French ideas and practices, the 
successor Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) was able to continue the ideals of his 
predecessor. While Sultan Selim III was assassinated by the Janissaries in 1807, Sultan 
Mahmud II was able to relatively consolidate his power with the help of a powerful 
notable, Bayrakdar Mustafa Pasha.198 As Sultan Mahmud II was able to suppress the 
Janissary opposition and reach an agreement with provincial notables, he positioned more 
reform-minded people in the higher seats of the state. These decades of reform efforts by 
both Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II ended with the transformative 
‘reorganization’ (tanzimat) of the Ottoman polity in every aspect of its functions and 
practices. Caroline Finkel (2005) states that the Tanzimat was a logical outcome and the 
continuation of Sultan Selim III’s Nizam-i Cedid.199  
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The Gulhane Imperial Edict of 1839 (Hatt-i Serif)200 under the Sultanate of 
Abdulmecid was the first leg of the Tanzimat. This imperial edict had three bases: “the 
security of life (can), honor (ırz u namus), and property (mal) of all subjects; fair taxation 
based on an individual’s property and wealth; and fair practice in the military 
conscription of Muslims in terms of provincial distribution and length of service.”201 
Carter Findley sees the Gulhane Edict of 1839 as a resonate of the Euro-American 
declaration of rights.202 However, he also states that the Gulhane Edict did not declare the 
equality of all subjects of the Sultan, but rather “what the decree says, however, among 
Ottoman subjects, ‘Muslims and members of other religious communities’ (ehl-i Islam ve 
milel-i saire) shall benefit ‘from these imperial concessions’ without exception.” 203  The 
laws are applied equally, but Muslims and non-Muslim millets were still not equal. 
Despite being liberal in tone, the Edict was still not independent from the Islamic 
philosophy of equity and justice of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, there was a discursive shift 
from ‘native locality’ to ‘fatherland’ as the common territory (vatan).204   
The second phase of the Tanzimat was the Imperial Edict of 1856205 which 
introduced a more concrete understanding of the equality between Muslim and non-
Muslim millets of the empire. This declaration weakened the centrality of Islamic law and 
brought non-Muslims and Muslims under the same judiciary by removing legal and de 
facto inequalities between different confessional groups within the millet system. For 
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instance, a special tax gathered from non-Muslims was abolished, conscription became 
available to non-Muslims, employment in public service became possible, and non-
Muslim millets witnessing against Muslims in courts was in practice. Moreover, non-
Muslims gained the rights to be represented in local and central state institutions such as 
the Council of the State.206 At first glance, these reform epochs in the nineteenth century 
may be read as Westernization, secularization, and liberal modernization and the state 
elites as liberal reformers. This one-size-fits-all reading of the late Ottoman history might 
be misleading at best and reductionist at worst. Frederick Anscombe brings a revisionist 
perspective on the teleological reading of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.207 The 
fundamental purpose of the Ottoman reform efforts, for Anscombe, was “strengthening 
the empire’s capacity to defend itself against the existential threat posed by historically 
hostile and increasingly powerful Christian Europe.” 208 However, this does not mean that 
the reforms and reformers were unwilling and reluctant to change Ottoman polity and 
society. In fact, Ilber Ortayli argues that Ottoman reformers believed in change and to 
some extent, pursued the Western norms and ideals.209  
In the mid-nineteenth century, the interstate relations were chaotic, especially the 
affairs among the European powers, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. The expansionist 
and imperialist ambitions within the interstate affairs reinforced the realist behaviors of 
urgent ally-seeking in the midst of intersecting and contradicting state interests. In this 
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survival-of-the-fittest context, the Ottomans were highly vulnerable to external influence 
due to their agonizing military, economy, and state authority. Under this context, the 
Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans, became the 
strategic concern of European powers.210 On the other hand, the Russian aggression 
toward the Ottomans with the claim of protecting the Ottoman Orthodox community and 
the increasing instability in the Balkans convinced the European powers to accept the 
Ottomans to the Concert of Europe by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The European 
influence in the internal affairs of the Ottomans was further reinforced after this alliance-
making. Thus, the idea of reform was at the intersection of internal and external historical 
contexts.  
Despite widespread Muslim opposition to the reforms that would grant equal 
status to Muslim and non-Muslim communities, reformist pashas Ali and Fuad were not 
reluctant to carry out new policies and institutions that would create a new political 
community:  
Their object was to create a new political community that would encompass the 
whole population of the Empire, and to found a new nationality based upon equal 
Ottoman citizens who regarded the Ottoman Empire as their fatherland. In this 
way they hoped to transfer the loyalty of the non-Muslims from the local 
community and the Ottoman dynasty to the fatherland and the state. 211 
This idea of the Ottoman Empire as the common fatherland (or homeland) for both 
Muslim and non-Muslim communities seeded the origins of Ottomanism—a patriotic 
stance that all members of the empire should be loyal to the state and the common 
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homeland—by various Ottoman elites, bureaucrats, and intellectuals known as the Young 
Ottomans. The Imperial Ottoman citizen was at the center of Ottomanism. Yet, Hakan 
Yavuz underlines a paradox of Ottomanism: 
The Ottoman reforms, which aimed at superposing an Ottoman identity above all 
ethnic and religious loyalties, had little chance for success given that the Ottoman 
state itself was always the most active promoter of Islamic superiority vis-à-vis 
other religions.212  
In the absence of a participatory political system, the chance of Ottomanism as a project 
of individual-rights based citizenship was less likely.213 Thus, there was a gap between 
the ideal of reforms and their implementation on the ground.  
Young Ottomans and Young Turks 
The ideals of Tanzimat to build a new political community based on territory and 
universalism that would cut across ethnic and religious particularisms in the Ottoman 
society did not turn into a societal reality. While various conservative Muslim 
communities were opposed to the equal status with the non-Muslim communities, non-
Muslim communities were unwilling to give up their cultural, economic, and political 
comfort zones provided by the traditional noninterventionist millet system. According to 
Erik J. Zurcher, various Christian communities refused to give up their traditional rights 
under the millet system since equality before the law would damage the Christian 
economic interests.214 The Muslim bureaucratic-military elite (political force) and the 
Christian merchant elite (economic force) were the two social forces that would challenge 
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surrendering their privileged status through equality. However, recent historical accounts 
argue that seeing the Tanzimat as solely a top-down project that did not have any impact 
on nonelite Ottoman masses would be misleading. It is argued that the ideas of Tanzimat 
increased the expectations of various communities such as the Armenians, and in fact, 
these communities adopted the discourses of Tanzimat against the state in order to justify 
certain claim-makings.215 Perhaps the Tanzimat was a top-down and outside-in project 
that lacked popular support but it definitely transmitted its ideals, discourses, and norms 
to the nonelite Ottoman masses in various ways. On the other hand, the Ottoman state 
was concerned about ethnic and religious particularisms that would disrupt the social 
cohesion of confessional groups, especially after the Greek independence 216 and Serbian 
autonomy in the first half of the nineteenth century.  
In the international context, Russia was pursuing a pan-Slavic and pan-Orthodox 
Christian foreign policy in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans 
definitely reflected the centuries-long multiconfessional and multiethnic social cohesion 
of the empire. Yet, the intersection of the Balkans and European rivalry in the nineteenth 
century transformed this region into a transnational and interstate zone of competing 
discourses and claim-makings. The Ottoman Balkans as a sphere of interstate competition 
and competing discourses of nationalism became known as the Eastern Question in the 
Ottoman Empire. Erik J. Zurcher defines the Eastern Question as follows:  
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The question of how to satisfy competing Balkan nationalisms and the imperialist 
ambitions of the great powers without causing the destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire, or, if this destruction was inevitable (something of which the majority of 
European statesmen were convinced), to dismember it without upsetting the 
balance of power in Europe and causing a general war, was known throughout the 
nineteenth century as the ‘Eastern Question.’217 
While Russian foreign policy aimed to establish a Bulgarian state as the center of 
pan-Slavism that included many parts of Ottoman Macedonia, Great Britain was 
concerned about the control of the Straits and Asia Minor by Russia which would disrupt 
the vibrancy of the British trade route reaching to its most important colony, India. This 
is why the British policy was based on the protection of the Ottoman territorial integrity 
within its rivalry with Russia.218 With its weak political and economic capacity since 
foreign intervention in the domestic decision-making of the empire was widespread and 
the dismal state of public debt was present,219 internal and external sovereignty of the 
Ottoman state was at risk, especially during the constitutional monarchy of Abdulhamit II 
(1876-1909). The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire—declared in 1876 and 
modeled on the 1831 Belgian Constitution—proclaimed the sovereign right of the Sultan 
on the one hand and the basic legal rights of the individuals on the other. The idea behind 
the constitutional monarchy flourished among a group of intellectuals, policy-makers, 
and bureaucrats220 known as the Young Ottomans who were critical of the disintegration 
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of Islamic values and ethics from the Ottoman political culture.  
The commonality of the Young Ottoman thought was to redefine a patriotic 
Ottoman identity in defense of the emerging political consciousness of nationhood in the 
Balkans in particular and Europe in general. This consciousness was seen as a threat to 
the territorial and social integrity of the empire, and the Young Ottomans were critical of 
the extensive concessions to the non-Muslim millets under the Tanzimat and the neglect 
of Islam as the engine of Ottoman political culture.221 Although the Young Ottomans did 
not pursue an Islamic political agenda and instead advocated participatory constitutional-
liberal values, they were skeptical of the extensive infiltration of European norms and 
values into the Ottoman polity and society. For instance, Namik Kemal, a literary 
intellectual proponent of the Young Ottoman thought, was critical of Tanzimat 
Ottomanism:  
First, to the absolutist, complicitous and spineless policies of the Tanzimat 
statesmen who allowed European interventions in the internal affairs of the 
Empire; second, to the firm belief that it was not anchored in a totalizing ethical-
political code, that is, the Shari’a. He did not, however, discard the ideology of 
Ottomanism. Its stated guarantees of 'protection of life, honor, and property' were 
not in contradiction to the Shari'a. Rather, its injunctions were incomplete and 
insufficient.222 
Young Ottomans sought a third way between the traditional conservatives (pro-
Sultanate) and the secular modernists (pro-Europeans) by limiting the powers of the 
Sultan and “also to bring the diverse amalgam of Ottoman communities together on the 
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basis of the law and equality.” 223 As the Abdulhamit II’s constitutional rule was short 
lived and ended in 1878, his authoritarian policies led to the emergence of a new 
epistemic and political faction called the Young Turks.  
The Ottomans lost the Russian War (1877-1878) with the consequence of massive 
territorial losses in the Ottoman Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania gained 
independence, Bulgaria was granted autonomy). The Ottoman defeat led to major 
criticisms toward the reign of Abdulhamit II and he basically dismissed the parliament 
and the constitution in 1878.224 His logic of abolishing the constitution and the parliament 
was that the lack of consolidated power in the hands of the Sultan paved the way for 
secessionist movements in the Balkans. Although Ottomanist intellectuals supported the 
efforts of preserving the remaining territories of the empire, Abdulhamit II’s despotism 
and failure to prevent military and territorial losses undermined his legitimacy to a great 
extent. In reaction to these incapacities and autocratic tendencies of the Sultan, a new 
intellectual and political movement was on the rise under the roof of ‘Committee of 
Union and Progress’ (CUP) which was established in 1894. The members of the CUP 
were known as the Young Turks.  
Many leading cadres of the Young Turks were politically active in the 
Macedonian question of the Ottoman Empire which the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs 
had national claims over. In this chaotic environment of violence, religion, and 
nationalism, the Young Turks experienced the antistate power of peripheral nationalism 
and nationalist mobilizations. In this socio-political context, “the main objectives of the 
                                                 




groups constituting the CUP were the opposition to the autocracy of Abdulhamid II, the 
restoration of the constitution, and the protection of the homeland.”225 These groups were 
willing to save the empire against the dissolution threat. Their common objective was to 
save the Ottoman state against the aggression and expansionism of the European powers. 
They saw centralization essential toward this end.226 Their increasing public prominence 
and the declining legitimacy of Abdulhamit II ended with the Young Turk Revolution in 
1908 and the restoration of the constitution.  
The mentality of the founding CUP (i.e., Eurocentric modernity, positivism, 
centralists, etc.) cadres was eventually transmitted to the founding elites of the Turkish 
republic after 1923. In addition to their common background of a Europe-based college 
education and service in the state, Erik J. Zurcher underlines the Young Turks’ profile 
characteristics as: 
consisted of Muslim males, born almost exclusively between 1875 and 1885, with 
an urban literate background (albeit hailing from different social strata). The 
majority of them had their roots in the Southern Balkans, the Agean or the capital, 
a region vastly different from inland Anatolia and the Arab provinces. Ethnically 
the composition of the Young Turks was diverse, with a majority of Turks but 
important components of Albanians and Caucasian immigrants, some Kurds and 
Arabs.227 
Thus, the Young Turks were not necessarily composed of a narrow group of Turks. As I 
will argue further in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the Young Turks can be categorized as 
Ottomanists in the sense that they advocated for a centralized empire rather than a nation-
state. However, after the experiences of ethnic and religious violence in the Balkans, 
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especially during the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913,228 the notion of Ottoman identity 
gradually came closer to being affiliated with Muslimhood which became evident after 
World War I. Surrounding this memory of overlapping linkages of religion, ethnicity, and 
violence, the Young Turks spent most of their energy on two interrelated political 
debates: (1) how to save the state from further territorial losses and partition; and (2) the 
question of centralization towards that end. After the Young Turk revolution in 1908, the 
elite cadres of the CUP pursued centralization policies by various mechanisms such as 
monitoring the education system, creating a ‘national’ economy,229 and consolidating the 
practice of conscription.230 The CUP put the Turkish language at the center of these 
centralization policies which different communities such as the Greeks, Albanians, and 
Macedonians perceived the intentions of the CUP as Turkification and assimilation by the 
state. The Young Turk project of a centralized imperial system collapsed after the 
devastating defeat of the empire in World War I.  
In the post-World War I context, the elite competition between the government in 
Istanbul and the opposition movement in Ankara was based on the choice between an 
imperial system and a national state. As I show in Chapter 5, the power consolidation of 
the opposition in Ankara was achieved to establish a national state by eliminating 
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Ottoman identity and replacing it with monolithic Turkishness. In order to understand the 
shifts and continuities between the different forms of belonging that were promoted by 
the ruling elites, one especially needs to pay close attention to the identity debates 
surrounding Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism in the early twentieth-century Ottoman 
empire. 
Yusuf Akcura and Three Types of Policy: Ottomanism, 
Islamism, and Turkism 
Yusuf Akcura (1878-1935), an émigré from Russia and an influential political 
figure in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, was involved in the national independence 
movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and served as a member of the 
parliament in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the early years of the Republic. 
His essay “Three Types of Policy” written in 1904 was perhaps the most striking piece 
that critically and strategically discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the three policy 
options for the Ottoman state: Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism: 
the first, the creation of an Ottoman nation through the integration and union of 
the various nationalities subject to the Ottoman government; the second, taking 
advantage of the fact that the Caliphate reposed in the rulers of the Ottoman State, 
the political unification of all the Islamic peoples under the control of the said 
government (what the Europeans term Pan-Islamism); and the third, the creation 
of a Turkish political nation based on race.231   
Akcura sees the idea of the Ottomanist nation as an equivalent with the American 
identity of the United States: 
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The real aim was to accord the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the 
Ottoman State the same political rights and to make them subject to the same 
obligations; to give them absolute freedom of thought and religion, and taking 
advantage of this equality and freedom, despite their religious and ethnic 
differences, to intermix and give coherence to the inhabitants in question, thus 
bringing into existence a new nation, an Ottoman nation, bound together, like the 
Americans of the United States, by a common fatherland. ”232   
According to Akcura, this idea of nationhood started with the Tanzimat and was 
influenced by the French Revolution’s discourse of nationalite based on voluntary 
consent rather than ancestry and race. As this policy showed traction under the rule of 
Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), Islamism gained momentum within the Ottoman 
government circles. However, as Akcura very succinctly puts, Turkism in this period is a 
very infant phenomenon:  
The idea of creating a Turkish political nation based on race is quite recent. I 
doubt whether the idea has existed either in the Ottoman State down to the 
present…I do not know that this idea has any supporters in the Ottoman territories 
outside Istanbul. Whatever one might say, the idea of creating a political nation 
based on race is rather recent and not too widespread .233 
If one reads Akcura’s essay very diligently, it is clear that the underlying 
motivation of his discussion between the three options of identity politics is the Ottoman 
state. This is why he asks: 
in which of the three political directions, discussed above, does the interest - that 
is, the strengthening - of the Ottoman State lie? And which of these is capable of 
application in the Ottoman territories? 234  
In quest of a solution to this crisis of the Ottoman state, Yusuf Akcura draws a 
very rational and pragmatic outline within which he argues that either Islamism or 
Turkism would serve as the most viable option in terms of empowering the state. 
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However, he does not see these two policy options as mutually exclusive either.   
For Akcura, the policy of Ottomanism would be ideal for the Ottoman state but 
there was little internal and external support for this option. While many Muslims 
objected to the idea of equality with the non-Muslim subjects, various non-Muslim 
communities did not want it because they already were in the loop of self-determination 
against the Ottoman state. Other actors such as the Russian and Balkan governments did 
not support Ottomanism either since it would make the Ottoman state stronger, as Akcura 
states.  
Islamism would cause exclusion of non-Muslim subjects and divide the Muslim 
and non-Muslim Turks which in turn would weaken the Ottoman state further. Turkism 
on the other hand would divide the Islamic community and weaken the state again. 
According to Akcura, Turkism would function better since it had the potential of fusing 
the religious and cultural bonds together. Yet, Akcura concludes with more questions 
than answers:  
In short, the question which has for long occupied my mind and for which I have 
not found a convincing answer remains before me and still awaits an answer: of 
the policies of Islamism and Turkism, which is the more beneficial to the Ottoman 
State, and which is capable of application? 235  
Akcura’s mindset in fact reveals the mindset of the Ottoman state elites in the 
sense that their utilization of identity politics was pragmatic rather than ideological in the 
sense that they cared more about the state than any specific identity category, be it 
Turkish, Muslim, Ottoman, etc. Whichever served the interests of the state best, they did 
not hesitate to adopt it depending on the internal and external political realities. Thus, 
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these identity categories were not necessarily mutually exclusive or completely 
independent from each other. They only served as a toolbox for the state elites where they 
could use one or more tools simultaneously. I will argue this aspect further in Chapters 6 
and 7.   
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to introduce the brief historical account of the late 
Ottoman Empire and the first steps toward the founding of the Republic of Turkey with a 
particular focus on the question of belonging to the state. While the institutional structure 
of political belonging to the state was designed on the hierarchy between the ruling 
Muslim millet and the ruled non-Muslim millets under the millet system, Ottoman 
nationhood—which was initially introduced in the Reform Edict of 1856 and later 
deepened with the Nationality Law of 1869 and the first Ottoman constitution in 1876—
sought to overcome the hierarchical notion of the millet system by establishing an 
overarching Ottoman identity that would exceed and cut across any particularistic ethnic 
belonging. However, the notion of Ottomanness did not necessarily turn a blind eye to 
communal identities within the empire; thus it was more of a hyphenated nationhood 
within which various communities of the empire would identify themselves first with 
their ethnic belonging and then with their allegiance to the state such as Armenian 
Ottoman, Albanian Ottoman, or Syrian Ottoman. Thus, the question of inclusion or 
exclusion is not much about neither the ‘civicness’ or ‘ethnic’ dimension nor the 
Turkishness or Ottomanness of the nationhood, but it is more about the singularity or 
plurality of the nationhood which would provide flexibility and voluntarism (or lack 
thereof) to the choice of rather than the imposition on the members of the state.  
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In the transition from Ottomanism to Turkishness, monolithic nationhood under 
Turkishness became dominant by the state elites. In the next chapter, I will provide an 
introduction to the emergence, persistence, and change in the conceptions of Turkishness 
from the 1920s until the contemporary era. The next chapter will also prepare the reader 
for the more historically grounded and theoretically informed case analyses in the later 
chapters where I will show the causal mechanisms and conditions under which the state 





ANATOMY OF A NATIONHOOD: THE ESSENTIALS 
 
OF POST-OTTOMAN TURKISHNESS 
Introduction 
As I narrated a brief history of transition from Ottoman nationhood to Turkish 
nationhood in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide the essentials of the 
imagined Turkishness, how the founding elites constructed this nationhood and how it 
has persisted and evolved throughout the twentieth century in the Republic of Turkey. 
This chapter’s historical account will supplement the following chapters on the analysis 
of the causal mechanisms behind the nationhood change from one form to another in 
postimperial Turkey.  
When Yasin Aktay, a Turkish sociologist and a member of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP in Turkish initials), has recently stated that Turkishness is a 
synthesis not a race, this statement once again stirred the debates on Turkishness in 
academic and political circles.236 What Turkishness meant in the minds and hearts of the 
political elites and the public masses is neither a historical nor a contemporary question in 
Turkey. Rather, this question is the chronic state of ontological inquiry in the history of 
                                                 





the Turkish Republic. If the founding elites debated the essentials and content of the 
status of Turkishness in the 1920s from various perspectives, this debate is still at the 
core of political and public debates in contemporary Turkey. For instance, the very recent 
process of new constitution making is essentially subject to contestation over the 
citizenship and nationhood definitions. While some policy-makers, intellectuals, scholars, 
and journalists promote the persistence of Turk or Turkish as applying to all citizens of 
Turkey—which has been the case throughout the Republican era—others prefer a change 
by abandoning the notion of Turk or Turkish and rather adopt Turkiyeli (people from 
Turkey) or a citizen of the Republic of Turkey.237 While the first group perceives the 
notion of Turk as a civic identity that includes the multiethnic communities of Turkey, 
the second group considers Turkishness as an ethnic identity that excludes other ethnic 
communities in Turkey such as the Kurds, Arabs, Lazs, and Armenians.238 This debate of 
whether Turkishness has been constructed as a civic or an ethnic or ethnoreligious 
nationhood subjugates the academic circles as well.239  
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In this chapter, I will argue that while approaching Turkishness from the civic 
versus ethnic dichotomy would be inconclusive and unproductive,240 there is an inherent 
inconsistency on the meaning of Turkishness in legal-institutional texts and its perception 
of it by different communities on the ground, most particularly the Kurds. In other words, 
first, there is no academic, political, or public consensus on the civic or ethnic content of 
Turkishness—and it is not possible to reach a consensus due to the paradoxical nature of 
the ethnic and civic dichotomy. Secondly, the inconsistencies between the founding 
elite’s theoretical construction of Turkishness in the 1920s and the way it is 
comprehended by the different communities on the ground throughout the twentieth 
century are inescapable. Despite its inherent paradoxes, if one still takes the civic versus 
ethnic dichotomy approach to explain the ontological status of Turkishness, one would 
end up observing the ebbs and flows and inconsistencies between theory and practice 
over the twentieth century. Rather, I will argue in this chapter that the constant 
ontological crisis of Turkishness is not due to its ethnic and/or civic characteristics (or 
antiethnic and monoethnic241) but rather it is the singularity of it which I define as 
monolithic nationhood (see Chapter 3). In other words, the founding elites of the Turkish 
Republic were more concerned with the singularity of Turkishness based on assimilation 
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and loyalty, thus establishing a monolithic nationhood, rather than its civic or ethnic 
characteristics. The political crises of the twentieth century surrounding Turkishness, 
most notably the question of Kurdish identity, have been more of an outcome of the 
Turkish state’s singular approach to Turkishness rather than its ethnic and/or civic 
practices.  
In the first section, I lay out the founding elites’ logic of constructing the ideal 
Turk and Turkishness on the basis of assimilation and loyalty. In the second section, I 
evaluate the persistence and change in the form and content of Turkishness throughout 
the twentieth century in the context of its monolithic nature. In the final section, I analyze 
the implications of recent ethnic policy changes by the Turkish government on the 
meaning of Turkishness.  
The Logic of the State Elites and the Making of Turkishness: 
Who Was (not) a Turk(ish)? 
The Young Turks and their Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that took 
control of the state in the last phase of the Ottoman Empire were believers in science, 
education, and modernization that they experienced in European colleges and witnessed 
in the life styles of the Ottoman Christian bourgeoisie.242 While the CUP cadres struggled 
to devise a social and political formula where Islam and science would not be 
contradictory, secular education designed around the Turkish language was believed to 
produce progress and enlightenment. This is why their scientific approach blended with 
rationalism and positivism insisted on constitutionalism and parliament as opposed to the 
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traditionalism of the Ottoman dynasty. One way or another, modernization in the Young 
Turk mindset meant Westernization equated with the European civilization. Attempts at 
modernization without Westernization in various postcolonial geographies such as India 
did not appeal to the Young Turks, except with the question of Islam in this ideal of 
European modernity. Bred with these ideas, the founders of new Turkey were mostly 
followers of the Young Turk mindset. Erik J. Zurcher very clearly acknowledges the 
characteristics of the founding political elites under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
(Ataturk): 
Almost without exception they were former members of the Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP) and played a role in the politics of the second constitutional 
period (1908-18). They were bound together with a common past which included 
a number of the greatest upheavals in modern Ottoman history. Most had 
participated in the constitutional revolution of 1908; the suppression of the 
counterrevolution of April 1909 by the ‘Action Army’ (Hareket Ordusu); the 
organizing of Bedouin resistance in Tripolitania against the Italian invaders in 
1911; the Balkan War disaster of 1913; the World War and the resistance 
movement after the war.243 
Within these war-torn and chaotic experiences of the collapsing empire, the 
Republican political elites were also vividly subject to the politics of identity at the 
junction of religion, ethnicity, and violence, especially in the Balkans.244 As their main 
identity marker of us versus them was based on Ottoman Muslims (with an emphasis on 
the Turkish language at the center of this demography) and non-Muslim inhabitants of 
the empire, this perception of nationhood was replaced with the Turks and non-Turks in 
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the 1920s. Yet, who would be considered a Turk? 
The goal of reaching out to a civilization in the mindset of the Republican 
founding elites corresponded with becoming a member of the European-Western world. 
Towards this end, state-centric Turkish modernity was the main cognitive map of the 
state elites. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Icduygu highlight four characteristics of state-
centric Turkish modernity: 1) the strong state tradition, 2) national developmentalism, 3) 
the organic vision of society, and 4) the republican model of citizenship.245 The idea of 
the strong state created a greater autonomy from society which gave the state a paternal 
role. On the other hand, the organic vision of society framed the nation as a monolithic 
body that should be congruent and docile with state interests. This is why the 
understandings of/from Turkish nationalism “did not lead to a language of rights, as in 
the French case, but rather to a language of obligations that was geared toward the 
preservation of the state.”246 In order to draw the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
for membership in the nation, the founding elites strategically devised the criteria for 
becoming/being Turkish that would serve the state's interests and the survival of the state 
in the long run.  
Under these conditions, Turkish nationhood has been inclusive based on 
Muslimhood along with the primacy of the Turkish language. Thus, despite secular 
tendencies of the state elites, Islam still played a central role in establishing congruence 
between the nation and the state. "Islamic political consciousness" before and after the 
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Republic "became a formative base for nationalism,"247 and being a Muslim was the 
precondition for membership in this new national identity. “Every Muslim citizen of the 
Republic, regardless of his ethnic origins, was invited—and obliged—to adopt the 
republican Turkish national identity.”248  In theory, making Turkishness thus included the 
Kurds, Arabs, Laz, Albanians, and Circassians in the project of national homogenization. 
Only non-Muslim communities, particularly the Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, were 
considered official minorities following the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.249 This is why 
Sener Akturk identifies Turkishness as monoreligious on the basis of Muslimhood but 
antiethnic in rejecting any communal ethnic attachments.250 While Soner Cagaptay 
identifies early Republican policies of nation-building as a blend of juis sanguinis and 
juis soli, he states that: 
Nationality-through-religion emerged as the most common way of gaining 
Turkish citizenship. The government processed citizenship as a category 
exclusive to the former Muslim millet. This explains why, although Ankara 
naturalized non-Ottoman Christians who converted and joined this millet, it 
blocked off Christian ex-Ottomans, most notably the Armenians, from 
citizenship.251  
Thus, other than Muslimhood, “the early Republican elite considered any kind of 
group identity to be an obstacle to the making of a modern ‘gesellschaft.’”252 Despite this 
approach that considers Muslimhood and the Turkish language as the sine qua non of 
nonminority status within Turkishness, there are other approaches that consider the 
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construction of Turkish nationhood around ethnic aspects on the basis of various 
Turkification policies in the first decades of the Republic.  
Scholars refer to various social engineering policies by the state that were not 
independent of an ethnic core of Turkishness. These policies include ‘Citizen, Speak 
Turkish!’ in the late 1920s that sought the elimination of non-Turkish languages from the 
public sphere,253 the founding of official institutions such as the Turkish Historical 
Society (1931) and the Turkish Linguistic Society (1932) that promoted official 
discourses of an ancient (pre-Islamic) and primordial Turkish identity,254 official interests 
in the anthropological origins of the Turkish race in the 1930s,255 Settlement Law of 1934 
that closed strategic locations to non-Muslim minority settlement,256 and also exchanged 
various Kurdish-speaking communities with Turkish-speaking communities between 
eastern and western parts of Turkey.257 Through the implementation of these policies, for 
instance, Mesut Yegen argues that the constitutional definitions of Turkishness regardless 
of race and religion (the 1924 constitution) or every citizen being considered as Turkish 
(the 1961 constitution) showed a gap between promises and practices.258  
However, despite some references to the ethnic-oriented practices of the state, one 
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way or another, there is a consensus that Turkishness was neither solely an ethnic nor a 
civic identity as many scholars approach it in these categories. Throughout the 
Republican era, the state never comprehensively institutionalized an ethnic-based legal, 
social, and political system. Soner Cagaptay, for instance, acknowledges the ethnic 
practices and thinks that Turkishness was never exclusionary in an ethnic sense: “as the 
‘Speak Turkish’ campaign demonstrates, although Kemalism increasingly favoured 
ethnicity as a marker of Turkishness in the 1930s, it never closed the gates to voluntary 
Turkification.”259 In their rhetorical analysis of Mustafa Kemal’s Nutuk (the Great 
Speech) before the national assembly in 1927, Aysel Morin and Ronald Lee reveal what 
he understood from the ‘noble blood’ of Turks.260 They argue that Ataturk’s narrative of 
the noble blood of Turks is not an ethnically superior story but rather it makes blood 
sacred when spilled in defense of the country. As long as an individual self-sacrifices for 
the defense of the country, he/she would become a member of the Turkish nation. The 
spilled blood creates the fatherland that includes those who showed self-sacrifice. This is 
why Ataturk considered the Anzac soldiers of Australia and New Zealand during the 
Gallipoli War (1915) as the sons of the Turkish nation.  
In conclusion, debates on Turkishness from the ethnic-civic dichotomy would be 
inconclusive and unproductive since there is hardly any consensus. While public 
perceptions of Turkishness can be different from the definition of the state, different 
sectors of the society are likely to interpret Turkishness from their own historical 
memories. However, this does not mean that we cannot identify the sine qua non of 
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Turkishness: a Sunni-oriented Muslimhood and the requirement to adopt the Turkish 
language. Still, the studies on Turkishness neglect the notion of monolithic nationhood 
and the existing literature cannot capture the questions of assimilation and loyalty 
sufficiently to understand why the political elites insisted on monolithic nationhood 
rather than their primary concern being ethnic or civic frameworks.  
Assimilation, Loyalty, and the Monolithic Nature of 
Turkishness 
On the debates of the construction of Turkishness, there is an overwhelming 
consensus that the state pursued assimilationist policies. Some scholars call this 
assimilation process the Turkification of non-Turks which was a top-down approach and 
forced social engineering rather than a voluntary process.261 It is often assumed that both 
non-Muslim minorities and non-Turk Muslim citizens such as the Kurds, Lazs, and 
Circassians were the main targets of this assimilation process. This story is correct but it 
is insufficient and neglects the essential rationale of the founding elites on nation-
building.  First, this approach tends to shy away from defining what assimilation is and 
identifying its variations. Second, they approach assimilation as an either/or concept that 
neglects the degrees of assimilation. As I question these shortcomings in the approaches 
to Turkishness in this section, I will argue that how my categorization of monolithic 
nationhood crosscuts the ethnic versus civic debates and how it demonstrates a more 
comprehensive understanding of the construction of Turkishness.  
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Rogers Brubaker identifies two separate but interrelated types of assimilation262: 
1) general and abstract, and 2) specific and organic.  While the first one refers to ‘become 
similar’ (used intransitively), the second one refers to ‘make similar’ (used transitively). 
The second meaning has become a morally repugnant meaning in the twenty-first 
century. For Brubaker, the specific and organic meaning of assimilation in transitive use 
(making similar) has been problematic throughout the twentieth century: 
the transitive use of ‘assimilate’ to mean ‘make similar,’ which suggests state 
policies and programs of ‘forced assimilation,’ or at least policies and programs 
that seek to assimilate people against their will…. Abundant historical and 
comparative evidence, moreover, suggests that they rarely work, and that they are 
indeed more likely to strengthen than to erode differences, by provoking a 
reactive mobilization against such assimilatory pressures.”263  
However, on the other hand, the general and abstract meaning of assimilation in 
the sense of becoming similar has remained ‘politically benign’: 
Yet when used intransitively in the general, abstract sense of becoming similar—
becoming similar in certain respects that obviously have to be specified—
assimilation does not seem to be morally objectionable, analytically useless, or 
empirically wrong as a conceptual instrument for studying populations of 
immigrant origin.264  
The political elites of the early Republic definitely followed the first meaning of 
assimilation that is making similar which was imposed rather than negotiated. However, 
this process of making similar was not a direction towards any kind of Turkishness but 
towards a very specific kind of it—that is Muslim, secular, educated, Western, and 
Republican. Thus, if those who would identify themselves as Turks did not fit to the 
political elites’vision of the ideal Turk, then they were also subject to assimilation in 
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schools, military, and other official institutions. Thus when states adopt the first meaning 
of assimilation in making similar national members (horizontal comradeship as Benedict 
Anderson named it265), assimilation becomes a matter of degree, not an either/or matter. 
The assimilation as a policy becomes ipso facto for the state. Then, I argue that the 
literature on the construction of Turkishness neglects the fact that Turks who did not fit to 
the ideal Turk in the mindset of the elites were also subject to ‘Turkification’ policies as 
well. Since “ethnicity is not a thing, not a substance; it is an interpretive prism, a way of 
making sense of the social world,”266 the founding elites of the Republic interpreted their 
own understanding of Turkishness and sought to establish a monopoly on defining it with 
their own ‘interpretive prism.’  
In The Politics of Nation-Building, Harris Mylonas introduces the concept of 
‘noncore group’ in nation-building processes.267 Noncore group refers to “any 
aggregation of individuals that is perceived as an unassimilated ethnic group (on a 
linguistic, religious, physical, or ideological basis) by the ruling political elite of a 
country.”268 Towards that end, “governing elites can pursue educational, cultural, 
occupational, matrimonial, demographic, political, and other policies aimed at getting the 
non-core group to adopt the core group’s culture and way of life.”269 In the Turkish case 
of nation-building, the core group was not the Turks per se, but the core group was the 
founding elites under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal who had a specific ‘interpretive 
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prism’ of Turkishness. Thus, those unassimilated Turks were also subject to nation-wide 
assimilationist policies. First and foremost, the idea of the leading Republican elites was 
to establish a singular Turkishness (not different interpretations of it) or what I call 
monolithic nationhood. For instance, a recent in-depth survey study on the perceptions of 
Turkish national identity at the societal level reveals: 
The initial expectation that civic notions of Turkish identity would promote more 
inclusive attitudes toward minorities and ethno-cultural notions would predict 
more exclusive attitudes was not met. Rather, in both studies, both of the ethnic 
and civic aspects of national identity led to more exclusionary attitudes.270  
This in fact shows the monolithic nature of Turkishness within which civic or 
ethnic perceptions of it do not change the fact that either draws the boundaries of 
Turkishness as a singular nationhood.  I argue that the monolithic establishment of 
Turkishness was the ultimate goal of the founding elites. They did not pay too much 
attention to the ethnic or civic component of Turkishness, but they were primarily 
concerned with the singularity of Turkishness in the way of what they understood from it 
that would prevent any future national disintegration and future collapse of the state. 
When the fear of national disintegration and the collapse of the state was the primary 
psyche of the founding elites, the state of loyalty became the ultimate essential of 
becoming Turkish. Muslimhood and speaking modern Turkish functioned as the cover 
toward establishing loyalty. This explains why secular and positivist founding cadre of 
the Republic utilized Islam and Muslimhood for securing the founding and furthering the 
consolidation of the new regime.  
This idea of loyalty in the mindset of the founding elites was a direct reflection of 
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their experiences in the late Ottoman Empire where the question of the loyalty of the 
different millets caused a sense of insecurity in the Ottoman dynasty within which the 
ontological (in)security of the state subjugated the worldviews of the late Ottoman 
intellectuals, bureaucrats, and military cadres. In order to establish this security of the 
new state, while loyalty became the primary motivation behind inclusion/exclusion, the 
monolithic definition of Turkishness in the vocabulary of the political elites became the 
ideal type that the assimilation sought to achieve. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that 
many citizens were denaturalized because they did not join the national struggle during 
the War of Independence.271 Or in the idea of becoming a Turk, Jews were more a 
possibility than the Greeks and Armenians. As Senem Aslan states, “The Jews had a 
unique position among the non-Muslim communities of Turkey” because “unlike other 
non-Muslim populations, separatism had never become a popular movement among the 
Jews of the Ottoman Empire.”272 Loyalty to the state was and still is at the core of 
nationhood in the Ottoman-Turkish political culture which “always exalted the state as an 
entity autonomous from and superior to society with a tutelary and paternalistic role.”273  
Overall, this overlapping mechanism of loyalty, assimilation, and the monolithic 
nationhood are understudied in the existing literature. Since many studies embrace ethnic 
and civic perspectives on Turkishness with a vicious cycle of ebbs and flows throughout 
the twentieth century, they are unable to grasp the persistence of the monolithic 
nationhood in the official discourse until the 2000s.  
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Persistence and Change of Turkishness (1920s-2000s) 
The essentialist arguments that nations are immemorial have little significance in 
contemporary nationalism studies. Rather, instrumentalist arguments as in Ernest 
Gellner’s idea of nationalism as a function of industrialization274 or constructivist 
explanations as in Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’275 attract more scholars. 
Besides, an ethnosymbolist approach by Anthony Smith offers a middle way through 
accepting the modernity of nations along with premodern ethnic backgrounds of what he 
calls ethnie.276 Except essentialism, what is common across these approaches is that 
identities are malleable/fluid rather than fixed. This is the case for the patterns of 
nationhood. The processes of nation-building and nationhood-building neither occur 
overnight nor reach a conclusive end over decades. As Justin Wolfe introduces his idea of 
‘the everyday nation-state’, he argues that “we should conceive the nation as a continuous 
process of struggle over the legitimacy of the state and the meaning of popular 
sovereignty…. Nation is not the sum of particular nationalist practices and ideologies; 
rather, it is the ceaseless, often mundane playing out of their entanglements.”277 This 
shows that transitions from imperial orders to nation-states are not necessarily a sudden 
break from the past. Rather, such transitions are the beginnings of continuous formations 
of nation-states. In other words, the institutional dissolution of empires into nation-states 
does not mean a complete formation of a nation-state or nationhood. In the light of these 
insights, the project of Turkishness as the nationhood of Turkey has always remained at 
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an incomplete stage in the sense that state intentions and societal perceptions have 
overlapped, contested, and clashed under different domestic and international socio-
political contexts. Therefore, I would periodize the assimilation policies between the 
1920s and the 1990s as the construction and consolidation process of Turkishness and the 
post-1990s as the introduction of alternative nationhood schemes in the polity of Turkey. 
While the monolithic nature of Turkishness persisted in the legal-institutional practices of 
the state until the 1990s, the gradual process of deconstructing that monolithic 
nationhood had begun during the 1990s with new discourses (such as neo-Ottomanism 
and pro-Kurdish challenges) until its fracture in the 2000s with the state project of 
devising new ethnic policies that would contradict monolithic Turkishness. 
The notion of Turk or Turkish was first used as an identifier of citizenship that 
was used in the 1924 constitution. Article 88 of the 1924 defines Turks as the people of 
Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of citizenship, be called 
Turkish. It is suggested that this definition was adopted directly from Article 8 of the 
1876 Ottoman constitution, which defines Ottoman as follows: whatever religion or sect 
they are from all individuals subject to the Ottoman State, without exception, would be 
called Ottomans.278 As these definitions followed a territorial understanding of 
citizenship on paper, Mesut Yegen argues that the Assembly debates on the wording of 
the 1924 definition reveal the distinction between the understandings of citizenship and 
nationhood. When the 1924 definition was first introduced to the General Assembly, the 
wording was as follows: The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would 
be called Turkish. With the proposition of a member of the parliament from Istanbul, 
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Hamdullah Suphi, citizenship was added because he perceived Turkish citizenship as 
different from the Turkish nationhood.279 Citizenship does not directly refer to 
nationhood. Although there are legal-institutional boundaries of citizenship, the practices 
and discourses toward non-Muslim and Muslim minorities in Turkey reveal a distinction 
between being a Turkish citizen and being a Turk. Internal others can be Turkish citizens 
but not Turks. However, on the other hand, external others without Turkish citizenship 
can be considered as part of the Turkish nation such as the Central Asian Turkic 
Republics and the discourses of ‘one nation, two states’ (especially with Azerbaijan).280  
Before the establishment of the 1924 constitution, the 1921 interim constitution of 
Turkey did not refer to any notion of Turk or Turkish citizen. Rather, it is emphasized 
that sovereignty belongs to the people. Andrew Mango reveals how the leading cadres of 
the War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal adopted discourses of 
brotherhood between the Turks and Kurds against ‘the infidel invaders’. For instance, he 
states that Mustafa Kemal: 
In order to prevent British infiltration for an independent Kurdistan, he sent a 
telegram to a Diyarbekir notable, Kasim Cemilpasazade. He said, “Kurds and 
Turks are true brothers and may not be separated…. Our existence requires that 
Kurds, Turks and all Muslim elements should work together to defend our 
independence and prevent the partition of the fatherland…I am in favour of 
granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure the attachment [to 
the state— merbutiyet] and prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on 
condition that the Ottoman state is not split up.281   
At this stage, the idea of a monolithic nationhood was absent in the idea of the 
political elites within which the Ottoman state was still at stake. The development of 
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monolithic Turkishness and its consolidation process through various social engineering 
programs such as the adoption of Latin scripts for the alphabet and official discourses 
invented by the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Linguistic Society continued, 
I would argue, until the 1990s when the neo-Ottomanist discourses re-emerged in the 
public and political arenas.  
After the military coup of 1980, the notion of monolithic Turkishness in the legal-
institutional structure of the state was further consolidated. The 1924 constitution was a 
little loose on monolithic Turkishness since it said the people of Turkey rather than the 
Turkish people and added the clause of “regardless of race and religion,” while Article 66 
of the 1982 constitution states that those who are tied to the Turkish state through 
citizenship are all Turkish which follows the 1961 constitution.282 A prominent scholar of 
constitution in Turkey, Ergun Ozbudun, defines the philosophy of the 1982 constitution 
as statist-solidarist-tutelary in which the goal was to protect the state from the citizen 
rather than vice versa.283 This, he argues, contradicts the pluralistic society in Turkey as 
the Ottoman legacy:  
Turkey, despite the systematic assimilation and homogenizing policies of its 
republican founders, still retains many of the characteristics of a plural society. 
The most fundamental problem facing the present-day Turkish democracy is to 
reconcile this social pluralism with an authoritarian state tradition that seeks to 
impose an artificial homogeneity, even uniformity, on the society.284  
For Ozbudun, the founding leaders of the Republic were aware of the pluralistic 
society and they advocated for the progress of different communities under the new 
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nation. Thus, the 1921 constitution involved great administrative decentralization and 
pluralistic notions. Yet, after the consolidation of power under a single-party regime, the 
idea of a homogenous society prevailed. The idea of Turkish nationalism was not 
necessarily chauvinistic or irredentist, and nationhood leaned more on cultural origins 
rather than certain ethnicity, yet monolithic Turkishness could not escape from the 
perceptions of being ethnically-driven since the practices of the state pointed to such 
thought. In other words, Ozbudun concludes that the major political and social tensions 
of modern Turkey were a result of imposing monolithic Turkishness and the monolithic 
state from above and the pluralistic reactions from below. 
In a 2004 minorities report prepared by the Prime Ministry Human Rights 
Advisory Council, it is stated that various legal structures such as in the Anti-Terror Law, 
Law on Associations, and Law on Political Parties ban the public discourses of 
emphasizing and promoting the existence of linguistic or ethnic minorities in Turkey. 
This, in turn, rejects the living space for different linguistic and ethnic practices as ‘sub-
identities’ of Turkey. For instance, the closure of pro-Kurdish political parties in the 
1990s by the Constitutional Court based on their promotion of ethnic politics is seen as 
the reflection of the singularity in the understandings of Turkishness by the state 
institutions.285 This psyche of the state persona is called by some scholars the ‘diversity-
phobic’ nature of the official discourse in Turkey since the 1920s.286  
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As I argued previously in this chapter, the issue with Turkishness is more to do 
with its monolithic nature than the debates over its civic or ethnic attributes as many 
scholars inconclusively approach this issue.287The singular Turkishness which did not 
provide any legal-institutional spaces for the expression of subidentities has narrowed its 
own boundaries of inclusion, for all of those who were not willing to melt into the ideal 
Turk as depicted by the founding elites.  
During the 1990s, neo-Ottomanist discourses have gained momentum that has 
two characteristics: (1) the reinterpretation of Turkish nationalism is more congruent with 
cultural tolerance for diversity; and (2) increasing economic and political relations with 
the ex-Ottoman world.288 Seeing the nation-state under pressure from universalization 
and localization after the end of the Cold War and the periphery becoming the new 
sources of identity, Yilmaz Colak argues that certain Islamist groups, Alevi communities, 
and the pro-Kurdish politics have challenged the unified history of the Kemalist nation-
state.289 Under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, the combination of neo-Ottomanist 
collective memory and liberal multiculturalism has gained more public visibility and has 
appealed to more masses as seen in the electoral victories of the Islamist Welfare Party in 
the 1990s.290 However, the real fracture of Turkishness as a monolithic nationhood 
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occurred in 2003 when broadcasting in minority languages such as Kurdish, Zazaki, and 
Arabic began on a state-sponsored television channel (TRT). In addition, on August 15, 
2005, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey from the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), stated that there were around 30 different ethnic identities in 
Turkey such as Kurd, Turk, Laz, Circassian, and Bosniak which constituted the sub-
identities of the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey—that is the one and only supra-
identity.291 Interestingly, after almost eight decades of official discourses insisting on the 
constitutional and territorial definition of Turkishness, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has framed 
Turkishness as an ethnic identity by publicly announcing the ethnic pluralism in Turkey. 
The citizenship of the Republic of Turkey (T.C. Vatandasligi), not either Turkishness or 
Turkish citizenship, was framed as the only supraidentity that would include all ethnic 
identities under its roof. I would argue that this shift in the official discourse of the state 
was definitely a critical juncture in the path dependent monolithic nationhood from the 
1920s to the 2000s.  
Conclusion 
Attributing the monolithic nature to Turkishness is not new in the literature but 
the argument about how it crosscuts the ethnic versus civic debates and how these 
dichotomous approaches are inherently problematic and paradoxical brings a nuanced 
understanding for the emergence of modern Turkey’s nationhood. In the light of this 
postdichotomous argument, I argued that the assimilation processes since the 1920s 
targeted not just non-Muslim citizens (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) or non-Turk 
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Muslims (Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Bulgarians, etc.) of Turkey but the Kemalist nation-
building project targeted those who claim to be Turks as well (especially those rural 
Anatolian Turks who did not fit to the elite's imagination of Turkishness). As often 
expressed in nationalist circles, ‘one state, one nation, one language’ or ‘the indivisibility 
of the nation’ in fact is the most vivid reflection in the historical depiction of Turkishness 
in its singularity or as I frame it in its monolithic nationhood. Whether it is civic and 
inclusive or ethnic and exclusive, the first and foremost goal of the Republican elites was 
to frame and spread monolithic Turkishness over an ethnically-pluralistic society within 
which any alternative identity claims that would contradict the state-framed nationhood 
would be subject to suppression, even the alternative identity frames of Turkishness. The 
assimilation in the aim of achieving the singularity of nationhood was functional for 
establishing an unrivaled loyalty structure which in turn would consolidate the legitimacy 
of the new regime. We can understand the origins of the monolithic nationhood in these 
overlapping mechanisms. In other words, the logic of the state for inclusion or exclusion 
has been similar: security and loyalty. This psyche of the state created the path dependent 
institutionalization of Turkishness as a monolithic nationhood.  
In this monolithic structure of Turkish nationhood, legal and institutional spaces 
for hyphenated nationhood did not exist that would draw the boundaries of belonging in a 
different way. For instance, hyphenated self-identifications of Kurdish-Turkish (or 
Turkish-Kurdish) and Armenian-Turkish (or Turkish-Armenian) would be an 
oxymoronic belonging in the context of Turkey. However, this has been becoming more 
a possibility after the minority and language reforms in the post-2000 era in Turkey. 
Although the current constitution still frames Turkishness with its monolithic structure 
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(that everyone is Turkish), the increasing public visibility and public use of alternative 
identities and languages along with the state attempts at promoting their existence, I 
believe, have increased a lot of potential for a hyphenated nationhood structure in 
Turkey. In this framework of change under my four ideal-types of nationhood structures, 
I explain the conditions of change in the patterns of these nationhood configurations in 
the following chapters. Overall, I see the post-2000 legal-institutional changes (which I 
will explain in detail in the case analysis in Chapter 8) as a shift from a monolithic 
nationhood toward a hyphenated nationhood in modern Turkey.The next chapter will 
analyze the conditions under which the Ottoman elites decided to shift from hierarchical 
millet system to an overarching Ottoman identity without turning a blind eye to 





NEW WORLD ORDER, RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF THE 
 
OTTOMAN STATE, AND THE EMERGENCE 
 
OF OTTOMANISM AND OTTOMAN 
 
HOMELAND (VATAN) 
“We had many soldiers, but not a military…We were impotent”292 
Mehmed Emin Âli Paşa, The Ottoman Grand Vizier, 1871 
 
“If we put the concept of homeland in force right now, perhaps it will 
gradually be internalized by people and become powerful like in Europe, 
but it would never become powerful enough like the struggle in the name 
of religion” 
Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, Ma’ruzat, p. 130 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the paradigmatic shift from the Ottoman Millet system to 
a new legal-institutional setting of belonging under an overarching Ottoman nationhood 
as a melting pot for all ethnoreligious communities in the Ottoman Empire. This mid-
nineteenth century Ottoman state policy change was primarily reactive to the internal and 
external challenges that put the ontological security of the state at risk and secondly was 
proactive to secure the survival of the state (Devletin Bekası). A systematic analysis of 
the conditions that led to this paradigmatic shift is the focus of this chapter.  
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Ottomanism as a State Project of Patriotism and Its 
Discontents 
The traditional institutional setting of the state-society relationship in the Ottoman 
Empire was based on the millets. Despite its contemporary use of as a nation, millet in 
fact refers to the religious term cemaat (religious community) and the millets of the 
Empire included the Greek Orthodox, Jews, and Armenians where the main millet 
(millet-i hakime) was the Muslim community.293 The administration of these millets was 
based on a system of self- and local rule. As Kemal Karpat clearly states: 
The Ottoman state developed a policy toward its ethnic-religious communities 
designed not to change their ethnic composition or to affect their identity but, 
rather, to integrate them into the administrative system by recognizing and giving 
them a large degree of cultural and religious autonomy and local self-rule.294  
The millets experienced freedom from state intervention in their internal affairs 
where they had the right to property, life, religious freedom, and protection in exchange 
for special taxes.295 Although this system of ruling was necessary and crucial for 
pragmatic reasons in administering extensive lands of diverse populations rather than 
rights-based raison d’être,296 it was also a reflection of tolerance and perception of justice 
under the Islamic law.297  
This imperial system of ruling, without a doubt, constitutes an oxymoronic 
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reflection with the contemporary idea of a nation-state. While “empires are large political 
units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain 
distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people,”298 the nation-state emphasizes 
the homogeneity of the people under its borders despite the more complex reality in most 
cases. Thus, the raison d’être of the nation-state tends to create majority and minority 
distinctions among the populations under its authority. Seeing the Ottoman social system 
of millets from a majority/minority lens would be both anachronistic and reductionist. 
Originated in Western political philosophy, Elie Kedourie argues that the concept of 
minority did not have any political meaning in the Ottoman Empire until the European 
ideas of popular suffrage and nationalism reached the Ottoman body of politics in the 
nineteenth century.299 The millets of the Ottoman Empire gradually began to turn into 
minority and majority affiliations as the Ottoman state started to follow the European 
ideas of modernization in the nineteenth century.300 The project of Ottomanism sought to 
prevent the millets from turning into ethnoreligious minorities.  
Prior to the reform age of the nineteenth century, Ottoman identity or 
Ottomanness “was not a widespread social identity; it was, rather, a way of highlighting 
the very culture of the ruling elites.”301 In other words, to be or not to be an Ottoman 
drew the boundaries of the ruling elite and the ruled subjects beyond ethnic and religious 
lines. The Ottoman Imperial Edict of 1839, Reform Edict of 1856, Ottoman Nationality 
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Law of 1869, and the first Ottoman constitution in 1876 one way or another attempted to 
transform the Ottoman identity into an overarching common identity for all from its 
vertical classification between the ruler and the ruled and horizontal classification 
between the Muslim millet and the non-Muslim millets. This process of transformation 
was at the center of the idea of Ottomanism.  
Ottomanism can be defined as a political approach that accepted diverse ethnic 
and religious groups in the empire under a single and united Ottoman community and 
aimed to integrate these different groups into a common imperial ideal.302 Although the 
conventional late Ottoman historiography extensively relies on the vocabulary of 
nationalism, the notion of patriotism is underscored. Patriotism differs from the 
vocabulary of nationalism in the sense that the former seeks loyalty and allegiance to the 
state. In other words, “patriotism can be defined as love of one's country, identification 
with it, and special concern for its well-being and that of compatriots.”303 Ottomanism 
was not a project of the state promoting a certain cultural or religious group over others, 
but it was a project of enhancing loyalty to the homeland and to the state from the 
heterogeneous demographic landscape. Hakan Yavuz also points to the analytical 
distinction between nationalism and patriotism in which he sees Ottomanism “as a way of 
cementing solidarity toward the state while maintaining the cosmopolitan nature of the 
empire.”304 Toward that end, new state schools were opened bringing Muslim, Christian, 
and Jewish students together and the modern bureaucratic apparatus attracted non-
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Muslims based on meritocracy.305 This is why the concept of vatan found a new 
discursive ground in the mental maps of Ottoman bureaucrats and diplomats. As Behlül 
Özkan states, “promoting vatan as a territorial concept to secure the loyalty of subjects 
served as a modern political foundation of the Ottoman state.”306 Thus, Ottomanism 
crosscuts the dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalism and in fact refers to a protoform 
of what Jürgen Habermas popularized as ‘constitutional patriotism.’307 Constitutional 
patriotism seeks to overcome “pre-political, i.e. national and cultural, loyalties in public 
life, and supplanting them with a new, postnational, purely political identity embodied in 
the laws and institutions.”308 This, in turn, aims to impersonalize the state. Overall, 
Ottomanism referred to a gradual institutional transition from a segregation-based millet 
system in the sense that each individual and each community should remain in their own 
border (hudud) 309 toward an integrationist model where Ottoman identity became the 
new melting pot.  
Although the aforementioned discussion of Ottomanism unpacks the ideal type, 
the reality was, of course, more complex. Rather than being monolithic in discourse and 
practice, Ottomanism had many faces in the sense that the intention of the state and the 
intentions of the communities in various peripheries clashed, overlapped, and 
contradicted each other. Ottomanism as a discourse was a contested zone where liberal, 
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communitarian, religious, and ethnic perceptions of imperial nationhood and citizenship 
competed.310 Although the intention of the state was to build a common and singular 
political identity—“united in spirit and in purpose”311—certain political figures in the 
Ottoman periphery interpreted Ottomanism and Ottoman identity flexible to ethnic 
identities in the sense of being used as a hyphenated identity. For instance, Şemseddin 
Sami Bey, an ethnic Albanian, considered his Ottoman identity as an association with the 
fatherland and his Albanian identity as identification with his homeland and saw patriotic 
devotion to the Ottoman state and national commitment to the land of Albania mutually 
constitutive rather than exclusive.312 Butrus Al-Butsani, a Syrian educater and thinker, 
advocated “Arabic cultural revival, on the one hand, as a means of promoting progress 
and collective consciousness among the Syrians and of countering Western cultural 
influences; allegiance to the Ottoman state, on the other, as the best available means of 
countering this influence on the political level.”313 Al-Butsani saw no contradiction 
between Ottomanism and Syrian nationalism. Although Al-Butsani was aware of the aim 
of the Tanzimat reformers toward a single but inclusive Ottoman identity, he referred to 
the American case of nation-building out of many European nations and how these 
nations were able to establish solidarity and American identity.314 In other words, like 
Şemseddin Sami Bey, Al-Butsani envisaged a hyphenated Ottoman identity where 
particularistic identities of the periphery and the universalistic ideals of Istanbul could co-
                                                 
310 Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth 
Century Palestine.  
311 Ibid., p. 2. 
312 Gawrchy, “Tolerant Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire.”  
313 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians Between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas 





Julia Philips Cohen, in her analysis of the Jewish imperial citizenship in the era of 
Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), reveals the ebbs and flows between what she calls 
civic Ottomanism (referring to the religiously and ethnically blind state policies toward 
different Ottoman communities) and Islamic Ottomanism (referring to the emphasis of 
Islam in state policies toward different Ottoman communities) and how Jewish 
communities struggled to emphasize civic Ottomanism.316 Arguing that although Sultan 
Abdulhamid II leaned toward the emphasis of Islam, civic and Islamic Ottomanisms were 
not mutually exclusive in the first place. Rather, exclusive and inclusive patterns of 
Ottomanism were cyclical rather than linear under varying conditions of tension and 
violence. For instance, Sephardi Jews were willing to promote inclusive notions of civic 
Ottomanism for their own end, especially during the incidents of the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation’s placing bombs around Istanbul in 1896 and during the Greco-
Turkish War on Crete in 1897. Thus, Jewish communities tried to distance themselves 
from other non-Muslims if they acted violently against the state. 317   
In other words, unpacking the origins of Ottomanism and what it meant and 
sought to solve from the point of view of the state, especially surrounding the notions of 
empowering and legitimizing the Ottoman state, is crucial for understanding the 
continuities in the late Ottoman intellectual and political thought. Taking the state as an 
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object of analysis here, the issue of what made Ottomanism in the mid-nineteenth century 
a timely political action in response to an ontological security crisis of the state needs 
further attention and elaboration. In other words, the external and internal conditions that 
pushed the Ottoman bureaucrats and diplomats to put the idea of Ottomanism forward 
still need a systematic and theoretical analysis in order to understand when and why the 
state acts in response to the moments of crisis. Understanding the power and legitimacy 
structures of the modern state is essential for this purpose.  
Bringing State Back In: The Late Ottoman State and Its Power 
Structures 
As I focus on a state-centric explanation for my analysis of identity building 
through Ottomanism, it is first essential to articulate the logic of being a state and 
practicing its functions. Despite different perspectives on, and the lack of a single general 
theory of, the state, one of the most accepted definitions of the modern state in 
contemporary studies comes from Max Weber who emphasized the state as an entity that 
employs “the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”318 
Being a modern state is incarnated in Weber’s use of monopoly and legitimacy. While 
monopoly refers to centralization in bureaucratic and military fields, legitimacy is 
associated with the social contract between the state and society. In premodern states, 
while the use of violence tended to be a private practice rather than an impersonal 
function such as exercised by mercenaries, the action of ruling over populations did not 
particularly entail a social contract such as constitutions. The Ottoman state’s 
                                                 




transformation beginning with the Tanzimat was an attempt to come to terms with the 
Weberian modern state: establishing the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence by 
centralization in the bureaucratic and military spheres on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, legitimacy through integration of all ethnoreligious communities under the 
common homeland since the ontological security of the Ottoman state was at stake.  
To be ontologically secure, the modern state depends on three assets: (1) territory, 
(2) sovereignty, 319 and (3) legitimacy.320 Any internal or external threat to these three 
assets jeopardizes the ontological security of the state. For this reason, the state is not a 
fixed entity but rather it is constructed and reconstructed in temporal sequences. 
Territory, sovereignty, and legitimacy of the state can suffer moments of crisis either 
internally between state and nonstate actors or externally with other states. Theda 
Skocpol thus argues a la Otto Hintze that “states necessarily stand at the intersection 
between domestic sociopolitical orders and the transnational relations within which they 
must maneuver for survival and advantage in relation to other states.”321 In this dynamic 
of ontological security, we can better understand the logic of reform by the state and for 
the state. For instance, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, a prominent statesmen and official historian 
of the Tanzimat era, similarly highlights the territory, sovereignty, and legitimacy 
problems within the Ottoman state. He discusses how the concept of homeland (vatan) 
was replacing religion as the catalyst for war-making capacities in Europe and argues that 
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the Ottomans would experience difficulties in replacing Islam with vatan as the power 
base for the Ottoman military’s war-making capacity.322 Thus, the conscription of non-
Muslims in the Ottoman military would be less likely to empower the Ottoman military 
he argues, but he also states that this was a necessity more than an option since the 
Ottoman military was experiencing difficulties in recruiting Muslim soldiers. This was, 
of course, an outcome of the financial collapse of the Ottoman state in the mid-19th 
century which according to Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, some considered this as a state collapse. 
At this time, he says, it was heard that European states would share the partitioning 
Ottoman Empire.323 The power of the Ottoman state, in terms of its autonomy and 
capacity, was failing.  
In terms of the state power, while “autonomy refers to the state’s ability to 
formulate interests of its own, independent of or against the will of the divergent societal 
interest,” “capacity is defined here as the state’s ability to implement strategies to achieve 
its economic, political, or social goals in society.”324 Yet, the sources of autonomy and 
capacity are not just material but also entail an immaterial base. This is why Tuong Vu 
aptly argues that “the state is no longer defined as a purely materialist concept; rather, a 
greater emphasis is now placed on immaterial (especially ‘cultural’) aspects of the 
state.”325 The works of Antonio Gramsci in the early twentieth century and Michael 
Mann in the late twentieth century have made important contributions to the 
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understanding of the modern state’s immaterial sources of power.326 For Gramsci, the 
nature of the modern state cannot be unpacked without linking force and consent, on the 
one hand, coercion and persuasion on the other. These two dimensions are historically 
and mutually constitutive incarnating the meaning of the state. 327 In other words, “no 
state can maintain its stability and permanence without establishing mechanisms to 
generate legitimating institutions by which the consent of the population is mobilized.”328 
In addition to Gramsci’s emphasis on the consent or persuasion mechanism in the 
survival of the state, Michael Mann focuses on the distinction between despotic and 
infrastructural power structures of the state.  While despotic power refers to the extensive 
authority of the state without any need of consultation with the society or other nonstate, 
infrastructural power is built through penetration and collaboration with the society.329 
Heavy reliance on the despotic power without grounding it on a sustainable 
infrastructural power is an important sign of weakness for modern states. In the cycle of 
state modernization attempts, Ottomanism definitely referred to this immaterial 
conceptualization in terms of empowering the autonomy and capacity of the Ottoman 
state by creating a new infrastructural power base when the new European norms began 
to emphasize homeland more than religion.330   
Based on these approaches to the state power, how can we contextualize the 
degree of power of the Ottoman state at the turn of the nineteenth century in order to put 
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the rise of Ottomanism into a historical context in terms of its intention and timing? Did 
the Ottoman state have despotic and infrastructural power, both internally and externally 
in the beginning of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries? Was the state capacity 
sufficient in order to put various governing policies forward and rule over the 
peripheries? What was the degree of state autonomy from other power structures in the 
periphery and at the imperial center? How strong was the Ottoman state when the Young 
Turks came into power? Through answering these questions, I believe two discussions 
can be made. First, the late Ottoman political elite mindset can be critically and 
analytically contextualized in relation and within the concept of the state. Second, one 
can grasp the larger picture of continuities from the Tanzimat elites to the Young Turks 
within the cognitive framework of Ottomanism.  Thus, the notion of empowering the 
Ottoman state through the intended policies of Ottomanism can be more vividly 
unpacked.  
Internal Opportunities and External Neccessities: The Making 
of Reforms and the Emergence of Ottomanism in the Early 
Nineteenth Century 
By the 1800s, the Ottoman political context corresponded to the weaker central 
state, stronger external rivals, and stronger provincial societal forces. The Ottoman state, 
which was still patrimonial as an extension of the Sultan’s dynasty, lacked both a 
despotic and infrastructural power. Neither the material sources of war-making and 
military-building nor the immaterial sources of penetrating the society for extracting 
resources were sufficient. While the lack of manpower for war-making was a real 
concern, “war, once an important source of income for the empire, had become a loss-
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making industry.”331 The unruly and arbitrary misconducts of provincial warlords and 
disobedient autonomous power networks of notables (ayan) were both threatening 
internal security and order and also challenging the authority of Istanbul as if the empire 
consisted of multiple dynasties rather a single and supreme one.332 The tax income base 
was mostly based on agriculture in which the traditional tax-farming system strengthened 
the autonomous power of the ayans. Besides, most of the tax income was spent by 
provincial administrations rather than by the central state. On the other hand, the 
Janissaries, an elite military faction, “were garrisoned in the major provincial centres as 
well as in the capital, were a numerically large (and expensive) but militarily largely 
worthless body, strong enough to terrorize the government and population alike, but too 
weak to defend the empire.”333 While this was a sign of the declining military efficiency 
of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis the technologically advancing European armies, it was 
also a manifestation of limited sovereignty of the Ottoman body politic. In other words, 
the capacity and autonomy of the Ottoman state in terms of the Sultan’s power house to 
act in and for itself was limited.  
From a historical-sociological perspective, Tim Jacoby very successfully narrates 
the change and continuity in the Ottoman state by adopting Michael Mann’s 
interpretation of imperial rule that laid out the notions of infrastructural and despotic 
power.334 He argues that ulema and Islam functioned as the primary infrastructural power 
                                                 
331 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 17. 
332 Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity. 
333 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 17. 
334 Jacoby’s book gives innovative insights on the background of the modern Turkish state through 
a macrohistorical analysis of the Ottoman past from a lens of Michael Mann’s social power theory: Tim 
Jacoby, Social Power and the Turkish State. For the article length version of the Ottoman state analysis, see 
Tim Jacoby, “The Ottoman State: A Distinct Form of Imperial Rule?” pp. 268-291.  
  
138 
of the Ottoman state: 
Underpinned by the flexibility of the örf, the imperial state maintained a polity of 
sufficient adaptability to prevent diverse socio-economic strata at the periphery 
from decentralising power and then forming an intermediary class between its 
agents and the plebeian reaya. In seeking to institutionalise a direct relationship 
between ruler and ruled through a hierarchically organised network of clerics, 
soldiers and administrators, the Ottomans transformed Islam's innate 
transcendentalism into an immanent ideological infrastructure.335 
Once this traditional infrastructural power diminished in parallel to the military 
decline and the Ottoman elites’ perception of a weakening state, the “viable alternative” 
to the Islamic ideological base of the Ottoman state was the project of Ottomanism. For 
instance, in Ma’ruzat, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa is well aware of how the infrastructural power 
base of religion was being superseded by the concept and idea of vatan. Yet, he states 
that although the political attachment and identification with the homeland was 
established gradually in the European context, replacing Islam with the idea of Ottoman 
vatan would need a few generations to establish it. Until then, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa argues 
that the Ottoman military would remain ‘soulless.’336 The Ottoman ruling elites were 
becoming increasingly aware of the relatively weakening imperial state both in relation to 
the other states and in relation to domestic peripheral forces, and Ottomanism was the 
recipe for overcoming the state crisis of ontological security. This institutional transition 
came into being with external necessities (i.e., forces of international context in relation 
to peripheral demand-makings) on the one hand and internal opportunities (elite 
competition and the elimination of the veto players) on the other.  
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International Context and Structural Changes 
In Ending Empires, which “attempts to explain why compromise and 
accommodation resolved some nationalist conflicts and why hard-line policies led to 
conflict and bloodshed in other instances,” Hendrik Spruyt argues that “while the 
international environment provided catalysts for change, domestic politics explains the 
variation in policies.”337 French and American Revolutions in the late eighteenth century 
definitely meant a sea of change in the international system and the international political 
culture.338 Mlada Bukovansky demonstrates the comparative-historical background of 
these revolutions and how they gradually affected the international political culture on the 
one hand and international state system on the other:  
From the mid-eighteenth century onward, the political struggles of European and 
American aristocrats against the perceived despotism of their monarchs yielded a 
profound shift in how both leaders and subjects came to view the sources and 
terms of legitimate political authority. Bloodlines and divine sanction began to 
lose their symbolic power as sources of legitimacy; popular will—however 
nebulously deﬁned—began its ascent as the ultimate source of legitimate 
authority. In their power struggles, monarchists and those who challenged them 
deployed the material and cultural resources at their disposal. A central resource 
for all sides was the complex and diverse body of discourse known as 
Enlightenment thought.339 
By Enlightenment thought, Bukovansky underscores the certain values and 
systems of government under modernity: 
We live in an era accustomed to taking Enlightenment conceptions of political 
legitimacy for granted. Equality, individual rights, the power of reason to resolve 
political and administrative issues, the necessity of checking the powers of 
government to allow civil society to ﬂourish, and the notion that political 
authority—or sovereignty—ultimately resides in the people of a nation: all these 
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notions, however imperfectly realized in practice, have come to dominate global 
political discourse. They are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as 
standards toward which all member states should strive. But historically, these 
standards of legitimacy emerged within a context dominated by a distinctly 
different notion of legitimate authority: that of dynastic, monarchical sovereignty 
legitimated by blood and divine sanction.340 
One of the leading Tanzimat reformers, Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha, describes this 
change in the system of ruling surrounding popular sovereignty and in the international 
political culture to Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) in 1871: 
His Highness, once upon a time, the rulers who had divine rights would hide 
themselves from ordinary people and thus grant themselves a mystic and a kingly 
image. The names of such rulers would suffice to create fear and respect among 
people. However, communities in our contemporary era show respect to their 
rulers as they represent authority with a worldly existence rather than a divine 
rule. Today, this worldly relationship between the ruler and the ruled is the 
strongest guardian of the rulers. 341 
Moreover, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, the official historian of the Ottoman state and a 
prominent statesman in the mid-nineteenth century, mentions the idea of nationality and 
how it is likely to change the internal and external relations of the imperial states:  
The French Emperor, Napoleon III, brought out an idea of ‘Nationalite’ during his 
war with Austria over the issue of Italy. This triggered a new situation against the 
rule of domination which had been in force for years. Namely, although the rulers 
had the authority and rights to forcefully suppress the peoples’ rebellions and 
subordinate the rebels, Napoleon III destroyed this right of the rulers by bringing 
out a new order to the world: ‘a government shall let the people go if those people 
would not be willing to live under that government.’ Thus, he said that ‘since the 
Italians under the Austrian rule did not want to live with Austrians, Austria should 
give up on these Italians’ and Britain was the one that first accepted this 
‘Nationalite’ norm. While states such as Russia and Austria rejected this norm, 
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other states hesitated to do so.342  
These Enlightenment values gradually shifted the imperial system of dynastic rule 
into an international system of nation-states as equals under the international bodies such 
as the United Nations. While many empires one way or another encountered internal and 
external crises in the process of the adaptation to the gradual transformation of the 
international system, empires were still the legitimate units of world politics until World 
War I. Although World War I did not completely legitimize the nation-state system (see 
Chapter 7), the number of nation-states skyrocketed especially after the dissolution of the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.343 However, it should be noted that structural change by 
itself does not constitute a causal effect on domestic changes. Rather, as Andreas 
Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein aptly argue, contexts and contingencies are important 
dimensions in understanding how global structures are diffused internally.344 In other 
words, the French and American Revolutions were the initial triggering forces that 
gradually led to the diffusion of the ideals and values such as popular and national 
sovereignty at the turn of the twentieth century.345  
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For instance, Eric Weitz, in his analysis of the shift in the nineteenth century 
international order from the Vienna system to the Paris system, argues that the interstate 
system moved away from dynastic legitimacy and state sovereignty with clearly defined 
borders towards population politics along with state sovereignty congruent with national 
homogeneity.346 The protection of minority rights, civilizing missions, and humanitarian 
interventions had become international issues amid the Great Power politics. For Weitz, 
liberal principles following the French and American revolutions and European 
imperialism are the two main factors behind the structural shift in the international order. 
The Ottoman state was not outside of these global trends in the international system. In 
the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman elites had 
observed these changes in different venues such as working in European embassies, 
receiving higher education in European schools, and getting trained by European military 
officials. These elites came to the conclusion that interstate competition, especially within 
the great power rivalry among the European states, necessitated the adaptation to the 
structural trends in the international system.  
Following Weitz’s analysis, Michael Reynolds successfully places the collapse of 
the Ottoman state within this international context where interstate competition deeply 
affected domestic policy-making with its intended and unintended consequences.347 The 
issue of ‘minority rights’ was, in fact, a means of great power competition. The Ottoman 
state was by no means outside of the structural changes at the international level. Yet, 
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weakening military capacity, declining economic resources and inefficiency, and 
declining rule-making and order-enforcing institutions put the Ottoman Empire as the 
follower of the new discourses and practices of the newly emerging European norms. In 
other words, the Ottoman state was not in a position to generate new discourses that 
could (re)shape the international system but rather the Ottomans were the inevitable 
followers of the external discourses.  
Davide Rodogno, in his analysis of the political history of humanitarian 
intervention, argues that the discourse and practice of intervening in other states in the 
name of ending human suffering in the target state was incarnated within the relationship 
between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers, especially in the context of the 
Eastern Question, a concern over the political and social conditions of the Christian 
populations in the Ottoman Balkans.348 Midhat Pasha, the late Tanzimat reformer and the 
architect of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876, emphasizes the significance of the 
Eastern Question for the Ottoman State: 
...many people still believe that Christians in Turkey are looked upon as vile 
slaves, and treated as such, it is necessary to demonstrate the falsity of these 
accusations, and to speak of the relations which exist in Turkey between 
Mussulmans and Christian....349 
He points to the centrality of the Eastern Question in the public interest of Europe 
and argues how the European expectations to the solution of this Question were 
miscalculated. He argues that talking about the East without knowing about its 
geography, ethnography, and history would not end up with a well-understood depiction 
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of it. Yet, there were two projected solutions to this humanitarian crisis as perceived by 
the European powers: either the dismemberment of the empire or the modernization of 
the empire through transformative reforms. However, as Davide Rodogno successfully 
reveals, the European discourse of humanitarian intervention lacked legitimacy from two 
shortcomings of the Europeans themselves: 1) the orientalist rhetoric that Europe was in a 
position of civilizational superiority over the ‘barbarian’ Ottomans; and 2) hypocrisy of 
the discourse due to the fact of the European treatment of human populations in their 
colonies such as the French treatment of the Algerians.350 Thus, the idea of humanitarian 
intervention, especially over the Ottoman territories, was more a realist notion of Great 
Power imperialism and power-seeking than a liberal notion of promoting political and 
civil rights per se. This is why the establishment of the Concert of Europe in 1815 
exercised a nonintervention clause only among the European powers themselves. 
Although the Ottoman Empire joined the Concert of Europe in 1856, the external 
pressure for reforms was present throughout the nineteenth century.  
Overall, these transformations in the international political culture had 
ramifications in the domestic balance of power between the imperial center in Istanbul 
and the peripheries within which peripheral demand-makings further gave the impetus for 
change in the boundaries of belonging to the Ottoman state. Unless reform was put in 
effect, the Ottoman elites believed that the ontological security of the state was in 
jeopardy. Ali Haydar Mithat Bey, the son of the most significant reformist Ottoman 
vizier Mithad Pasha in the late Tanzimat era, states this security dimension in his 1903 
biography of his father: 
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At the time of Mahmud II.’s accession to the throne [1808], after the murder of 
Selim III, the accumulation of difficulties and dangers that beset the empire were 
such that it seemed as if nothing short of a miracle could prevent its complete 
destruction. It required at any rate some very potent principles of internal strength 
and cohesion to resist the centrifugal forces in full activity at that crisis…Serbia 
was in open revolt under Michel Obrenowitz, Egypt was in the hands of the able 
and ambitious Mehemet Ali, Arabia was in the effervescence of a Wahabee rising, 
the Pasha of Janina had raised the standard of revolt, and the Governor of Widdin, 
the famous Pasvan Oglou, had proclaimed his independence, and--most serious 
danger of all--the insurrection of Greece, supported by a consensus of enthusiasm 
in Europe, threatened the integrity of the empire; all this, too, at the very moment 
when the military forces of the empire were undergoing the complete 
reorganisation which Selim had begun, and Mahmoud was resolved to carry 
out.351 
Ali Haydar Mithat Bey calls this era of turbulence “the mortal crisis of the 
Ottoman Empire.”352  As stated previously, Greek independence supported by European 
liberal circles was the most significant and proximate cause in the incarnation of the 
threat to the security of the empire in the mindset of the elites.  
Peripheral Demand-Makings, Relative Weakness, and State 
Security 
Midhat Pasha vividly summarizes the state of the Ottoman Empire in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: 
During this time Europe was becoming organised and was entering by degrees on 
the path of progress. Towards the end of that century a vigorous and energetic 
effort was giving a new start to modern civilisation and changing the form and 
nature of governments, whilst the Ottoman Empire, wanting men capable of 
appreciating the excellence of realised progress and the necessity of making the 
country take a step in advance, had remained stationary, and had modified in 
nowise its ancient institutions, which themselves, it must be admitted, had fallen 
into such a state of disorganisation that a change of system had become inevitable. 
The material forces of the Empire were exhausted alike by intestine disorders and 
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by the periodical wars which it had to maintain against Russia.353 
The elites were increasingly aware of the relative weaknesses of the Ottoman state 
vis-à-vis the military and political development of the European powers surrounding the 
ideals of Enlightenment after the French and American revolutions. They were also 
aware of how the new trends external to the Ottoman Empire had serious internal 
ramifications in terms of different antistate demand-making structures such as separation 
movements (e.g., Greece and Serbia). Thus, one cannot understand the conditions that 
pushed the Ottoman ruling elites to perceive the state as materially and immaterially 
weak without the claim-makings of various peripheral movements and the incapacity of 
the state to respond to these claim-makings in a timely manner. The Greek independence 
and Serbian autonomy in the first half of the nineteenth century were the key challenges 
that put the Ottoman state into an ontological security crisis. As Carter Findley argues, 
“Greek independence and Serbian autonomy signaled the start of a reconfiguration that 
would ultimately shatter the equilibria and relationships that held the multinational 
Islamic empire together.”354 Moreover, Şükrü Ilıcak critically analyzes the Greek 
insurgency (1821-1826) and provides a thick description of it, a topic that has been 
largely ignored in the history of the late Ottoman Empire according to Ilıcak.355 He 
considers the effect of the Greek insurgency on the Ottoman ruling elites greater than it is 
often thought. For him, the Greek insurgency “proved to be a war of survival both for the 
insurgents and the Ottoman central state: the former struggling literally for their 
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existence, the latter forced to rethink its system of imperial allegiances and human 
capital, carry out two colossal operations of social engineering and recast its military 
establishment and society in order to prevent collapse.”356 The Greek insurgency was not 
the only antistate mobilization against Istanbul but due to its discursive content and form 
of separatism, it caused deep and long-lasting impacts in the nineteenth century Ottoman 
state and society. The holistic transformative approach of reforms was the vivid 
manifestation of the perception of the weakness in the state apparatus of the empire. This 
is why the Sultan viewed the separatist movement as a reflection of the weak state rather 
than a conscientious political action by the insurgents.357  
The leading reformers of the state (i.e., Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Mehmed Emin Ali 
Pasha, and Fuad Pasha) during the Tanzimat era one way or another all emphasized the 
survival of the state (Devletin Bekası). For instance, Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha describes 
the Tanzimat politics as a choice between life and death of the empire in his political 
statement in 1871:  
It was necessary and crucial to resist, to stand on our own feet and to prevent the 
separation and partition…The future of our State depended on whether this policy 
[Tanzimat] was accepted or rejected.358 
In his political statement to the Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876), Fuad Pasha 
mentions the integration of different millets in order to prevent the partition of the state:  
In terms of our domestic affairs, we need to put all of our efforts into one goal: to 
                                                 
356 Ibid., p. 1. 
357 Ibid.  
358 “Ayakta durmak, direnmek, bolunmeye ve parcalanmaya yer vermemek gerekiyordu...Unlu 
atalarimizin mirasi olan Osmanli Devleti su anda butunlugunu hemen hemen muhafaza etmektedir. Biz 
iktidara geldigimizde bu miras yok olmak yolundaydi. Bu durum karsisinda en uygun siyaseti guttugumuze 
inaniyoruz. Devletimizin istikbali bu siyasetin kabulune veya reddine baglidir” in Fuat Andic and Suphi 
Andic, eds. 2000. SADRAZAM ALI PASA: HAYATI, ZAMANI VE SIYASI VASIYETNAMESI. Eren 
Yayincilik: Istanbul, 2000, p. 59. 
  
148 
integrate different communities together in our country. Without this integration, 
the survival and continuity of the Ottoman State is impossible.359 
As these state elites of the Tanzimat era saw the necessity of reform in order to 
integrate different communities together on the one hand and empower the state by 
centralizing its power on the other, their reformist agenda would be less likely to be 
implemented unless they would eliminate the veto powers of the old Ottoman guards 
(i.e., the military (Janissaries) and the ulema).  
Inside the State: Elite Competition and Veto Players 
For Selçuk Akşin Somel, the first elite-level ideas of Ottomanism after 1839 were 
conducive to the authoritarian centralization of the state.360 This is why İlber Ortaylı 
states that the Westernization of the empire in the nineteenth century was more an 
outcome of domestic processes than a direct result of external pressures.361 In other 
words, the power consolidation at the center vis-à-vis other power networks such as the 
Janissaries and the provincial ayans created more opportunity spaces for the Ottoman 
Sublime Porte to initiate, design, and implement reforms.  
The aim of Ottomanism was to strengthen the state not just externally but 
internally as well, because traditional power centers such as the Janissaries and the 
increasing power of provincial notables (ayans) vis-à-vis the central state were a sign of 
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what İlber Ortaylı calls “double sovereignty.”362 “During the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the central government relied heavily on the ayan both for troops and 
for tax collection (many notables held official posts as tax collectors)”363 and some of 
these families even conducted independent foreign relations without any control of the 
central government. The reformist mindset, thus, was also a reaction to the warlord ayans 
for the Sultan to consolidate the power of the center and the foundation of Sublime Porte 
as a shift from military bureaucracy to civic bureaucracy facilitated the initiation of 
Ottomanist reforms.364 In that regard, the elimination of the veto players against the new 
institutionalization efforts was essential in the making of Ottomanism which would pre-
empt further weakening of the state.  
In his insightful analysis of reformist mindset in the nineteenth century Ottoman 
Empire, Burak Kadercan also reveals the intraelite competition within the Ottoman state 
particularly within the framework of civil-military relations.365 By particularly looking at 
the Ottoman military reforms in the beginning of the nineteenth century, Kadercan argues 
that “whenever the Janissaries perceived a threat to their corporate interests and 
privileges, they blocked military reforms not only within the corps but elsewhere in the 
Ottoman military establishment.”366 The ulema (the highest religious establishment) was 
also an agent within the elite competition since “to ensure that future Ottoman leaders 
refrained from similar reform efforts, the Janissaries convinced the state’s religious 
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authorities to issue an opinion declaring that the suggested military reforms were 
incompatible with religious law.”367 Although Kadercan’s analysis focuses on military 
reforms, the intraelite competition in general and the civilian-military relations in 
particular was an important component of the dynamics of Tanzimat and Ottomanism 
throughout the nineteenth century.368 It was only after the abolishment of the Janissaries 
in 1826 and the power consolidation of civilian elites who had a reformist mindset 
(Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha and later Midhat Pasha) 
that the structural reform of the empire toward a solid integration of different millets and 
efficient centralization under Ottomanism became possible.  
Seeing the state as a unitary actor may be viable in the international system. 
However, in order to understand the internal and external actions of the state, one needs 
to look at the elite structure and elite competition inside the state. It is the governing 
elites who become able to rule by eliminating the veto players, and who create 
opportunity structures for reform.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the rise and the spread of Ottomanism in the mindset of the early 
nineteenth century Ottoman ruling elites came into being among mutually constitutive 
historical contingencies and temporal sequences. The context of these external necessities 
and internal opportunities to reform occurred in three interconnected relationships: 1) the 
changing international context toward popular sovereignty rather than dynastic 
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sovereignties; 2) the rise of peripheral antistate demand-makings that benefited from the 
opportunity spaces of the changing international context; and 3) the internal power 
competition within the Ottoman state and the power consolidation of civilian elites who 
believed in reform.  
While the peripheral challenges to the central state, especially the separatist Greek 
insurgency, pushed the Ottoman state elites to reconsider the condition of state weakness 
and strength, the rising European norms of humanitarian intervention and popular 
sovereignty along with their realist articulation in the context of power-seeking rival 
states provided more opportunity spaces to insurgent movements against the Ottoman 
state. On the other hand, the increasing diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman state 
and European powers exposed the relative weakness of the Ottoman state among the 
Ottoman foreign diplomats and bureaucrats. Yet, the necessity to reform would be less 
likely unless the power of the imperial center was consolidated vis-à-vis the veto players 
such as the traditional military establishment and the semisovereign provincial notables.    
Thus, I unpacked the conditions that led to the first comprehensive identity 
reform—the patriotic Ottomanism project—in the Ottoman Empire that sought a major 
paradigm shift from the institutionalized millet system. In terms of the timing of the 
incarnation of Ottomanism in the Ottoman body politic, I have proposed a multilayered 
process of historical contingencies and temporal sequences which I phrase as ‘external 
necessities and internal opportunities.’ While external necessities speak to the structural 
trends in the international political environment (e.g., the emergence of new international 
norms, their various use for geopolitical competition and political gains by states), 
internal opportunities point to the reaction to and adoption of these norms and political 
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trends by domestic political actors—be it the state and/or the societal actors.  
Although the aforementioned multilayered process of change can explain the 
conditions under which the state elites seriously reconsider and implement reform of the 
old institutional structures of belonging to the state, the question of what motivates the 
same elites for identity-based reform is more related to the perceptions of the ontological 
(in)security of the state (Devletin Bekası). As I articulated throughout this chapter, the 
leading elites of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century became 
increasingly aware of the state weakness relative to their European counterparts. The 
reformers believed that the only way to overcome this power gap in interstate 
competition was to adopt the international political culture (i.e., popular sovereignty, 
constitution, and the idea of vatan) through internal institutional transformation of the 
state.  
As a result, this reform-making surrounding the Ottomanism project in relation 
and in response to the ontological security of the state which was internally and 
externally threatened established a state-centered mindset of the latter Ottoman political 
thinkers and statesmen including the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. The 





POST?WORLD WAR I CONTEXT, NEW ELITES WITH `NATIONAL` 
 
MINDSET AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF OTTOMAN 
 
IDENTITY INTO MONOLITHIC TURKISHNESS 
“The integrity of the homeland, the sovereignty of the nation is under threat.” 
The first clause of the communique in Sivas Congress, June 1919 
 
“In the West and East alike, the internal organization of a state that has 
communities from different cultures, genesis, and ideals in a single 
territory that are not compatible with each other would be baseless and 
rotten.” 
Mustafa Kemal, President of Turkey, 1927 
 
‘İktidar olduk ama muktedir olamadık’ 
Adnan Menderes 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I unpacked the policy shift of the Ottoman elites from the 
millet system to the policy of Ottomanism for greater integration of the different 
communities under an overarching Ottoman identity and better centralization of the 
government authority. In this chapter, I first reveal the continuity of Ottomanism as a 
state policy towards the end of World War I and underline the conditions under which the 
state elites were more committed to an imperial Ottoman identity rather than a national 
identity. Second, I articulate the changing domestic and external conditions after World 
War I  and discuss how new external necessities and internal opportunities gradually led 
to the adoption of a monolithic Turkish nationhood under the leadership of Mustafa 
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Kemal and his movement against the guards of the old Ottoman regime.  
Continuity of the Ottoman Identity Until the End of World 
War 1 
If the Tanzimat reformers, particularly Ali and Fuad Paşa, cultivated the first 
seeds of Ottomanism in response to the internal and external challenges that the Ottoman 
state was encountering at the turn of the nineteenth century, an opposition group against 
these reformers emerged in the 1860s under the secret society called the Patriotic 
Alliance and was later known as the Young Ottomans. Although the Young Ottomans 
were not necessarily against the reforms per se, “their intense patriotism made them think 
of reform for Ottomans, by Ottomans, and along Islamic lines.”369 They considered the 
Tanzimat reforms to be the outcome of European pressures rather than the Ottoman state 
acting independently by itself and for itself. The lack of a separation of powers after the 
fall of the Janissaries and the declining influence of the Ulema and the Tanzimat regime 
under the rule of Ali and Fuad Paşa were seen as more and more an absolutist rule that 
rejected sharing their power through a constitutional and parliamentary government. The 
reforms were seen as concessions to the European powers rather than a sovereign attempt 
of the state to defend and strengthen itself. Namık Kemal, a literary figure and a poet of 
the time and perhaps the most important figure among the Young Ottomans, publicized 
the concept of vatan (fatherland) through his play called Fatherland, or Silistire (1873) 
within which vatan and Allah are seen as inseparable units of the state.370 However, this 
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was not necessarily a challenge or opposition to Tanzimat Ottomanism, but rather it was 
a critique that Ottomanism “lacked complete legitimacy because it did not conform fully 
to Europe’s discourse of reform or to the anchors of Islamic collective identity.”371 Thus, 
the legal equality of non-Muslims and Muslims was not a concern and it was not in 
contradiction with Islamic community values, but again it was more about the condition 
of the state in the hands of the few and ‘at the service’ of the European powers. The 
Young Ottomans sought to utilize Ottomanism deeper and further to make the Ottoman 
state sovereign and independent through the institutions of constitutional and 
parliamentary rule.  This legacy of the state persona continued within the Young Turks 
as well.  
If the conditions surrounding the ontological security of the state pushed the 
Ottoman governing elites to reform the state by initiating the project of Ottomanism in 
the early nineteenth century, the intended goals of establishing a stronger Ottoman state 
with new institutions and new raison d’état were curtailed with more crises at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Let alone establishing a secure political and social environment for 
non-Muslim communities, the Ottoman state became weaker to the point that it could not 
even provide security for its Muslim populations. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 
and the resulting Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 which ended 
with the Ottoman state’s death in Europe and the massacre of Balkan Muslims were 
important indicators of the Ottoman state’s unrelenting weakening and incapacities 
despite the intentions of the Tanzimat reforms. As opposed to the aims of finding a 
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ground of legal equality between Muslim and non-Muslim communities through 
Ottomanism, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of Berlin further 
legitimized the idea of border-making based on national homogeneity in the international 
state system and led to further national aspirations for the different communities within 
the empire such as the Armenians, Macedonians, and Albanians. At the end of the Balkan 
Wars, the Ottoman state lost 83% of its land and 69% of its population in Europe.372 
Basically, the Ottoman Empire turned into an Anatolian state with Muslims constituting 
the majority of the population. This was, of course, a devastating experience for the 
Ottoman ruling elites since the Balkan territories were the engine of multireligious and 
multi-linguistic harmony and the economic power house of the Ottoman wealth. 
 If Greek separatism and independence (1821-1832) was shocking to the 
‘almighty’ Ottoman state at that time, the post-1878 and the Balkan Wars laid the 
groundwork for more devastating national struggles and territory losses in conjunction 
with European economic and political interventions against the state at multiple fronts. 
After such military defeats and their outcome of legitimacy deficits,373 the state became 
completely ontologically insecure and the Ottoman elites encountered fear and anxiety on 
how to keep the only territory in their hands: Anatolia. For instance, in his memoirs, Talat 
Paşa, one of the most leading figures of the CUP during World War I, reveals the fear 
and anxiety over the survival of the state. He states that the “power overrides right” 
theory was apparent for ‘Devlet-i Aliyye’ after the defeat in the Balkans referring to the 
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weakness of the state.374 The desperate need for an external ally was inevitable.  
The search for an external ally was in order to revitalize the psychologically and 
physically defeated state and distorted social psyche. Entering World War I on the side of 
the Germans was a risk but also an opportunity to secure the survival of the remaining 
Muslim Anatolia. According to Mustafa Aksakal, a diplomatic historian of the Ottoman 
involvement in World War I, by 1914, the Ottoman elite (the CUP) regarded the only 
way to cease the further partition of the state to be through military power and World 
War I functioned as an opportunity space in that regard.375 Under the siege of European 
capitulations that favored the trading activities of the Ottoman Christians and the 
European political tutelage, the Ottoman state was only de facto sovereign and 
independent. As Zafer Toprak argues, the CUP entered World War I to gain back its 
sovereignty and full economic and political independence from the European powers.376  
If isolated from international politics, neither material nor immaterial sources of state 
power were sufficient to prevent the further disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.377  
In the context of understanding Ottomanism as patriotism and the Ottomanists as 
empire-savers rather than empire-destructors, the state-centric mentality of the late 
Ottoman elites would be better understood. Amid the aforementioned series of turmoil in 
the post-Tanzimat era, Ottomanism was still the driving force of the state after 1878 until 
the end of World War I.  After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, although Sultan 
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Abdulhamid II emphasized the role of Islam and the institution of the Caliphate after this 
war’s catastrophic loss for the Muslim world in general and the Ottoman state in 
particular, the policy of Ottomanism was not abolished, at least in a legal sense. 
Regarding Sultan Abdulhamid II’s Islamic policy, Hasan Kayalı argues that “it did not 
entail a novel definition of the fatherland; nor did it jeopardize the legal status and rights 
that the non-Muslims had gained under the secular Ottomanism of the preceding decades, 
though clearly Hamidian ideology was exclusionary from a social and psychological 
point of view with respect to non-Muslims.”378 Thus, the Hamidian era should not be read 
as a sharp rupture from the Tanzimat (1839-1876) as is often done in the discussions of 
the late Ottoman history. Frederick F. Anscombe also points to this continuity especially 
from a perspective of religion since “the Ottoman state had always been of and for 
Muslims first.”379  
The Young Turks or the Committee of Union and Progress emerged and evolved 
as a coalition of oppositional figures who were against the authoritarian policies of Sultan 
Abdulhamid II. It was a coalition because the organization was neither monolithic nor 
unified in its political agenda.380 The main concern that brought the oppositional figures 
together was the reinstituting of the Ottoman constitution thus creating accountability on 
the arbitrary rule of the Sultan. Since the Young Turks were not all Turks and did not 
belong to a similar ideology, they considered the constitution the guarantor of liberal 
politics within which Ittihad-ı Anasır (union of all Ottoman elements; Muslims and non-
Muslims, Turks and non-Turks alike) would be secured and established. In Talat Paşa’s 
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words, the CUP aimed “the progress and rise of the common vatan through the union of 
all Ottoman elements.”381 
Sultan Abdulhamid II didn't completely shy away from the idea of Ottomanism, 
and neither did the CUP. However, prominent scholars such as Şükrü Hanioğlu frame the 
CUP in the framework of Turkish nationalism.382 According to Hanioğlu, the true agenda 
of the CUP included: 
a strong government, the dominant role played by an intellectual elite, anti-
imperialism, a society in which Islam would play no governing role, and a 
Turkish nationalism that would bloom later…The last item on the agenda was 
controversial, since some CUP members were not Turkish. While Turkish 
members gravitated toward Turkish nationalism, which became the guiding 
ideology of the CUP, especially after 1906, the non-Turkish members leaned 
toward their own respective nationalist movements.383 
On the contrary, Hasan Kayalı, one of the leading scholars of the Young Turks, 
argues that: 
The Young Turks envisaged the creation of a civic-territorial, indeed 
revolutionary- democratic, Ottoman political community by promoting an 
identification with the state and the country through the sultan and instituting 
representative government. Though they remained committed to the monarchy 
within the constitutional framework, they conceived of an Ottoman state and 
society akin to the French example in which religion and ethnicity would be 
supplanted by state-based patriotism.384 
While Kayalı and Hanioğlu’s approaches are two contradicting views regarding 
the identity politics of the CUP, Erik Jan Zürcher introduces a somewhat vague 
framework of ‘Ottoman Muslim nationalism’ by rejecting the identity categorizations 
among Turkish nationalism, Islamism, and Ottomanism: 
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The Unionists’ ideology was nationalist in the sense that they demanded the 
establishment of a state of their own: before 1918 they took every step to make 
the existing Ottoman state the Muslims’ own and after 1918 they fought to 
preserve what remained of that Ottoman Muslim state and to prevent it from 
being carved up. But the nation for which they demanded this political home was 
that of the Ottoman Muslims-not that of all of the Ottomans, not only that of the 
Turks and certainly not that of the Muslims of the world.385  
While Kayalı and Zürcher’s approach eliminates the portrayal of the CUP as 
Turkish nationalists, Kayalı’s thesis is more cautious in conceptualizing the CUP era as a 
nationalist period even when the CUP utilized Islamic values and discourses after 1913 
since Kayalı emphasizes ‘state-based patriotism.’ What is usually underscored in this 
controversial debate is the primacy of the state and the concerns over its continuity and 
survival through policies on the basis and in reaction to the internal and external political 
and socio-economic realities. For instance, Erol Ülker, in parallel with Kayalı’s 
argument, argues that what is often regarded as Turkification before 1913 was the 
centralization efforts of the CUP rather than nation-building efforts.386 After 1913, 
although Turkification was in progress in Anatolia according to Ülker, this policy existed 
with the other imperial policies. In other words, although Ülker frames the identity 
policies of the CUP as nation-building especially after 1913, he fails to explain why 
Turkification was not a unified and single policy of the CUP but rather one of the 
imperial policies designed for Anatolia as he claims. This is perhaps due to the centrality 
of Devlet-i Alliyye and imperial vatan rather than millet in the mindset of the CUP elites. 
As empire-savers rather than nation-state admirers, the CUP elites sought to hang onto 
Ottomanism, perhaps with more emphasis on Islamic values and discourses after the 
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Balkan Wars. The project of nation-state became only feasible during the so-called 
National Independence war (1919-1922) since the international system after WWI was 
more favorable for such a choice. 
The Young Turks, Ottomanism, and the International System 
Rather than the Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal’s Kuva-yi Milliye (National Forces) 
after World War I insisted on achieving a national state by rejecting the imperial legacy. 
The Young Turks on the other hand had an imperial mindset and commitment to save and 
strengthen the Ottoman state through radical centralization and thus weaken the power of 
peripheral elites in their potential collaboration with rival states such as Russia and 
Britain. Scholars of this era have so far neglected the role of the international system in 
terms of norms, state structures, and institutions in the decision-making processes of the 
ruling elites of empires, especially those of the Young Turks. Perhaps a recent study by 
Michael Reynolds (2011) pays close attention to the nature of the international system 
during the Young Turk era:  
In their endeavor to preserve the empire and reform it from top to bottom, 
however, the Unionists faced an interlocking dilemma. The ﬁrst part lay in the 
nature of the interstate order in the early twentieth century. That order was 
anarchic, competitive, and dominated by a small, select group of actors. In an 
environment where no higher sovereign existed to regulate interstate relations, a 
state’s only guaranty of survival was its own power…Anarchy, competition, and 
the global reach of the great powers combined to create extraordinary turbulence 
around the globe in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the Ottoman 
lands were among those most buffeted .387  
In this highly anarchic and competitive system, there was no overarching 
international institution or organization that would regulate or constrain the imperial 
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rivalry. According to Reynolds, this international system was run through the normative 
context of population politics based on ethnicity and nationalism which established the 
pretext of power rivalry among empires. He states that:  
The afﬁrmation of the nation-state by the great powers as the normative unit of 
global politics exerted a tremendous impact upon local politics already in turmoil. 
It made the language and program of nationalism essential to the central objective 
of modern politics, obtaining and maintaining control of the state, and thereby 
facilitated the spread of nationalist ideologies. The structure of the global order 
and interstate system provided powerful incentives to adopt nationalist ideologies 
by tying control of the state and its territory to claims made on behalf of the 
nation.388  
Although Reynolds is right that the politics of identity was on the way of 
becoming the normative framework for many imperial states in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, he overemphasizes ‘the affirmation of the nation-
state by the great powers as the normative unity of global politics.’ If this statement 
should be considered sui generis, one would neglect the qualitative difference in the 
international system between pre-World War I and post-World War I. It is true that 
population politics based on ethnicity and nationalism was on the rise, but a statement of 
the nation-state being the unit of the international system before World War I is an 
overstretch since the end of World War I globally skyrocketed the rise and spread of 
national states. Before World War I, empires rather than national states were still the 
main units or actors in the international system. In fact, even after World War I, certain 
imperial states managed to survive longer than others and Michael Reynolds 
acknowledges this:  
A closer inspection of the historical record at the end of World War I reveals the 
lesson of imperial collapse to be far from clear-cut. Not all empires met their end 
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in World War I. Indeed, several of them expanded, most notably the British, 
French, and Japanese. The common determining feature of the Ottoman, Russian, 
and Austro-Hungarian empires was not their imperial structures so much as the 
fact that they had all been defeated militarily. Had the war’s military outcome 
been different –and it was a very closely run affair–so the list of collapsed 
empires would have been different. As this study argues, nationalism, understood 
as the mobilization of groups based on ethnicity for the purpose of asserting a 
claim to political sovereignty, was at least as much a consequence as a cause of 
imperial collapse.389 
In other words, the nation-state system was not the defining framework of the 
international system before World War I. This is perhaps why ‘nationalizing the state’ 
was more strategically and practically appealing to the Kemalists after World War I 
rather than the Young Turks before the war. The international environment for full-
fledged national homogenization based on Turkishness was more favorable after the war. 
The national self-determination principle of the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson after the 
war constituted the paradigmatic shift in the global order. Michael Reynolds does not 
neglect this either:  
At the end of 1918, the former spaces of the Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-
Hungarian empires were in disarray. Creating a new framework for order in the 
vast territories of the Middle East, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe was one of the 
challenges facing the victorious Entente powers. Shortly after the Bolsheviks had 
announced national self-determination as their formula for the postimperial order, 
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States embraced it in a bid to undercut 
Bolshevism, thereby ensuring that it would become a foundational principle of the 
postwar order. Such, perhaps, was Wilson’s idealism that he believed that popular 
and democratic sovereignty would determine the shape of the postwar 
settlement…It heralded the emergence of a deﬁnitively different interstate system, 
one clearly ‘focused on populations and an ideal of state sovereignty rooted in 
national homogeneity.’ Diplomacy and international relations were never the 
same afterward.390 
If the international environment is not favorable for internal reform-making 
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surrounding the politics of identity, state elites are less likely to act against such current. 
Thus, if Ottomanism is read as a project of patriotism rather than nationalism, then the 
ideational continuity between the early nineteenth century reformers and the early 
twentieth century Ottoman political elites would be revealed more clearly. Feroz Ahmad 
emphasizes this continuity as well: 
The CUP was a direct extension of the reform movement of the nineteenth 
century, especially the Young Ottomans, and like them it was concerned only 
with the problem of how to save the Empire. Fundamentally, the Young Turks 
provided the same answer as the Young Ottomans of the 1860s and 1870s; to 
introduce constitutional government, thereby curbing the power of the Sultan, and 
at the same time satisfying the aspirations of the minorities by giving them equal 
rights within the law.391 
Although Young Ottomans were critical of the Sultan’s regime, they were also 
very loyal to the state to the extent that they were very cautious in their ideas and actions 
in order to prevent any potential harm to the Ottoman state.392 This common psyche of 
saving and empowering the state among the late Ottoman political elites from the early 
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century is at the center of understanding 
Ottomanism as a project of patriotism. None of these political elites sought to disintegrate 
the Ottoman Empire and found a new state other than the Ottoman state until the very end 
of World War I. Thus, despite their different methods, they were all Ottomanists in the 
sense of establishing an ontologically secure Ottoman state, like its heydays in the old 
days. However, understanding Ottomanism as a fixed and monolithic concept is also 
problematic as well. Ottomanism was a contested zone within the Ottoman political and 
intellectual milieu at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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For instance, Hakan Yavuz underlines at least three modes of Ottomanism: 1) one 
that emphasized legal equality of all before the law in the sense of a religiously and 
ethnically blind state and allowed the expression of local identities regardless of religion 
and ethnicity (Abdullah Cevdet); 2) secondly, Prince Sebahaddin approached 
Ottomanism as an idea of developing a free market economy and adopting 
decentralization in the sense of administrative autonomy; and 3) finally, Ahmet Rıza 
emphasized the role of Islam as the moral center of Ottoman society for achieving 
cohesion.393 The main debate over Ottomanism was whether the state should be 
centralized and thus become a strong state or should be decentralized and share the power 
with ethnoreligious community leaders. Since the CUP cadres opted for the centralization 
policy, those who favored decentralization founded the Liberal Union Party in 1908 
under the leadership of Prince Sebahaddin. The CUP’s centralization policy fused with 
the policy of establishing a national economy that favored the Muslim merchants over the 
Christians especially after the Balkan Wars394 and the policy of national education based 
on the Turkish language was perceived as a Turkification policy by some of the 
ethnoreligious communities. Yet, “Turkish nationalism gained some influence in the 
Society, but never replaced Ottomanism.”395 But why? Perhaps ironically, Şükrü 
Hanioğlu provides a potential answer to this in his later study. He states that the late 
Ottoman history should not be read as a struggle between competing ideologies since 
ideas and ideological struggles are not the primary engines of historical change but rather 
                                                 
393 Hakan Yavuz, “Warfare and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst for Homogenization,” 
p. 78.  
394 Zafer Toprak, Milli Iktisat-Milli Burjuvazi.  
395 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 329. 
  
166 
structural and domestic realities provided the main context for policy makers in order to 
choose one policy over another.396  
As I mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Ottomanism came into being in 
temporal sequences and historical contingencies that made the Ottoman political elites in 
the early nineteenth century perceive the condition of the state as ontologically insecure. 
It was a turning point in the sense that the millet system no longer served the purposes of 
keeping the state intact397 but rather began to undermine the integrity of territory, 
sovereignty, and legitimacy of the state. Ottomanism gradually replaced the millet system 
throughout the nineteenth century for the same purpose of keeping the state ontologically 
secure and in one piece. Rather than being ideological choices of the state elites, these 
policy changes were direct outcomes of the structural and domestic realities as I 
mentioned in the first section. Thus, a policy shift away from Ottomanism toward 
Turkism would entail the same structural and domestic realities rather than ideological 
motivations in order for the state elites to reconsider the path dependency in their policy 
choices. Such realities in the CUP era only matured at the very end of the Balkan Wars, 
1912-13, convincing the state elites that Ottomanism in terms of holding the empire intact 
through the integration of Muslim and non-Muslim communities was longer feasible. 
Yet, the shift was not mechanical in the sense that Ottomanism suddenly collapsed and 
Turkism was adopted. Rather, the patriotism of Ottomanism evolved into a Muslim 
patriotism with full devotion to the Ottoman state until the very end of World War I. This 
                                                 
396 Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire. 
397 See Karen Barkey’s Empire of Difference where she argues that tolerance and the non-
assimilationist policy of the Ottoman Empire was a necessity to institutionalize the territorial integrity of 
the state.  
  
167 
nonexpansionist Muslim patriotism was also in the discourses of Mustafa Kemal as well, 
perhaps for strategic reasons until he consolidated his power in the mid-1920s.398  
The conventional late Ottoman periodization flows with the Tanzimat (1839-
1876) along with its aims of secular integration of the millets under a common Ottoman 
homeland; then the Islamist policy of the Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) through the 
emphasis on the institution of the Caliphate; and finally the Young Turk rule (1908-1918) 
along with the emphasis on the agenda of Turkish nationalism within the CUP. What 
makes this periodization somewhat problematic is the overrated emphasis on sharp 
ruptures within the political agendas of each governing elites, especially from a 
perspective of identity politics. There is no doubt that there were policy variations within 
these different periods, yet in the grand scheme of things such variations were the means 
toward the same end, that is the prevention of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
and the institutional establishment of the Ottoman state’s ontological security.  
I believe one of the reasons of this overrated emphasis on ruptures is the 
conceptual confusion over the forms and contents of identity politics that is attributed to 
each period. This problematic approach—perhaps being built on Yusuf Akçura’s three 
policies of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism (1904)—considers these three identity 
politics options in the late Ottoman Empire as mutually exclusive and each being the 
counterpart of the other. Kemal Karpat articulates the downsides of this approach:  
In reality all three concepts coexisted and evolved together in constant interaction. 
Ottomanism and Islamism nurtured Turkishness, were absorbed by it, and survive 
in it today. When Ziya Gökalp differentiated “artificial” Ottomanism from the 
“real” one that was likely to save Turkism and Islamism, he knew that all three of 
these ideologies were so deeply embedded in one another that they were 
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inseparable, as a proper reading of his famous article on the subject makes clear. 
Gökalp’s criticism of Ottomanism grew vehement after the Empire disintegrated 
in 1918 and the leaders of the Turkish nation, defined as a nation-state that 
emerged in Anatolia in the years 1919–23, turned their backs on their Ottoman 
and Islamic heritage and proceeded to advance their own Turkish nationalist 
interpretation of history and national culture.399 
Thus, what is often neglected is that Ottomanism was qualitatively different in its 
form and content from Islamism and Turkism. In other words, Ottomanism as a project of 
patriotism was an antidote to nationalism while Islamism and Turkism were both 
compatible with the nationalist agendas. Ottomanism was inherently immune to 
constructing ‘internal others’ since its primary focus was the political attachment to the 
state, not a specific religious or ethnic community. On the other hand, Islamism had its 
‘internal others’ of non-Muslims and Turkism had its ‘internal others’ of non-Turks. 
Since the late Ottoman political elites from the Tanzimat reformers to the Young Turks 
were very cautious of establishing ‘internal others’ in order to prevent the excuse of 
European ‘humanitarian’ interventions on the one hand and the political claim-makings 
of various ethno-religious communities on the other, one way or another their emphasis 
was much more on Ottomanism rather than Islamism or Turkism. Moreover, since all of 
these late Ottoman elites’ first and foremost concern was the survival of the state, 
Ottomanism was pragmatically more compatible with their concern regarding the state.  
The second reason for the mutually exclusive and rupture-oriented approaches to 
the late Ottoman periodization is perhaps the neglect of the essential relationship between 
Ottomanism and the ontological security of the state. As I articulated previously, 
Ottomanism emerged under certain conditions which were threatening to the Ottoman 
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state’s physical (territorial losses, antistate mobilizations) and psychological (declining 
confidence in the ‘mighty’ empire). This fear and anxiety among the Ottoman statesmen 
was the moment within which they aimed for institutional change in the qualitative nature 
of the state. Ottomanism as the backbone of this nineteenth-century transformation was 
the recipe to overcome fear and anxiety within the state. Young Ottomans and Young 
Turks were both raised in this political, psychological, and intellectual milieu that placed 
the survival of the Ottoman state on the top of their agendas. This is why one was not 
qualitatively less Ottomanist than the other in each period of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. This trend only began to paradigmatically change after the very end 
of World War I when the National Pact under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal gradually 
rejected the Ottoman legacy and pursued a completely new regime with a new identity 
for the state.400  
Turkishness and Turkish State in the Making: Power 
Struggles and Regime Change 
The Ottoman Empire joined World War I on the side of Germany and Austria-
Hungary against the Allied Powers and faced the catastrophic defeat at the end of the 
Great War. This war imprisoned the ‘almighty’ empire into Anatolia with limited 
sovereignty. The Armistice of Mudros was signed on October 30, 1918 which gave the 
Allied Powers the right to control the strategic Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus and 
the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the empire under the circumstances of 
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internal disorders, especially regarding the conditions of the Armenian population in 
Eastern Anatolia.401 Following the armistice, Istanbul—the heart and the capital of the 
Ottoman Empire—was occupied by the Allied Powers and Izmir—an important port city 
on the Aegean coast—was occupied by Greek military forces. The imminent threat to the 
political survival of the empire and the Ottoman state was at stake and this question 
regarding the ontological security of the state led to two different elite factions.402 One of 
these factions was the Ottoman government in Istanbul that consisted of the sultan, the 
high-level military, and the civil bureaucrats and politicians who believed that the only 
way for the survival of the Ottoman state was cooperation with the Allied Powers since 
they considered the Ottoman state, militarily and politically, was in no position to 
challenge the victors. However, another faction emerged in 1919 under the leadership of 
various Ottoman statesmen and commanders such as Mustafa Kemal, Kazim Karabekir, 
Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Rauf Orbay. This group, based in Ankara, rejected the surrender 
and cooperation option with the Allied Powers. Rather, they started the Anatolian 
resistance movement against the foreign occupation on the one hand and the Istanbul 
government on the other. Interestingly, as Hakan Ozoglu403 aptly argues, these two 
competing elite factions had the same purpose with differing methods. Both of these 
factions’ purpose was to save the empire by liberating the sultanate and the caliphate 
from the occupation and the yoke of the Allies. However, while the Istanbul government 
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sought to achieve this purpose by cooperating and negotiating with the Allies, the 
opposition in Ankara supported the idea of armed resistance by mobilizing and building 
Anatolian Muslim communities under the umbrella coalition of Kuva-yi Milliye (National 
Forces). As Niyazi Berkes404 states, “the ruling group in Istanbul believed that, since 
Great Britain controlled more Muslims than anyone else, Muslim unity under the British 
wing was the best alternative to an independent existence” and “the ideal condition would 
be a British protectorate over the Ottoman Caliphate, a British guarantee for the Ottoman 
Sultanate, and a bit of land in Anatolia for the Turks (peasants).”405 On the other hand, 
the aims of the Kuva-yi Milliye included “unconditional national independence, the 
rejection of any protectorate or mandate, the rejection of exterritorial rights for foreign 
nationals and powers, the rejection of all special privileges for the minorities, and the 
acceptance of aid from any power not pursuing imperialistic objectives.”406 This is why, 
in his Great Speech, Mustafa Kemal—the leader of the opposition in Ankara—states that 
solutions such as the British protectorate or American mandate would mean slavery for 
the state.407 Amid these competing discourses over the question of state survival 
(Devletin Bekası), the establishment of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in April 
23, 1920, further challenged the authority of Istanbul and in fact created two governments 
in one state.  
These two factions developed their own discourses to delegitimize each other. 
While the Istanbul government accused the opposition in Ankara as the extension of the 
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Committee of Union and Progress and as backed by the Bolsheviks,408 they framed the 
Grand National Assembly in Ankara as an anticaliphate and antisultanate formation.409 
Through this propaganda, the Istanbul government aimed to mobilize people throughout 
Anatolia against Mustafa Kemal and Kuva-yi Milliye. On the other hand, opposition in 
Ankara aimed at delegitimizing the Istanbul government through the narrative of national 
will410 and was very cautious not to challenge the sacred institutions of the Ottoman 
society (i.e., the sultanate and the caliphate). A day after the opening of the Grand 
National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal very clearly states that one of the functions of the 
Assembly was to “liberate the supreme sultanate and caliphate.”411 The Islamic paradigm 
of Kuva-yi Milliye was apparent as well in the opening ceremony of the Grand National 
Assembly which was purposefully opened on Friday—the holy day of Islam—with 
Friday prayers. Thus, Kuva-yi Milliye used the Islamic discourse to neutralise the 
propaganda of the Istanbul government and to obtain maximum unity among the Muslim 
communities such as the Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Turks, and Lazes (Ahmad 1993).412 
This race to coalition-building amidst the external and internal political realities defined 
and redefined the character of elite competition in the years to come until and after the 
Republic was established by Ankara in 1923. The new regime’s discursive base 
surrounding the national will and national independence was not independent from the 
metanarratives of the postwar international order, especially national self-determination 
and sovereignty which were more or less in tandem with the Wilson principles.  
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Postwar International Context/ Order/ Discourses 
The nineteenth century was the era of consolidation of the European society of 
Westphalian states which defined the rules and norms of the international state system on 
the basis of territorial integrity and noninterference. However, such norms and rules were 
not objectively applied to all states, especially to those that were outside the European 
society of states. Imperialism and colonialism were justified by “the West” through the 
pretext of modernity that was understood as the amalgamation of secularization, 
rationality, and scientific progress that gave “the West” the moral right of civilizing 
mission and ‘humanitarian intervention’ for ‘the barbaric,’ ‘the uncivilized,’ ‘backward’ 
Eastern states . As Ayse Zarakol argues, empires such as the Ottoman, Russian, and 
Japanese states were stigmatized both internally and externally in their domestic as well 
as international affairs.413 “As empires, they long sustained social universes capable of 
producing comprehensive worldviews—in other words, before their incorporation into 
the Westphalian system these states had their own normative standards by which they 
defined themselves as ‘normal’ and others as different, abnormal, or inferior.”414 Yet, 
since they became integrated into the European society of interstate system in the 
nineteenth century, “they came to an awareness about their inferiority, i.e. in the sense of 
a lack or deficit of modernity, through their own discussions.”415 Such awareness of a 
development gap –militarily, politically, and socially—led to the major ontological 
insecurity of these states and their political elites which turned into a race to 
Westernization and modernization.  Late Ottoman elites throughout the nineteenth 
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century and the Young Turks in the early twentieth century were all seeking ways to 
overcome this ontological security of the state and its survival by complete emulation of 
the Western institutions, rules, and norms. This was so that they would not be isolated 
from the international system defined by the major European states on the one hand and 
that they would be recognized as equal and sovereign without a threat of foreign 
intervention on the other hand. While Westernization reforms toward these ends could 
not prevent the defeat and the death of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, 
the founding elites of modern Turkey encountered the same concerns and questions 
surrounding ontological security, sovereignty, and international recognition as an equal 
member of the European society of states. This is why although the Ankara government 
had close ties with the Bolsheviks in Russia, the founding intelligentsia after the victory 
of national independence turned its face toward the West by incorporating and utilizing 
the national self-determination and national sovereignty discourses rather than 
communism or pan-Islamism which were the other viable alternatives. After World War 
I, the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, declared the principle of national 
sovereignty and nations to be treated equally under a body of an international 
organization which later became the League of Nations.  
The United States entered World War I on the side of the Allies by declaring war 
first on Germany and then on Austria-Hungary in 1917 on the basis of Germany’s 
submarine attacks on passenger and merchant ships.416  After entering the war, U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson appointed a committee of experts, known as the Inquiry, in 
order to prepare and enforce a postwar “just and secure peace” plan rather than “a new 
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balance of power.”417 As a result of this collaborative work, President Wilson introduced 
the famous Fourteen Points to the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918 which later led to 
the foundation of the League of Nations in 1920 as the first international organization 
with the mission of maintaining world peace by guaranteeing “political independence and 
territorial integrity [of] great and small states alike.” 418 Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
included agendas such as free trade, arms reduction, and open diplomacy. However, in 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the most transformative and influential principle for the post-
war international order and normative context was the idea of self-determination for those 
nationalities under European colonial rule on the one hand and under the imperial orders 
that became ‘the prison of nations’ on the other. One way or another, this ‘Wilsonian 
turn’ in the rules and norms of international politics led the world to believe in a postwar 
order of nation-states.419   
The government in Istanbul and the opposition in Ankara were very well aware of 
this new design of states based on nations. As Yucel Guclu states, “at the end of the First 
World War, the Turks had looked to the principles of Wilson with great hope because 
they seemed to provide certain guarantees of national existence.” 420 The twelfth point in 
Wilson’s package was directly related to the Ottoman Empire: 
The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured 
an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of 
autonomous development; and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as 
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a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international 
guarantees.421 
For instance, during the meetings between the Istanbul government and the Allied 
powers before the Treaty of Sevres was signed in 1920, the debates were carried via the 
national/nationalities principles. The Ottoman government in Istanbul blamed the Allies 
for the nationality and national self-determination principles not being applied to the 
Ottoman government equally as these were applied to Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, and 
Austria (Osmanlinin Cokus Belgeleri, Meray and Olcay 1977). For example, the 
imposition that Eastern Thrace belonged to Greece in the Treaty of Sevres outline was 
opposed by the government in Istanbul on the basis that “there were three hundred and 
sixty thousand Turks in Eastern Thrace including Edirne as opposed to two hundred and 
twenty four thousand Greeks.”422 Moreover, the clause regarding the autonomy for the 
Kurds, if not independent statehood through referendum, was questioned by the Ottoman 
government due to the belief that the Kurds were and would be loyal to the Sultan 
without any demand for secession.423 At the end, the Ottoman government signed the 
Treaty of Sevres in 1920 by considering the option of not signing this treaty as the death 
of the Ottoman state.424 In other words, the Istanbul government assumed that if they did 
not sign the Treaty of Sevres, the state death of the long-lived Ottoman Empire would be 
imminent against the Allies. The opposition in Ankara always framed and perceived this 
kind of mentality as nonresistant, surrendering and not sufficiently ‘national.’ 
For Woodrow Wilson, “the definition of ‘nation’ was not confined to populations 
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sharing an ancestral homeland,” rather “it denoted, simply, the population over which a 
state maintained order.”425 In other words, what Wilson understood from self-
determination was not necessarily ethnically-driven independence movements around the 
world but rather he uttered the need for civic participation of all citizens in the states’ 
decision-making processes. This is actually what distinguished Wilson from Vladimir 
Lenin’s call for ‘national self-determination’ for all the non-Russian nationalities and 
other ‘oppressed nations’ after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Not only did Lenin 
grant the freedom of secession to all ‘oppressed nations,’ but he also envisioned 
ethnically-based sovereign states within the metanarrative of socialism.426 On the other 
hand, “Wilson’s entire philosophy of government was antithetical to the Bolshevik’s 
pronouncements that every ethnic-nationalist aspiration must be realized as a sovereign 
state.”427 The ideal nation-state, for Wilson, was both organic and civic within which the 
nation and state grow and change together in a dialectical relationship.  
Although Lenin’s anti-imperialist tone in his idea of national self-determination 
appealed to Mustafa Kemal and the opposition in Ankara, he later stated that the new 
regime was not based on the Bolshevik principles but rather modeled on nationalism 
without any class consciousness.428 However, on the other hand, the question of the 
American mandate was fiercely debated during the 1919 Congress of Sivas—the 
Congress that gathered all the factions of Anatolian opposition together and shaped the 
framework of Misak-I Milli (National Pact) which was accepted in 1920. Some members 
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of the Congress demanded the American mandate on the basis that this would give the 
Anatolian resistance an upper hand against the British and Greek occupations along with 
the idea that Americans were willing to accept fewer concessions to the Armenians in 
eastern Anatolia than Britain.429 The main debate regarding the American mandate was 
framed within the dichotomy of “independence” from a foreign state or “dependence” on 
a foreign state. Mustafa Kemal was critical of the idea of the American mandate by 
underlying two issues/questions: (1) “the abandonment of internal and external 
sovereignty of the state,” and (2) “whether [the] state and nation needed assistance and 
support against the harmful foreign pressure.”430 The Congress still decided to invite 
American delegates to Anatolia for meetings. However, Mustafa Kemal states that he 
rejected the mandate option on the basis of the one and single goal of the Anatolian 
resistance: “to establish a Turkish state based on national sovereignty without any 
restrictions and conditions.431 Accepting the mandate option for Mustafa Kemal meant 
“deprivation from the quality of humanity” and “confessing impotency and laziness.”432  
Despite this critical stance to the American mandate, Mustafa Kemal’s discourse 
of national sovereignty as a territorial (Wilsonian) rather than ethnicity-based (Leninist) 
definition of nation-state overlaps with the Wilsonian idea of self-determination. Since 
Mustafa Kemal viewed the British as the most dangerous antagonist in the Kuva-yi 
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Milliye struggle, his “language about Wilson was a shade more charitable.”433 The 
Society of Wilsonian Principles established in Istanbul in 1918 included some of Mustafa 
Kemal’s closest supporters as well.434 As the opposition in Ankara gradually became the 
center of power in the new regime, the founding intelligentsia were very well aware of 
the dynamics of international discourses on the boundaries of nationhood and nation-
building which one way or another were influenced by Wilson’s framework. While the 
Treaty of Sevres, which was signed (but not ratified) by the Istanbul government in 1920, 
entailed harsh sanctions such as the self-determination right for the Kurds in southeastern 
Anatolia (Article 64)435 and territorial rights for the Armenian state in the eastern regions 
such as Van, Erzurum, and Bitlis (Article 89),436the counter-elites in Anatolia under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal did not recognize this agreement and aspired to renegotiate 
with the Allies through the Treaty of Lausanne on July 1923 after they eliminated the 
Istanbul government and stopped the Sultan from defining the faith and the future of the 
state. In the Treaty of Lausanne, while concessions to the Kurds and Armenians were 
canceled, only non-Muslim communities were recognized as minorities with certain 
                                                 
433 Dankwart A. Rustow. 1968. “Ataturk as a Founder of a State,” Daedalus, 97(3): p. 799.  
434 Ibid. 
435 “If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within 
the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a 
manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and 
if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it 
should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all 
rights and title over these areas.” Retrieved at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-
_260  
436 “Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the 
arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between 
Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision 
thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to the access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the 




rights (Article 39).437 Thus, the founding elites conceptualized Turkishness as the melting 
pot for Muslims along the lines of Wilsonian self-determination within the Misak-i Milli 
borders of modern Turkey.438  
Throughout the Anatolian resistance, as Dankwart Rustow aptly underlined, 
“Kemal’s action rested on a few basic convictions that he applied to shifting 
circumstances with great flexibility.”439 That said, Kemal was a man of action rather than 
an abstract thinker.440 The notion of ‘national sovereignty’ as the metanarrative of the 
postwar international order—especially after President Wilson’s influence in 
‘globalizing’ the national self-determination—was one of Mustafa Kemal’s few basic 
convictions. This is why he confidently and loudly praised that “today the nations of the 
world recognize only one sovereignty: national sovereignty.”441 In his Great Speech 
(1927), he explains how the nation should be structured and designed based on a 
monolithic nationhood, which in turn makes a strong state, according to Mustafa Kemal.  
“In the West and East alike, the internal organization of a state that has 
communities from different cultures, genesis, and ideals in a single territory that are not 
compatible with each other,” states Mustafa Kemal, “would be baseless and rotten.”442 
He continues stating that “such as a state would be far from national and its political 
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method would not be national either.”443 Thus, he visualizes a strong state only within the 
framework of ‘a single nation.’ He also rejects the irredentist ideals of bringing all Turkic 
nations on the one hand (Turanists) and all Muslims around the world (Islamists) on the 
other under one single state. Mustafa Kemal considers Turanists and Islamists as 
dreamers and illusionary on the basis of the “general conditions of the contemporary 
world.”444 By “general conditions of the contemporary world,” Mustafa Kemal definitely 
refers to the postwar context of nationality norms and discourses within the larger 
framework of Wilsonian self-determination. These external conditions provide a point of 
reference for the design and form of the new state structure on the one hand and national 
body on the other. This postwar international context also speaks to the external 
necessities for the state elites within which they can find legitimacy and recognition. This 
is why Levent Urer underlines that after the opposition in Ankara came into power, they 
sought to design the base of the national body as large as possible compatible with the 
Wilsonian principle during the meetings of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. This 
approach ended by constructing Turkishness on the basis of Muslimhood that would be 
inclusive of the Kurds, Lazes, Albanians, and others. As articulated in Chapter 5, the new 
identity for the state under the leadership of the new ruling elites became monolithic with 
the purpose of assimilating all Muslim populations of the new Turkey under the roof of 
Turkishness. However, the new elites’ full-fledged efforts of constructing the new Turk 
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did not start until they consolidated their power, eliminated all opposition, and overcame 
their insecurities in their shift from ancien regime to the new one. Unless the veto players 
were eliminated, the political elites’ attempt at changing the form and content of 
nationhood would be less likely.  
Opposition in the New Regime and the Insecurities of the New 
Elites 
As Mustafa Kemal was able to lead the anti-Istanbul and anti-imperialist 
Anatolian resistance with his charismatic leadership, Islamic oratory, and military 
experience during World War I, the Istanbul government and the Sultan Vahdettin was 
unable to crush this opposition despite fatwas (Islamic rulings) that labeled the people in 
Mustafa Kemal’s movement as infidels, Bolsheviks, and Unionists. One of the reasons 
for this unsuccessful propaganda against Mustafa Kemal was Istanbul’s submissive 
policies and behaviors toward the Allied powers within which the Ottoman’s holy city of 
Istanbul was occupied in March 1920 and the signing the Treaty of Sevres humiliated the 
Muslim communities of the ‘ghazi state’ (Islamic warrior). On the other hand, Mustafa 
Kemal utilized the Islamic discourse very well as his war propaganda that created unity 
among the Anatolian Muslims of different ethnicities such as the Kurds, Turks, Arabs, 
and Lazes.445 The influence of the sultanate and the caliphate in Istanbul in mobilizing 
Muslim populations across and beyond the Ottoman territories became increasingly 
impotent. The disunity and internal power struggles within the Allied powers in terms of 
reaching an agreement on the future and faith of the Ottoman Empire also created 
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windows of opportunity for Mustafa Kemal’s opposition in Ankara. For instance, while 
Britain sought to prevent France and Italy from acquiring lands that would make them 
more powerful than Britain in the Mediterranean, France and Italy were both uneasy 
regarding Britain’s attempts to use Greece as a proxy state.446  
Under these conditions, Mustafa Kemal’s national movement held a strong hold 
against the Greek occupation in the Western front, Armenian forces in the Eastern front, 
and French forces in the Southern front along with fighting against the Sultan’s army in 
Anatolia. Overall, while the support base of the national movement gradually expanded 
and the Sultan’s government lost its legitimacy, the supporters of the national movement 
were able to control the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul in 1920 which isolated the Sultan 
further. Moreover, the terms of the Treaty of Sevres were first undermined in the London 
conference of the Allied powers in 1921 within which the French and Italians agreed on 
rapprochement with the representatives of the national movement. Greek occupation 
backed by Britain was also eliminated with the Armistice of Mudanya on October 11, 
1922. With this armistice, the national movement forces regained control of the Western 
front and their sovereignty was recognized leading to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 
which recognized the national movements’ terms of National Pact (Misak-I Milli). When 
the Sultan Vahdettin was also invited to the peace talks, Mustafa Kemal found the 
opportunity to abolish the sultanate on November 1, 1922. However, as Hakan Ozoglu 
argues, “One can convincingly make the case that Ankara originally intended to get rid of 
the “office” of sultanate, not necessarily the sultan in person” and  “the main target for 
the abolition of the sultanate was the Istanbul government, not Sultan Vahdettin or the 
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Ottoman dynasty.” 447 Although the sultanate was abolished in 1922, the institution of 
caliphate remained until 1924 after the Republic was declared in 1923.  
Although Mustafa Kemal achieved a great deal of bringing different coalitions 
under the roof of the national movement, this bloc of coalitions dissolved when the 
common enemy was defeated and the war was won. Different factions of the national 
movement coalition disputed the characteristics of the new regime. The most disputed 
issue was over the presence of the Caliphate as the symbol of Islam and the 
representative of all Muslims around the world. However, as discussed earlier, Mustafa 
Kemal was neither Islamist nor Turanist that he solely believed in national sovereignty. 
He explains this in his Great Speech:  
Let’s say, Turkey would hold the institution of Caliphate for a while by seeking to 
bring all Muslims together and govern them with success. Good, but what if these 
nations under our control would one day ask for the right to national self-
determination. What will happen then?448  
In parallel with the postwar context of Wilsonian thought, Mustafa Kemal was 
very committed to the nation-state idea with no intentions of expansionism and 
irredentism. This was in his realist and pragmatic nature. If Turkey was to keep the 
institution of Caliphate, many external crises in the Muslim world would easily be 
imported into the domestic affairs of the new Turkey. Moreover, keeping an institution of 
an old regime would always run the risk of giving leverage to the supporters of the ancien 
regime against the new one.  As Feroz Ahmad argues, “the notion of an Islamic state was 
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anathema to Mustafa Kemal and his supporters.”449 Within this process, the Muslim 
Anatolian civil society and the Kemalist state had contested with each other within which 
“the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment has viewed large sections of its own 
society, rather than foreign countries, as its main threat.”450 This is why Hakan Yavuz 
aptly argues that “the primary aim of modern Islamic movements in Turkey is either to 
carve new spaces in society or to penetrate the state and reshape it according to their own 
counteridentities and perceptions of the Seljuk and Ottoman past.”451 The challenge to 
Mustafa Kemal not only came from Islamic-conservative circles but also from his close 
military comrades during the war of national independence as well. For instance, Rauf 
Orbay, one of the top military commanders during the war of national independence and 
the prime minister of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara between July 1922 and 
August 1923, encountered Mustafa Kemal on the grounds that abolishing the Caliphate 
would be disastrous for the new regime. Mustafa Kemal framed such actions and 
attempts as a ‘counter-revolutionary threat.’452 Amit Bein (2011) argues that “every 
instance of religiously motivated protest or violent opposition—and there were a handful 
of these in the 1920s and 1930s—was lambasted as a manifestation of religious 
fanaticism and dealt with harshly by security forces.”453 The 1925 rebellion of Sheikh 
Said—a Kurdish sheikh of a Sunni sect from Diyarbakir who fought for the 
reestablishment of the Caliphate—was an important turning point in the contestation over 
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the new regime which led to the initiation of Takrir-i Sükun (Law on the Maintenance of 
Order). According to Hakan Ozoglu, “this law virtually eliminated any and all future 
opposition to Mustafa Kemal and to his inner circle.”454  
External Necessities, Internal Opportunities, and Monolithic 
Turkishness 
As I discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the Republic under the leadership of 
Mustafa Kemal came to the conclusion of adopting monolithic Turkishness by 
assimilating all the Muslim elements of Anatolia. However, this policy choice in nation-
building was not necessarily a predetermined plan but rather came into being within 
temporal sequences and historical contingencies. For instance, while Mustafa Kemal 
emphasized the brotherhood of the Kurds and Turks and even mentioned autonomy for 
the Kurds after the common enemy would be defeated,455 he abolished this option for the 
Kurds after his regime was consolidated with no opposition through the end of the 1920s. 
As Dankwart Rustow aptly stated, Mustafa Kemal was a man of action rather than a man 
of abstract ideology. He believed in national sovereignty and an independent state within 
which he was intentionally very cautious not to give a clear definition of what he meant 
with nation in order to bring different Muslim communities under the umbrella of the 
national independence movement against the Christian ‘invaders.’  His national 
independence movement successfully labeled and framed any collaborators with the 
European occupation forces as ‘traitor’ (vatan haini) within the Islamic metanarrative. 
Thus, he was able to mobilize the different ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Lazes, 
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Circassians, Turks, and Albanians within the larger Muslim community in Anatolia. He 
was very attentive to the context of postwar international politics and leading discourses. 
He and his movement took every step leading to the establishment of the Republic and 
the adoption of monolithic Turkishness very strategically in response to both internal and 
external circumstances. The priority of these elites again was to save the state like the 
Young Turks until their defeat in World War I. However, Mustafa Kemal saw the 
survival in completely different institutions within a national state along with national 
belonging rather than embracing the institutions of the Sultanate and the Caliphate as in 
the preceding imperial state with forms of imperial belonging.  
World War I ended with the globalization of the nationality principle which was 
sponsored by two leadership currents: one that of Woodrow Wilson and the other that of 
Vladimir Lenin.456 The Leninist Revolution in Russia introduced the idea of ‘brotherhood 
of all nations’ within the Marxist-Leninist framework which led to the policy of ethnic 
federalism in the Soviet Union.457 Woodrow Wilson’s idea of national self-determination 
also gained momentum at the same time, which Erez Manela underlines as “the 
Wilsonian Moment” in world politics:  
It launched the transformation of the norms and standards of international 
relations that established the self-determining nation-state as the only legitimate 
political form throughout the globe, as colonized and marginalized peoples 
demanded and eventually attained recognition as sovereign, independent actors in 
international society.458 
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The Wilsonian moment, therefore, should be examined and understood as an 
international phenomenon not because every individual on the face of the planet 
was aware of Wilson’s rhetoric, but because the scope of its dissemination and 
import transcended the usual geographic enclosures of historical narratives.459 
The national independence movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was 
not outside of these external discourses. While the imperial government in Istanbul could 
not resist to the peace settlements in the Treaty of Sevres which was based on the 
partition of Anatolia with an emphasis of ethnicity (i.e., Armenia, Greece, and 
Kurdistan), the national independence movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
rejected this peace settlement in order to gain sovereignty in a larger Anatolia territory 
which included the Kurds. This is why the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which gave 
international recognition to Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey, framed minorities only in religious 
terms (Armenians, Greeks, Jews), not in ethnic terms.  
Historically armed with experiences of orientalist discourses toward the Ottoman 
state under the banner of “Sick Man of Europe” within which the Ottoman state 
sovereignty had a semicolonial status with the privileges of capitulations given to the 
non-Muslim Ottoman communities, the founding elites of modern Turkey did not want to 
be labeled as such but rather sought international status and recognition as a member of 
the West and an equal partner of the European states. Neither pan-Islamism nor 
communism as the alternative policy options for the state elites would fulfill the will to 
become an equal partner with the ‘civilized nations.’ Thus, a transnational reading of the 
Turkish nation-building along with the domestic drivers of change is more likely to 
explain why and under what conditions these elites decided to adopt monolithic 
                                                 
459 Ibid. p. 7. 
  
189 
Turkishness rather than Islamic multiculturalism as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire on 
the one hand and ethnically-conscious Soviet communism on the other.  
The external necessity of being recognized as a sovereign state and autonomous 
nation with full independence in the international system—rather than becoming a semi-
colonial state with the partitioning of Anatolia along ethnic and religious lines under the 
terms of the Treaty of Sevres signed by the Istanbul government in 1920—shaped the 
decision-making mechanisms of the Kemalist elites very well. While this external 
necessity more or less created a favorable environment of monolithic nation-building as 
understood as more territorial than ethnic, internal opportunities such as the elimination 
of the veto players (i.e., the Istanbul government and the Sultanate) and the antistate 
domestic claim-makings by the Sheikh Said and other reactionary rebellions throughout 
Anatolia provided the pretext of securitizing any alternative identity claims other than the 
definition of the state.  
Conclusion 
Both the late Ottoman and the early Republican elites were first and foremost 
concerned with devletin bekası (survival of the state) within the grand psyche of 
ontological insecurities caused by the external and internal military and psychological 
defeats throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the patriotic policy 
of Ottomanism (see Chapter 6) sought to soothe this ontological insecurity through the 
inclusion of all Muslim and non-Muslim communities of the empire under the 
overarching Ottoman identity, the shift to Turkishness as the identity of the state and 
nation aimed to overcome the same ontological insecurity that the political elites 
encountered. These policy shifts happened when such moves were favorable in the 
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international context on the one hand and when political elites, who were receptive to 
change as opposed to the status quo, gained a hegemonic position within the state 
(Tanzimat reformers and Kemalists, respectively). If Turkishness as a national identity is 
less inclusive than the Ottoman identity, what is interesting here is that the logic of the 
state in the Ottoman/Turkish context in either excluding or including alternative identities 
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Introduction 
In Chapter 7, I discussed the conditions under which the founding elites of the 
Turkish Republic came to the conclusion of adopting monolithic Turkishness with the 
motivation of saving and establishing an independent state along with national 
sovereignty. This chapter first looks at the consolidation and continuity of monolithic 
Turkishness throughout the twentieth century and articulates the conditions under which 
changing monolithic Turkishness was not rational and feasible for the state elites. 
Secondly, the chapter looks at the structural changes in the international context after the 
end of the Cold War and how the state and societal actors have been influenced by this 
gradually creating opportunity spaces for the state policy change from monolithic 
Turkishness to hyphenated Turkishness after the 2000s.  
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New Regime, Power Consolidation, and Fixating Monolithic 
Turkishness 
 As the new regime under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal eliminated all the veto 
players and opposition and consolidated its power under the single party (Republican 
People’s Party) rule through the end of the 1920s, a full-fledged nation-building program 
(see Chapter 5) took place with no tolerance of any alternative identity claims such as 
Kurdish and pious Muslim identities. The metanarrative of state ideology in the process 
of nation-building was framed as Kemalism which the Republican People’s Party 
adopted in its 1931 party program under six basic principles: republicanism, secularism, 
nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism. As Erik Zurcher states, “These six 
principles...were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937…together they 
formed the state ideology of Kemalism and the basis for indoctrination in schools, the 
media, and the army.”460 State institutions founded in the 1930s such as the Turkish 
Historical Society and the Turkish Linguistic Society functioned as intermediaries of 
constructing a national memory apart from the crucified ancient regime of the Ottoman 
dynasty.  
The theses developed under the Turkish Historical Society promoted the idea that 
the origins of the Turks were in Central Asia who were then spread to other regions of the 
world such as the Near East and Europe. By these means of identity-building, the Turkish 
Historical Society “aimed to give Turks a sense of pride in their past and in their national 
identity, separate from the immediate past, that is to say the Ottoman era” and “it was one 
of the means whereby the Kemalist leadership tried to construct a new national identity 
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and strong national cohesion.”461 Thanks to the single-party rule with no separation of 
powers and no opposition, the founding elite’s agenda in building new institutions for the 
state on the one hand and constructing nationhood congruent with this new state on the 
other were mostly undisturbed. In fact, after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, 
intermittent tribal Kurdish uprisings against the state (i.e., Agri in 1930, Dersim in 1937-
38) and their suppression by the state paved the way for further consolidation of the 
regime. The insecurity of this infant regime had to be eliminated with radical reforms in 
the mindset of Mustafa Kemal’s cadres. Thus, the late 1920s and 1930s were the golden 
age of the ruling Kemalist cadres to reinvent the socio-political and institutional nature of 
the new regime which Hale Yilmaz frames as “Becoming Turkish.”462 From new 
dressing codes (such as the Hat Reform of 1925 embracing European hats as official 
symbols of modernization) to adopting the Latin alphabet by abolishing Arabic scripts in 
1928 and from establishing new national holidays such as the 23rd of April celebrations 
commemorating the opening of the National General Assembly in Ankara in 1920 as the 
symbol of and first step toward a ‘modern’ and secular nation-state. The making of the 
Turkish state and nation came into being through the dissemination of such reforms to the 
overall society by co-optation on the one hand and contestation on the other. This mostly 
unhindered and abled power consolidation of the founding cadres became officially 
contested when the multiparty era began in 1946 and an opposition party (Democrat 
Party) was able to topple the founding elites.  
After Mustafa Kemal’s death in 1938, his Weberian charismatic authority and 
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state persona were succeeded by his loyal comrade, Ismet Inonu. Served as the Chief of 
the General Staff and as Prime Minister after the national independence war, Inonu 
became the second president of the Turkish Republic with the title of National Chief 
(milli şef). The Inonu era of the Turkish Republic coincided with World War II. Despite 
being neutral until the last months of the war (joined the Allies at the very end of the 
war), the Inonu government became increasingly unpopular due to deteriorating 
economic conditions such as high inflation, poor living standards in the countryside, and 
increasing military expenditures.463 The resentment against the Republican People’s Party 
and its highly centralized decision-making structure was on the rise both within and 
outside the party. As the United States became the major leader of the international 
economic and political system in the Western world against the communist Soviet Union, 
Turkey became more integrated into the US-led international system especially by 
receiving funds from the Marshall Plan and being a partner within the Truman Doctrine 
against the communist threat. This integration to the Western state system pushed the 
single party regime under Inonu to shift to a democratic multiparty system in 1946. 
Fearful of the rapid rise of the opposition Democrat Party (DP), the Inonu government 
shied away from holding fully fair and free elections in 1946 keeping him in power until 
the next elections in 1950. The hegemonic victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 and 
1954 elections happened by receiving 53.4% of the total votes, which opened a new era 
in the history of modern Turkey. Feroz Ahmad (1993) insightfully reveals the trajectory 
of this transformative shift in relation to the culture of the founding elites:  
There were now two cultures: the Westernised, secular culture of a tiny but 
                                                 
463 Zurcher 1993. 
  
195 
influential minority associated with the bureaucracy, and the indigenous culture of 
the mass of the people associated with Islam. When opposition was permitted 
once more at the end of the Second World War, it was able to exploit this 
alienation with great success and win mass support in order to oust the ruling 
party at the polls. That marked the beginning of an Islamic reassertion whose 
impact is being felt even today.464  
However, the cadres and founding leaders of the Democrat Party such as Adnan 
Menderes and Celal Bayar were still politically raised within the Kemalist trajectory. 
That being said, the party program of the new elites incorporated many aspects of 
Kemalism in itself. According to Zurcher, “the most striking difference from the RPP 
was the virtual absence of representatives with a bureaucratic and/or military 
background.”465 This is why the Democrat Party continuously uttered the motto of 
‘national will’ (milli irade) as opposed to the will of the few under the party-state rule 
until the 1950s. By embracing the notion of milli irade, the Democrat Party had antistate 
aspects both socially and economically. For instance, in the government program under 
the first Menderes administration, the Election Day (May 14th) in 1950 was framed as the 
opening of a new era466 and the old era’s state was depicted as “interventionist capitalist, 
bureaucratic, and monopolist” that led to high state expenditures and low economic 
efficiency.467 Thus, the Democrat Party promoted liberal economic policies with less 
state intervention in the market.  
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Socially, the Democrat Party advocated a more sophisticated understanding of 
secularism than the party-state regime before 1950. The first government program clearly 
makes a distinction between struggling against the ‘reactionary movements’ and being 
committed to the freedom of religion and conscience.468 This makes a qualitative 
difference from the Republican People’s Party regime which understood secularism as a 
necessity for the idea of progress where science would play the leading role and Islam 
was a hindrance toward that goal. In the 1931 party program of the Republican People’s 
Party, under the secularism section, it is stated that all laws, codes, and practices would 
be based on science compliant with the necessities of the age.469 This statement does not 
mention any aspect of freedom of religion. Yet, the DP program in 1946 recognizes 
freedom of religion as one of the sacred rights of humanity.470 
In terms of nationalism and nationhood, the DP and the RPP do not show 
analytical differences in the sense that the idea of monolithic Turkishness persists. In 
other words, unity in homogeneity or uniformity rather than unity in diversity shows 
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continuity in the approaches toward nationhood. In the 1931 Republican People’s Party 
program, nation is defined as “the political and social whole that incarnates through 
citizens who are tied together with common language, culture, and ideal.”471  The 
principle of nationalism (ulusculuk, not milliyetcilik), on the other hand, is articulated as 
the promotion of the nation to the level of modern nations and the protection of free self 
and the particular character of the nation as defined previously. In similar lines, the 
Democrat Party approaches the nation as a unity of citizens who share a common culture 
and ideals as a result of the common history and in addition to that the party specifically 
accepts an understanding of nationalism that rejects all the exclusionary notions.472 The 
DP also considers all the citizens as Turks regardless of religion and race.473 This 
continuity in the fixation of monolithic Turkishness within the idea of unity in 
homogeneity shows that the perception of Turkishness remained the same across these 
two competing elite groups (the RPP versus the DP). Sener Akturk (2012) specifically 
studies the case of the Democrat Party as counter-elites who held political hegemony 
without any attempts at changing the boundaries of nationhood. However, he fails to 
explain why the Democrat Party did not have a new paradigm or discourse on 
nationhood.474 This failure is also the main insufficiency in his theory of nationhood 
change under the conditions of 1) counter-elites, 2) new discourse, and 3) political 
hegemony. In order to understand and explain under what conditions the state elites are 
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more likely to change the form and content of nationhood, it is important to unpack the 
external necessities of the state within the international community on the one hand and 
internal opportunities on the other. Most particularly, while the international context 
shapes domestic discourses, alternative domestic claim-makings by nonstate actors in 
relation to the international context determines the state elites’ perception of change or 
lack thereof.  
The Cold War Era and Domestic Discourses within the State’s 
Political Agenda 
The first Menderes government’s program very vividly articulates the priorities in 
the national security agenda and the threat perception of the political elites (i.e., radical 
left). This is not surprising within the context of the Cold War where Turkey was an ally 
of the United States, was part of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plans, and joined 
NATO against the Soviet-led communist bloc.475 In this bipolar international context 
within the metanarratives of communism versus capitalist democracy, Turkey’s choice of 
alliance naturally determines the threat perceptions of the political elites and their agenda 
of national security. As stated in the 1950 government program, “we, in the contemporary 
conditions, will not consider radical left circulations within the subject matter of freedom 
of expression and conscience.”476 Radical left circles are depicted as ‘spies’ who would 
‘destroy the homeland from within’ and thus, the roots of the radical left should be 
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The military and political alliance of Turkey with the United States and being a 
member of the anti-Soviet bloc in the United Nations made ‘democracy’ the main 
discursive paradigm of Menderes' government. This discourse was also used to make a 
qualitative distinction between ‘the old regime’ before the Democrat Party rule since the 
May 14 elections in 1950 was depicted as the “great revolution” that established “the 
democratic system” against “the dogmas, traditions, and thoughts in the lifetime of the 
State.”478 In this context, the United States was insistently framed as “the great friend” by 
Menderes' government between 1950 and 1960. These political elites were also very 
conscious of the shifting necessities of the state under different international conditions. 
The fifth Menderes government program clearly states this: “in terms of significance and 
content, the necessities, issues, and causes of today’s Turkey cannot be possibly 
compared to the necessities and issues of yesterday’s Turkey.”479 If one of the necessities 
of the ‘old Turkey’ and the founding elites of the Republic in the late 1920s and 1930s 
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was to construct a very particular nationhood (see Chapter 5) for the state, such necessity 
was not present for the ‘new Turkey’ under the Democrat Party rule due to the 
international context of the Cold War—i.e., class-based struggles rather than ethnic 
struggles defined the security agenda of the state—on the one hand and the absence of the 
nationhood question on the other, particularly within the context of Kurdish threat and 
question of the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, the threat and question of Kurdistan in the 
Eastern provinces in the mindset of the founding elites was gradually transformed into 
and framed within the socio-economic development paradigm especially during the Cold 
War era.  
According to Sener Akturk, the Democrat Party in the first multiparty elections 
was the counter-elites against the party-state under the Republican People’s Party.480 
However, its strong support from the Kurds and Alevis alike came from the common 
opposition and criticism of Kemalism on the one hand and commitment to socioeconomic 
development on the other, rather than any discourse related to ethnic demands as Akturk 
states (p. 136). However, Akturk takes Kurdishness in this case as taken for granted or as 
if it is primordial in the sense that mass Kurdish ethnic consciousness was present in the 
1950s but the Kurds did not mobilize around ethnic demands. Moreover, he considers the 
Turkish state an isolated body from world politics and international discursive patterns, 
especially in the context of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. Turkey, of 
course, was not neutral in this bipolar world being a member of NATO and a close ally of 
the United States, as stated in the fifth Menderes government (1957-1960).481 Within this 
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context, the security paradigm of the state was based on the communist threat, not an 
ethnic threat. This was very vividly articulated by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in his 
fifth government program as well, especially within the context of suppressing media 
under the banner of fight against hidden communism.482 If the ruling elites did not have 
any perception of ethnic claim-making or ethnic threat in a mass organized way in the 
1950s, why would they reconsider the relationship between ethnicity and nationhood? 
Unless it is a necessity for the state elites, they are less likely to change the boundaries of 
nationhood. Until the 1960s, Hakan Yavuz (2001), in his seminal study on the stages of 
Kurdish nationalism, aptly states that:  
The discourse of the new Republican ideology of Mustafa Kemal either denied 
the existence of the Kurds or reconstructed a political language to talk about the 
issue without pronouncing the word 'Kurds.' As a part of the radical nation-
building reforms, Kurdish traditional notions of identity and culture were 
constructed as 'reactionary', 'tribal', and an outcome of regional 'backwardness'.483  
If the state elites did not frame the Kurdish question in an ethnic paradigm but 
rather considered it in a socio-economic scope, there was no need to revise the 
boundaries of the Turkish national identity. Especially after the 1950s within the context 
of the Cold War, “Kurdishness” was structured within the leftist-communist paradigm in 
the eyes of the state elites. An ethnicity-based consciousness of Kurdishness among the 
                                                                                                                                                 
tehlikeli hal almaktadır… Hususiyetle dost ve müttefikimiz Birleşik Amerika ile karşılıklı hürmet ve itimada 
dayanan çok samimi rabıtaların her zamandan ziyâde kuvvetli bulunduğunu ifadeden haz duymaktayım. 
Bütün NATO müttefiklerimizle ve bu meyanda bilhassa Almanya, Fransa, İngiltere ve İtalya ile olan ve 
karşılıklı anlayışa ve dostluğa dayanan iki taraflı münâsebetlerin her sahada her gün biraz daha takviye 
edileceği gibi…” Retrieved from The Grand National Assembly of Turkey at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP23.htm on September 23, 2014.  
482 “Esefle kaydetmek icabeder ki; ölçüsüzlüklerden faydalanmak ve meydanı boş zannederek 
harekete geçmiş olan ve siyâset mücadelelerinde ağırlaştırma ve zehirleme gayreti içinde çalışan ve birçok 
yerlere barınmak istidadında olan gizli komünistlikle müessir bir mücadeleye girişmek, huzur ve sükunun 
temininde ve manevi asayişin iadesinde ehemmiyetli bir tedbir olarak telakki edilmek icabeder.” Retrieved 
from The Grand National Assembly of Turkey at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP23.htm on 
September 23, 2014. 
483 Yavuz, p. 2.  
  
202 
Kurds existed only at the elite level, not at mass groupings. While Islam and communism 
functioned as surrogate identities for the Kurdish identity until the 1980s, the 
ethnicization of Kurdishness became a reality after the insurgency started by the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party after the 1980s.484 This speaks to the fact that an amalgamation 
of concepts such as ‘terrorism’, ‘separatism’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘cultural pluralism’ were 
only put to the security and political agenda of all the ruling governments after the 1980s. 
In addition to other factors, states are more likely to change their structure of nationhood 
when rival identity and identity movements pose greater threats to the ontological 
security of the state (Devletin Bekasi). This was the case when the Ottoman elites 
introduced Ottomanism in the early nineteenth century and when the Republican 
founding elites introduced Turkishness as the monolithic identity of the state in the 
1920s.  
Sener Akturk’s theory states that “counterelites need to be armed with a new 
comprehensive discourse on the relationship between ethnicity and nationality and 
acquire an overwhelming majority in the political arena in order to change the ethnicity 
regime.” 485 According to Akturk, although the Democrat Party era (1950-1960) was an 
era of the counter-elites gaining political hegemony against the Kemalist party-state of 
the 1930s and 1940s, the absence of new discourse on ethnicity caused a continuity of the 
way that Turkish nationhood was officially structured. Yet, since Akturk does not explain 
why the Democrat Party did not have a new discourse regarding the relationship between 
ethnicity and nationhood especially within the context of the Kurdish question, his theory 
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loses its explanatory value and remains insufficient for our understanding of under what 
conditions states are more likely to change their nationhood frameworks. Domestic 
claim-makings by various nonstate actors on the one hand and the international discursive 
context within which the state is embedded on the other are key factors that reveal when 
the political elites adopt new approaches and policies toward framing the nationhood. For 
the case of Turkey, challenges to the official Turkishness were much more imminent 
when various domestic actors were able to mobilize the masses surrounding identity 
politics within the opportunity spaces of the post-Cold War international context.    
Post-Cold War International Context and the Transformation 
of the Nation-State: The Decline of Forced Assimilation and 
the Extension of Human Rights 
The post-Cold War state of world politics manifests greater attention to the 
politics of identity—be it ethnic, religious, linguistic, or gender. Amid the optimism of 
democracy and human rights, the question of nation-building under decolonization and 
post-Communist states has become one of the key issues in debates over stability and 
order. The human catastrophes in the backyard of relatively prosperous and stable 
Western Europe—the Balkans—after the breakup of Yugoslavia have forced the 
international community to reconsider the extent of human rights on a scale between 
individual rights and group-rights.486 Various international conventions by the United 
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Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Union487 right after the Cold War 
manifest the idea that individual rights within the borders of citizenship and national 
membership are insufficient to restore order and stability in nation-states where multiple 
identity belongings surrounding ethnicity, religion, and language weaken the 
understandings of a monolithic nationhood based on individual rights. These conventions 
in the international normative context have led to the decline of assimilation in 
contemporary nation-building processes. In other words, the early and mid-twentieth 
century’s assimilation par excellence has been more or less framed as crimes against 
humanity in the international community. Thus, the post-Cold War has increased the 
debate and adoption of multicultural policies and norms in the public sphere, and has 
reduced the idea of the nation-state as a project of homogenization and monolithic 
nationhood.  
Michel Seymour indicates that “certain homogenous types of nation-states are 
outmoded, but others deserve to be maintained, especially those that are able to recognize 
their own polyethnic and pluricultural character.”488 For David Laitin, “the classical 
nation-state, one where a nation and state are commensurate, in which the national will is 
                                                                                                                                                 
49–71.  
487 For instance, since 1989, there is a trend that individual-rights based human rights norms have 
been expanding toward group-rights based international norms: The UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), The UN International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), The Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (2007), European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Copenhagen Document (1990) and Helsinki Document (1992) and the 
1992 creation of the office of High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Council of Europe Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (1995).   
488 Michel Seymour, “Introduction: Theories and Practices,” in The Fate of the Nation State, ed. 
Michel Seymour (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), p. 3.  
  
205 
embodied in a state of its name, is today largely a nostalgic myth.”489 However, on the 
other hand, Brendan O’Leary argues that “the claim that nation-states are fading fast also 
seems highly provocative and indeed deeply insensitive when numerous nations without 
states strive to reverse what they generally and correctly see as a major disadvantage in 
their collective powers, including their power of self-determination and self-
government.” 490 
In addition to the arguments that monolithic nationhood has been in decline in the 
last two decades, there have been debates on a paradigmatic shift to the postnational era 
or postnational citizenship, especially under the models of regional political integrations 
such as the European Union.491 This idea is based on how national identity is superseded 
by transnational or supranational identities in particular and global cosmopolitan 
attachments in general. However, the idea that the nation-state in particular and the state 
in general is in total decline vis-à-vis supranational and transnational forces is premature 
at best and misleading at worst. In fact, the changing nature of national identity is not its 
shift to supranational attachment, but its pluralization and atomization from its uniform 
and homogeneous raison d’être into heterogeneity. This pluralization is facilitated by the 
subnational challenges from minority communities and the mobility of migrants from the 
outside. Thus, “many of those who stress plural group identities, with the exception of 
strong cosmopolitans, stop short of rejecting national identity, the nation-state, or even 
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nationalism, properly conceived”; rather “they typically call for the internal 
transformation of nation-states and a reconceptualization of nationalism along lines that 
are more inclusive and hospitable to cultural difference.”492 In other words, as John A. 
Hall states, “political authority and decision making are not simply pushed upward to the 
supranational level; rather they are evolving in multiple vertical and horizontal 
directions.”493  
This pinpoints the fact that as different segments of political authorities other than 
the nation-state find opportunity spaces for decision-making in complex interdependent 
relations, this does not necessarily mean that the state remains static but it is, in fact, 
continuously evolving according to the changing dynamics of domestic and transnational 
political and socio-economic realities.  Then, “the evolution in state types—from the 
princely state to the dynastic state to the territorial state to the nation-state—is a grand 
transformation in the character of state power and the sources of state authority.”494 In 
terms of power and authority, managing multiethnic societies along with a social 
cohesion seems to be one of the major challenges for the nation-state in the twenty-first 
century, not just for weak or nondemocracies, but for strong liberal democracies as well 
(e.g., Quebec in Canada, Scotland and Northern Ireland in Great Britain, Basque and 
Catalan regions in Spain, the immigration question in the US and the European Union). 
Such management both entails a redefinition of nation and reorganization of the state. 
Overall, more or less a consensus is that nation and state are neither divorcing from each 
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other nor disappearing in a globalizing world. Yet, the idea of homogenizing and 
forcefully assimilating nation-state of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where 
nation-building culturally and linguistically destroys minorities, is both morally and 
legally unacceptable in our contemporary world. Overall, the contemporary international 
normative context one way or another enforces diversity and pluralization of identity 
belongings away from monolithic understandings of nationhood.  
Post-1980s Counter-Hegemonic Mobilizations and the 
Domestic Political Claims-Making in Turkey 
As the contemporary international normative context has become more favorable 
to group rights and multicultural policies, domestic social movements or political 
mobilizations that aim to change state policies toward the meaning and practices of 
established nationhoods have utilized this opportunity space for their own purposes. Due 
to the proximity and Turkey’s bid for the EU, the European normative context has 
provided the discursive repertoires to various identity groups in Turkey against the 
tutelage of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic elites. However, the European human 
rights regime that is favorable to minorities has already been embedded in the 
international normative context of declining forced assimilation and the extension of 
human rights. Thus, the role of the EU as the engine of domestic change toward 
minorities in Turkey is overemphasized. Besides, the external norms do not provide one-
size-fits-all policies but rather these norms are vernacularized by those domestic groups 
who attempt to seek change in the institution of nationhood. As I previously articulated 
the international normative context that identifies monolithic nationhood frameworks as 
morally and legally less acceptable, in this section, I would like to lay out domestic 
  
208 
political activism by the various groups that interact within this structural context in order 
to change the institution of nationhood.  
The Republic of Turkey is a top-down project of social engineering in the pursuit 
of transforming the society toward a modern civilization.495 This entails a strong state 
tradition in charge of every social and economic aspect: the relationship between the state 
and Islam, the state and economy, the state and society and the idea of national 
identity.496 In turn, this strong tradition of transforming society was facilitated through an 
ideal of homogenous and monolithic Turkish identity. The military in this process 
became the guardian of the secular state and indivisibility of national unity. A series of 
military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 manifest the idea of the Turkish 
state analogous with the Turkish military. In other words, the content and extent of 
Turkishness as an institution of nationhood had always been a top-down project rather 
than an outcome of grassroots mobilizations, civil society effects, or societal consensus. 
Since the 1980s in general and the post-Cold War era in particular, increasing civic and 
political activism of various groups that have been critical of the top-down impositions of 
identifying the nation either from religious or ethnic perspectives have led to the gradual 
erosion of Kemalist statism and its ideal of monolithic national identity. These counter-
hegemonic groups can be categorized under pro-Kurdish, pro-Islamic, and pro-Alevi 
claim-making political and civic organizations in the 1990s.497 These counter-hegemonic 
                                                 
495 Fernee, Tadd Graham. “Modernity and Nation-Making in India, Iran, and Turkey.” 
International Journal of Asian Studies 9(1): 71-97. 
496 For a comprehensive study on the ideological roots of the Turkish Republic along with its 
hegemonic discourse of Kemalism, see Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist 
Turkey: Progress or Order? (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004).  
497 These groups are neither mutually exclusive from each other nor do they refer to internally 




groups have had various common characteristics: (1) they have been transnational, (2) 
they have been represented in many NGOs, media organizations, and political parties, 
and (3) they have been critical of singular and secular conceptions of Turkishness from 
their own identity stances.  
Firstly, these groups have been involved in transnational activism beyond Turkey. 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have built the theoretical basis of such activism 
around the world by arguing that “states no longer look unitary from the outside” and 
“increasingly dense interactions among individuals, groups, actors from states and 
regional and international institutions appear to involve much more than re-presenting 
interests on a world stage.”498 The notion of transnational advocacy networks highlights 
the era of global politics where states are not the ultimate sovereign bodies anymore as 
argued previously. In Keck and Sikkink’s seminal study of transnational advocacy 
networks, it is emphasized that political claim-making or rights claim are the prototypical 
discourses in the aim of changing the behavior of the state of subject matter. Adopting a 
repertoire of action from information, leverage, symbolic, and accountability politics, 
transnational advocacy networks become better off to voice their demands and concerns 
from the outside rather than from within.499 The goal is to establish legitimate claims that 
would persuade masses in order to transform the status quo of the state. The more the 
network can legitimize its discourse, the less autonomous the state becomes in 
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maintaining the status quo regime.  
Many pro-Kurdish and pro-Alevi communities in Europe have campaigned 
against the alleged discrimination over their identity in Turkey.500 Referring to the Kurds 
in Europe, Vera Eccarius-Kelly states that “as European voters, they can raise 
expectations with regard to Turkish membership in the European Union, and as Diaspora 
Kurdish nationalists, they can pursue the option of encouraging critical examinations of 
Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish minority.501 Through lobbying activities in Europe, the 
Kurds have sought new ways of legitimizing their political claim-making which has been 
in direct opposition to the monolithic conception of Turkishness. The transnational nature 
of pro-Kurdish activism has, to some extent, delegitimized monolithic Turkishness along 
with the other political movements. As Nathalie Tocci argues, “the EU discourse has 
legitimized what were previously considered taboo subjects, providing political space 
both for suppressed Kurdish demands to come to the fore and for these to be discussed 
(albeit not necessarily accepted) within the more liberal segments of the establishment.” 
502 Moreover, Jeremy Walton in his ethnographic study of confessional pluralism in 
contemporary Turkey argues that pro-Islamic groups, especially the Sunni Hizmet 
organizations, and the Alevi institutions such as Cem Foundation and the Haci Bektas 
Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation have institutional ties with like-minded organizations 
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outside Turkey.503 In his comprehensive and critical interpretation of the Fethullan Gulen 
movement— the primary pro-Islamic claim-makers against the Kemalist state and the 
Turkish Armed Forces—Hakan Yavuz articulates the transnational activism of the 
movement through establishing private schools and charity and cultural organizations in 
Europe, North America, and Central Asia.504  
Secondly, all of these organizations have been very active in the public sphere in 
Turkey through establishing foundations and institutions and running media 
organizations including newspapers and television channels. Despite their 
nongovernmental politics within civil society,505 they either dominate a political party or 
have strong ties with major political parties in Turkey. For instance, pro-Kurdish groups 
have been successful in founding various political parties despite their closure by the 
Constitutional Court.506 Despite their closures, the first establishment of the People’s 
Labor Party (Halkin Emek Partisi-HEP) in 1989 to the Democratic Society Party 
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi-DEP) in 2005 has represented the pro-Kurdish political 
agenda. The current governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi-AKP) has had close ties with the Gulen movement in its formative years.507 
Moreover, pro-Islamic discourses within the claim-makings of Milli Gorus (National 
Vision) during the 1990s, especially with the rise of Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party, 
mobilized many grassroots organizations against the tutelage of the Kemalist elites. The 
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28th February process in 1997, which is often referred to as a post-modern coup d’état, 
took Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan out of his office on the grounds of ‘reactionary 
rise’ against the Kemalist principles of the state. Many of the current governing AK 
Party’s founders have come from Erbakan’s Milli Gorus with strong critiques of military 
tutelage.     
Thirdly, these groups promote claim-makings that are critical to certain 
conceptions of Turkishness under the hegemony of the Kemalist state. The pro-Alevi 
groups are concerned with the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the compulsory 
religion courses from a perspective of the Sunni interpretation in public education—
especially after the Turkish-Islam turn following the military coup in 1980—as the 
representative of the dominant Sunni Turkishess,  Pro-Islamic groups have reacted to the 
monopolization of Islam by the Kemalist secular state which had hindered free 
expression of religious customs and traditions such as the ban on headscarves in public 
institutions including universities and the Turkish parliament. The secular emphasis of 
being a Turk has been criticized. On the other hand, pro-Kurdish groups have framed and 
criticized Turkishness as an ethnic identity. In fact, the rise of the AK Party in 2002, just 
like the Democrat Party in 1950, have come into being through a strong coalitional 
establishment which largely included the Kurds, pious Muslims, liberals, and Alevis who 
have been more or less critical to certain characteristics of the founding philosophy of 
modern Turkey and their guardians in military and bureaucratic circles.  
 These separate and often rival groups with different discourse backgrounds on 
how to change the institution of nationhood have mostly referred to international human 
rights norms in general and the European rights regime surrounding the EU and the 
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Council of Europe in particular. Between 1959 and 2011, the European Court of Human 
Rights has delivered 2,747 judgments for Turkey which constitute the largest share 
(18.49%) of all judgments.508 The right to a free trial (729), protection of property (611), 
and right to liberty and security (554) constitute the largest share in these cases.509 Many 
Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups in the 1990s have referred to the institutions of the 
European Union in order to safeguard their discourses especially against the military 
tutelage of the state.  
National Security Agenda of the State After the 1980s 
Since I emphasize the post-1980 political activism of various groups especially 
after the collapse of the bipolar international system, it would be misleading to assume 
that state-society relations during the 1960s and 1970s were any steadier or calmer. For 
instance, in terms of Kurdish nationalism, Hakan Yavuz frames 1961 to 1983 as the 
period of secularization of the Kurdish question through socialism.510 In this period, 
Kurdish identity along with Alevi identity was one of the markers of the broader socialist 
mobilizations in Turkey. Organizations such as the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the 
East (DDKO in Turkish acronym), media circles such as Dicle-Firat and Deng, and the 
socialist Labor Party of Turkey (TiP in Turkish acronmy) all promoted antistate ideas 
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surrounding the Marxist-Leninist norms of national self-determination and ethnic 
federalism within the socialist idiom of the ‘brotherhood of peoples’ (halkların 
kardeşliği). Rather than tribal and traditional Kurdish leaders, urban and educated youth 
were mostly involved in such mobilizations and claim-makings. On the other hand, 
Turkish nationalism along with pro-Islamic discourses was sided under the anti-
communism coalition. During the Cold War years, there was an increasing Islamic turn in 
Turkish nationalism due to the anti-Kemalist sentiments, demographic change, and 
electoral behavior.511 For instance, political and cultural activities of an organization 
called the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocagı) led to the dissemination of the Turkish-
Islamic synthesis after the 1980s.  
Structural conditions affected the domestic political contestations and how they 
were framed by the political elites. The difference between the pre- and post-1980s 
political contestations and activism in Turkey is that the pre-1980s political context from 
a national security perspective by the state was framed as the left-right polarizations due 
to the structural Cold War environment. Since Turkey was an ally of the anti-Soviet bloc, 
communism was the main threat to the security of the state. Communist activism rather 
than identity claims was primarily securitized. However, after the military coup of 1980, 
Islamic political identity and Kurdish identity became the two top concerns in the 
national security agenda. The beginning of armed insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) also put concepts such as ‘separatism’ and ‘ethnic separatism’ as the main 
idioms of national security perception.  
Amid the increasing terror environment between the PKK and Turkish military at 
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the turn of the 1990s, perhaps Turgut Ozal was the first leader in Turkish politics who 
publicly offered alternative paradigms in the fight against the PKK. Ozal understood the 
problem with the PKK in particular and the Kurdish question in general beyond a security 
paradigm by uttering the liberty paradigm through human rights and democracy.512 The 
reason behind this paradigm in Ozal’s mindset was the different realities of the internal 
and external realities. Ozal viewed Turkish identity within the philosophy of the melting 
pot as similar to the American identity and raised a question about the potential results of 
whether Mustafa Kemal would name the Republic as the Ottoman Republic rather than 
the Turkish Republic.513 One of Ozal’s important moves was to lift the ban on the 
Kurdish language in 1991.514  
Islamist circles in the 1990s also began to debate multiculturalism under Islam. 
The Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi) with the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan 
envisioned an Islamic ummah where the Kurds would be granted linguistic and cultural 
rights.515 “The Medina Contract”—in which Prophet Muhammad granted rights for the 
Jews and Christians in the first society of Medina—appealed to Islamist circles as well as 
liberals (Bulac 1993).516 Erbakan’s framework for solving the PKK terrorism was based 
on the Islamic brotherhood. In one of Erbakan’s visits to Bingol—a heavily Kurdish-
populated city—he stated that “Even though for centuries children of this country began 
school with besmele [in the name of God], you removed besmele. What did you put 
                                                 
512 “Meselenin bugun artik eski usullerle cozulmesi hadisesi soz konusu degildir…Yani insan 
haklari ve demokrasi…25 isyan soyle cozulmus, boyle cozulmus…Bugun o donem kapanmistir” An 
interview on 12 November 1993, Hurriyet.   
513 Isin Celebi. Turkiye’nin Donusum Yillari (Alfa Yayincilik, 2012); Aktuel 1992. 
514 “Ozal’in Kurt Plani” http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1999/06/19/haber/hab02.html  
515 Fehmi Calmuk,. Erbakan’in Kurtleri: Milli Gorus’un Guneydogu Politikasi (Istanbul: Metis 
Yayinlari, 2004).  
516 Ali Bulac, “Medine Vesikasi Uzerine Tartismalar,” Birikim 47 (1993): 40-6.  
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instead? I am a Turk, I am right, I am hardworking.”517 Saying this entitled a Muslim 
child of Kurdish origin to reply, “Is that so? Then I am a Kurd, I am more right, and I am 
more hardworking.”518  
Although Erbakan’s party gained great support from the Kurdish areas of east and 
southeast Anatolia in the 1995 general elections and was able to form a coalition 
government with the center-right True Path Party (DYP in Turkish), this government was 
taken out of office by military intervention in 1997. Overall, Ozal’s neo-Ottoman 
discourses on the one hand and Erbakan’s Islamic multiculturalism on the other were 
signs that monolithic Turkishness was in decline during the 1990s. While Ozal was more 
endorsing the European Union membership and adopted human rights discourse towards 
that end, Erbakan was not very fond of the idea that Turkey would become a member of 
the EU. Social democrats and pro-Kurdish political parties in the 1990s, however, heavily 
relied on the EU norms regarding minority rights which occasionally strained Turkey’s 
foreign affairs with Europe. Overall, despite the increasing challenges to monolithic 
Turkishness from within and outside, the monopolization of Turkishness under the 
guardianship of the Kemalist military elites was an important hindrance until the AK 
Party came into power in 2002 with a hegemonic power base.   
The Justice and Development Party, Elite Change, and Power 
Consolidation 
In the previous sections, I articulated the counter-hegemonic mobilizations in the 
domestic political structure that has been shaped and reshaped within the systemic 
                                                 
517 From the national oath which students in public schools used to read every day by law.  
518 Calmuk, Erbakan’in Kurtleri, p. 8; Akturk, Regimes of Ethnicity, pp. 173-174.  
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context of international norms of human rights and its extension toward group rights or 
minority rights. The major outcome of this political context has been the society 
becoming autonomous from the state and its reflection of increasing identity-based 
activism. These two mutually constitutive forces have destabilized the taken-for-granted 
notions of Turkishness as an institution of nationhood in Turkey. After the rise of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) in 2002 which fused Ozal’s neo-
Ottoman and Erbakan’s Islamic discourses together, the singular and monolithic social 
engineering project of constructing a Turk has experienced a critical juncture where its 
content and extent has been deconstructed and has become a contested zone. Then the 
Prime Minister and currently the President—Recep Tayyip Erdogan—has promoted the 
AKP as the party that stomp all sorts of nationalisms (“milliyetcilikleri ayaklar altina 
alan parti”) and the Party in its first government program under Abdullah Gul defined 
their philosophy as “let the people live so that the State can live” (“insani yasat ki devlet 
yasasin”).519 This statement one way or another has been the AKP’s policy which one 
way or another pluralized Turkishness. In other words, the monopoly on the definition of 
Turkishness was shattered when Erdogan stated that there were around thirty different 
ethnic identities in Turkey such as Kurdish, Laz, Circassian, and Bosniak which 
constituted the subidentities of the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey—that is the one 
and only supraidentity.520 While the state television (TRT) channel started broadcasting 
in languages other than Turkish, the AKP government introduced the program of 
                                                 
519"İnsanı yaşat ki devlet yaşasın" düşüncesinden hareket eden Hükümetimiz, bütün politikalarının 
merkezine insanı koyacaktır”  Retrieved from The Grand National Assembly of Turkey at 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP58.htm on October 7, 2014.  
520 Milliyet. 2005. “Kimlik degisimi!.” At www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/13/siyaset/axsiy02.html, 
accessed March 8, 2013.  
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integration rather than homogenization under the narratives of “Kurdish Opening” and 
“Democratic Opening.” Such a paradigmatic shift in the logic of the political elites has 
been in tandem with the AKP’s reformism with the intention of EU membership as well. 
Why could the previous governing parties before the AKP not initiate a similar package 
of reform targeted to integrate alternative identities other than defined by the state? The 
veto players, especially the military tutelage which designed the Turkish politics as the 
guardian of the founding Kemalist principles played an important role in the persistence 
of monolithic Turkishness.  
Veto player is an “individual or a collective actor whose agreement is required for 
a policy decision.”521 George Tsebelis argues that “policy stability of a political system 
increases when the number of veto players increases, when their congruence decreases, 
and when their cohesion increases.”522 Although George Tsebelis’ argument primarily 
referred to legislative processes in liberal democracies, the notion of veto player can be 
adopted in a nonelectoral fashion. Hendrik Spruyt argues that actors who do not hold 
formal office can also exercise veto power as well, particularly when the preferences of 
the military might determine the outcome.523 In the political context of Turkey, the 
military as the guardian of official ideology has played the major role in being the veto 
player on the issues of national identity and state policies toward ethnicity and religion.  
The military in Turkey has had two main tasks: to prevent any increase of ethnic 
                                                 
521 George Tsebelis. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarianism, Multicameralism, and Multypartyism” British Journal of Political 
Science 25(3): 289-325.  
522 Tsebelis, p. 322. 
523 Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005).   
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consciousness other than the state-defined Turkishness—that is to protect the 
indivisibility of the nation and state—and to safeguard the state against the infiltration of 
pro-Islamic groups—thus, defining the depth and breadth of secularism. Any attempt to 
foster these two ‘threats’ has been suppressed forcefully: modern Turkey has experienced 
four military interventions in politics.  
Umit Cizre states that "anti-military sentiment has always been limited to very 
small group consisting of a handful of a Western-influenced group of intellectuals and 
human rights advocates."524 Moreover, Nil Satana argues that "after Republic, Turkish 
military, as the most prominent guardian of the Kemalist principles, followed a national 
defense policy based on protection of national unity, national borders and population 
homogeneity."525 Due to the "distrust of politics" and "fear of the state collapse," states 
Ersel Aydinli, the military has been the most prestigious and trusted institution in 
Turkey.526 Moreover, he argues that "society has had a primary relationship with the 
army and a secondary relationship with politicians."527 TSK, as an autonomous body of 
Turkish polity, has a unique place as Mustafa Kemal settled a separation of the military 
from politics.528 Besides, Sam Kaplan argues that "the state school system fosters 
identification with the military institution and values."529 In 2007, when the General Staff 
                                                 
524Umit Cizre. 2003. “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: the Case of Turkey,” 
Middle East Journal Vol. 57, No.2, pp. 213-229, p. 216. 
525 Nil Satana. 2007. “Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy,” Armed 
Forces and Society Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 357-388, p. 365. 
526 Ersel Aydinli. 2009. “A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup 
Era in Turkey,” Middle East Journal Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 581-596. 
527 Ibid., p. 585. 
528 David Capezza. 2009. “Turkey’s Military is a Catalyst for Reform,” Middle East Quarterly 
Vol. 16, pp. 13-23.  
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of the Turkish military aired an e-memorandum against the presidential candidacy of the 
AKP’s Abdullah Gul whose wife wears a headscarf, such a statement was justified on the 
Republic’s secular values and principles within which political Islam was identified as 
anathema. This e-memorandum stated that “It is observed that some circles who have 
been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of 
Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently.”530 In the statement, 
there were reactions to the AKP’s alternative understanding of national unity which has 
been somewhat similar to Islamic multiculturalism influenced by the Ottoman nostalgia: 
Those activities include requests for redefinition of fundamental values and 
attempts to organise alternative celebrations instead of our national festivals 
symbolizing unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out the 
mentioned activities which have turned into an open challenge against the state, 
do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try 
to hide their real aims under the guise of religion. Developments in our region 
give numerous examples that playing on religion and manipulating the faith into a 
political discourse can cause disasters. Those who are opposed to Great Leader 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a 
Turk' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish 
Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties 
stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of 
Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute.531 
This was the first serious intervention of the military into civil politics after the 
28th February 1997 intervention which took the Erbakan government down. The Justice 
and Development Party used this attempt to initiate the so-called Ergenekon trials against 
many military-bureaucratic officials on the grounds of a coup plot against the 
government. Ilker Basbug, a former General Staff, was sentenced to life in prison.532 
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Thus, reading Turkish politics only from an electoral framework (which Sener Akturk 
does) is a misleading approach since civil-military relations throughout the history of the 
Republic shaped and reshaped the autonomy and capacity of political parties to act of 
their own will. In other words, electoral victories of the AKP did not necessarily or 
directly transform them into a hegemonic force in Turkish politics. Interestingly, while 
the military’s e-memorandum in 2007 prioritized the security of “the State” based on the 
founding principles of secularism and nationalism, the AKP’s counter-discourses 
prioritized the security of the State as well, especially in the meta-narrative of its 
‘Democratic Opening.’ The AK Party especially relied on the EU process in its initial 
years in government since the EU was an important shield against the veto players in 
Turkish politics (i.e., the military and judiciary). For instance, the Court of Cassation 
(Yargıtay) and the Chief Public Prosecutor (Yargitay Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı) 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya attempted to close the AK Party in 2008 based on the principle 
of secularism stated in the constitution. In the closure indictment, it was stated that the 
founding members of the AK Party were all coming from ex-Islamist parties such as the 
Welfare Party (Refah) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet) and their previous statements 
contradicted with the Kemalist values of the Republic, most particularly secularism.533 In 
other words, the dynamics of Turkish politics cannot be solely read from an electoral 
perspective. In order to understand the elite competition, veto players, and hegemonic 
governments, one needs to look at the relationship between the major civil, military, and 
judiciary players. The AK Party’s civilian base vis-à-vis the military and judiciary 
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533 Anayasa Mahkemesi, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi Kapatilma Iddianamesi, 2008, p. 142. 
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tutelages and their elimination as veto players led to the one party rule which is 
somewhat similar to the Republican People’s Party’s party-state hegemony in the 
formative years of the Republic. Sener Akturk aptly argues that political hegemony is one 
of the conditions for dynamics of change in the boundaries of one state’s nationhood, 
however reading the trend of this political hegemony solely from the electoral victories or 
defeats is crucially misleading, especially in Turkey. In the struggle of the elites to 
control the state, the AK Party turned out to be victorious especially after 2008 when the 
party closure pressures and military e-memorandum threats were eliminated. This is why 
the full-fledged initiative under the title of Democratic Opening which primarily targeted 
a solution to the Kurdish question started in 2009. Yet, the ‘Democratic Opening’ has not 
come into being primarily with the ruling elites’ normative motivations such as human 
rights or minority rights, but rather again the State and its survival has been essential in 
the metanarrative of this reformist mindset.  
The Justice and Development Party’s Metanarrative of the 
“Democratic Opening” and the Logic of Redefining 
Nationhood 
Yalcin Akdogan, the former chief adviser to the then Prime Minister Erdogan and 
currently the deputy prime minister in Ahmet Davutoglu’s government, has been one of 
the key official figures in the formation and evolution of the AK Party’s ‘Democratic 
Opening.’ He has compiled the intent, processes, and dynamics of the ‘Democratic 
Opening’ in a book.534 Akdogan identifies two goals of the project: 1) democratization, 
                                                 




and 2) ending the terror.535 He mentions Turkey’s accession process to the European 
Union under the AK Party rule as the positive catalyst for democratization in general and 
the Kurdish question in particular.536 Democratic Opening, according to Akdogan, was a 
necessity in the EU accession process. In this process, the government’s initiation of a 
television channel airing in the Kurdish language 24/7 in 2004 is reflected by Akdogan as 
the official recognition of the Kurdish identity by the state.537 According to Akdogan, the 
opposition (mainly the Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Action Party) 
against the Democratic Opening argued that this project would lead to ethnic separatism 
in Turkey. Akdogan cites some statements by the opposition leaders regarding the 
Democratic Opening:  
Devlet Bahceli (Nationalist Action Party): “It is the first time we witness a search 
for separation models in Turkey by a government in our political history…. The 
government’s point of departure for PKK opening [defines Democratic Opening 
as such] is the definition of the separatism problem fed by terror as the question of 
ethnic and legitimate identity and rights claim-making.538 
Deniz Baykal (Republican People’s Party): “In its grand history since 1920, it is 
the first time that The Grand National Assembly of Turkey brings ‘openings’ that 
reverse the struggles of nation-building and that destroys the identity of the 
national state and nation-state identity by a ruling government to the agenda of 
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey…. The name of our state is Turkish, the 
name of our nation is Turkish…. They say this is an ethnic imposition! Be fair! So 
many Circassians, Albanians, Arabs, and millions of Kurdish-origin citizens don’t 
feel this ‘ethnic imposition’ but do we have to feel that way just because the PKK 
sees it as such? The Turkish nation is not ethnic. This is the name that the world 
gave us. In democracies, none of the national states would allow practices and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Istanbul: Meydan Yayincilik, 2010).  
535 Ibid., p. 11. 
536 “AB’ye uyum sureci, genel anlamda demokratiklesmeye, ozel anlamda ise Kurt meselesinin 
demokratik cozumune olumlu bir etki yapiyordu.” p. 27. 
537 “TRT Ses’in kurulmasi, devlet nezdinde Kurtce’nin taninmasi anlamina geliyordu.” p. 17. 
538 “Hukumet eliyle Turkiye icin bolunme modelleri arayisina girilmesine siyasi tarihimizde ilk 
defa sahit olunmaktadir...Hukumetin PKK aciliminin hareket noktasi, terorden beslenen boluculuk 
sorununun etnik ve mesru kimlik ve hak talebi sorunu olarak tanimlanmasidir” p. 73. 
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policies that would encourage the separation of their people.539 
However, on the other hand, then the Prime Minister (currently the President) 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan introduced a different paradigm by referring to the founding years 
of the Turkish Republic: 
One of the most important successes of Ataturk was to strengthen the 
consciousness of being a nation by first to bringing all the [identity] differences 
under the roof of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and then integrate them 
under the citizenship of Republic of Turkey. It is important to remember the 
statements made by Ghazi [referring to Ataturk] in the opening of the first 
Assembly…‘Efendiler[Misters], the intention here and the people who form the 
Assembly are not only Turks, Circassians, Kurds, or Lazs. But it is the elements of 
Islam [Anasiri Islamiye] out of all. ’ This Assembly had kneaded the dough of our 
dear nation with the ‘unity in diversity’ understanding and had established the 
soul of our nation’s solidarity and unity.540  
Erdogan’s discourse in revising the boundaries of belonging to the nation and the 
state emphasizes Islam on the one hand and ethnic diversity under Islam on the other. 
This approach becomes distant from the monolithic Turkishness that the founding elites 
seeded and later the political elites promoted nearly until the end of the Cold War. 
Although Turkishness was never separate from Islam, it was blind to ethnic diversity. 
                                                 
539 “Ilk kez Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, 1920’de baslayan buyuk tarihi icinde, uluslasma 
mucadelesini tersine cevirmeye yonelik, milli devlet kimligini, ulus devleti kimligini tahrip etmeye yonelik 
acilimlari, Hukumet eliyle, iktidar araciligiyla Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi gundemine tasimistir” pp. 74-
75. “Devletimizin adi Turk devleti, milletimizin adi Turk milleti, ‘Bu, bir etnik dayatma’ diyor. Insaf 
ediniz! Yani bu etnik dayatmayi Turkiye’de cerkezler hissetmiyor, Araplar hissetmiyor, Arnavutlar 
hissetmiyor, milyonlarca Kurt kokenli vatandasimiz hissetmiyor da PKK hissediyor diye biz de oyle 
hissetmek zorunda miyiz? Burada Turk milleti lafi etnik bir anlam tasimaz. Bu, bize dunyanin verdigi bir 
addir. Demokraside hicbir milli devlet kendi icinde ki insanlarin ayrismasini tesvik edecek uygulamalara 
kesinlikle izin vermez” p. 75. 
540 “Ataturk’un en buyuk basarilarindan biri, her turlu farkliligi once Turkiye Buyuk Millet 
Meclisi catisi altinda, ardindan Turkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandasligi paydasinda birlestirmek, millet olma 
bilincini guclendirmek olmustur...Ilk Meclisin acilisinda Gazi’nin dile getirdigi su ifadeler her an hatirda 
bulundurulmalidir. Daha once de ifade ettim yine bu kursude, ama biliyorsunuz tekrarda fayda vardir: 
‘Efendiler, burada maksut olan ve Meclisi alinizi teskil eden zevat, yalniz Turk degildir, yalniz Cerkez 
degildir, yalniz Kurt degildir, yalniz Laz degildir. Fakat hepsinden murekkep anasiri Islamiye’dir, samimi 
bir mecmuadir.’ Bu Meclis, aziz milletimizin hamurunu ‘cokluk icinde birlik’ anlayisiyla yogurtmus, 
milletimizin birlik ve butunluk ruhunu tesis etmistir” p. 76. 
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Erdogan’s narrative on this new Turkishness adds emphasis on ethnic diversity under the 
Islamic unity. This shift pluralizes Turkishness on the one hand and hyphenates it with 
particularistic identities such as Kurdishness. But it is essential to understand the logic of 
the AK Party in its new approach to nationhood. It would be misleading to diminish this 
paradigmatic shift either to the AK Party’s ideological tendency surrounding Islam or to a 
transnational normative context within the EU accession process. Rather, the crucial 
aspect here is the State, the ontological security of it, and how the AK Party understands 
this security dimension (Devletin Bekası). Akdogan reflects on this security dimension:  
Those, who see the ‘opening’ as the destruction project, do not want to see that if 
this project is not put in effect, Turkey will be encountering a survival 
question…Thus, the [AK Party] government explains the opening process both as 
humanitarian and democratic move as well as considering it as a security and 
survival question.541  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan also emphasized this security dimension of the opening: 
Rationally and conscientiously accepting the status quo which will put Turkey in 
greater dangers and risks is not possible…. Strong states do not insist on 
unsustainable policies…. War on terror cannot be effective solely by military 
means. It has psychological, sociological, diplomatic, and economic 
dimensions.542   
This is why the AK Party always framed the ‘Democratic Opening’ as the project 
of the state, not the Party. The project has intended to enhance people’s identification 
with the state of Turkey which had been weakened in the past, according to Akdogan. 
                                                 
541 “Acilimi ‘yikim projesi’ olarak gorenler, bu politikalarin devreye sokulmamasi halinde 
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buyuk devletlere yakismaz… Demek ki terorle mucadele, salt olarak, guven sorunu olarak sadece guvenlik 
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226 
Thus, the project has been structured as a peace project between the state and its nation. It 
is interesting that how the old ruling elites (i.e., military-bureaucratic cadres) before the 
AK Party and the AK Party itself have common understandings of the identity question 
as the question of the ontological security of the state. However, the difference is that 
while the AK Party defines security in its wider meaning (i.e., military, social, cultural, 
and economic), the old elites defined security more narrowly (i.e., physical) that 
understood the Kurdish question in particular and any other identity threat to monolithic 
Turkishness in general to be dealt with militarily. It is no surprise that the State Security 
Courts in Turkey functioned as the mechanism of the narrow security understandings of 
the old elites. The AK Party abolished the State Security Courts due to the wider 
understanding of security.  
Theoretical debates on security among the scholars and policymakers of 
international relations have been built on the questions of what security is, what should 
be or is being secured, what leads to insecurity and how insecurity should be best 
resolved.543 While realists and neorealists prioritize the state as the main referent of 
security in the sense of the protection of the territorial integrity from external aggression 
and address such insecurities mostly in the self-help system and through the degree of 
military strength,544 liberals recognize the role of the state and nonstate actors such as 
international institutions in building interdependent relations to maintain and seek 
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security.545 Constructivist scholars have challenged the fixed and essentialist 
understandings of security especially in realist and neorealist frameworks and introduced 
the malleability of the taken-for-granted concepts and behaviors within the social 
processes and interactions between the state and nonstate actors.546 The post-Cold War 
era increased the pace of critiques on state-centric understandings of security since many 
challenges such as “transborder threats such as poverty, globalization and environmental 
disasters, internal armed conflicts and international terrorism—have failed to be resolved 
by traditional realist responses.”547 The AK Party represents the post-Cold War 
understandings of security which define the strength of the state not just through hard 
power that is solely based on the military capabilities but also through soft power such as 
diplomatic, cultural, and normative capabilities that empower the external and internal 
legitimacy of the state.  
Conclusion 
This chapter first discussed the path dependency in monolithic Turkishness 
through the 1990s and explained how the international context and domestic affairs were 
not favorable for policy change toward hyphenated Turkishness. However, as the new 
societal actors such as the PKK entered the political scene of Turkey after the Cold War 
and the eastern question of the 1960s and 1970s have become the Kurdish question 
within the EU ideals of the state, the sustainability of monolithic Turkishness has been 
more and more questioned. As such questioning gradually continued through the 1990s, 
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the political hegemony of the AK Party eliminated the old Kemalist elites within the 
military and judiciary and opened the path of change in the state policy toward 






“Theoretically, no exogenous factor can in and of itself explain the 
specific forms that institutional change takes. While the destabilization of 
existing institutions can be exogenously driven, moving from such a 
position to a new stable institutional order must be seen as an endogenous 
process. Specifically, how agents redesign and rebuild institutional 
orders, and the conditions under which these activities take place, need to 
be explained.”548 
 
In understanding the conditions under which the state elites are more likely to 
change the boundaries of nationhood (between hyphenated, monolithic, asymmetric, and 
hierarchical) or their policies of nation-building (i.e., assimilation versus cultural 
pluralism)  and why they do so in the first place, recent studies have emphasized external 
dimensions informed by theories of International Relations such as realism and 
constructivism on the one hand549 and internal dimensions informed by theories of 
Comparative Politics such as elite competition within the state and social movements as 
agents of transforming the state itself on the other.550 While analyses primarily 
emphasizing international dimensions tend to black box the state as a unitary actor and 
neglect the intrastate elite competition and the role of subnational actors such as minority 
groups, studies that primarily emphasize domestic dynamics tend to assume that states 
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are isolated from the normative and empirical realities of the international system. 
However, both internal and external dynamics should be approached comprehensively 
rather than seeing them both as mutually exclusive in influencing the decision-making 
process of the state elites in nationhood and nation-building policies. I tackle this 
significant theoretical puzzle in understanding the state policy changes toward 
nationhood and nation-building first by placing the state in the historical context of the 
international system and second by unpacking the state through analyzing intraelite 
competition in relation to the counter-discourses generated by minority groups. Thus, I 
combine the insights of International Relations perspectives with the theoretical intuitions 
of Comparative Politics.  
By placing the realist notion of the state’s physical security at the center of his 
analysis, Harris Mylonas (2013) seeks to explain “the conditions under which a state is 
likely to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude a non-core group.” 551 He argues that “the 
foreign policy goals of the host state and its interstate relations with external powers drive 
a host state’s choices of nation-building practices toward non-core groups.”552 He 
contextualizes his theoretical framework through the cases of the post-Ottoman Balkan 
states after World War I. There are a few weaknesses in the theoretical proposition of 
Mylonas. First of all, he reduces the dynamics of nationhood and nation-building choices 
of the political elites into their pure security perceptions. Although security is an integral 
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part of the elites’ nationhood policy choices, Mylonas understands security in its narrow 
definition (i.e., physical, military, hard power) promoted by realist scholars of 
International Relations. However, he neglects that different security understandings of the 
political elites may lead to change in nationhood policies of the state as I demonstrated in 
Chapter 8. The AKP government in contemporary Turkey has understood security in its 
wider meaning (i.e., military, socio-economic, and cultural) and this has led to these new 
elites’ different approaches to nationhood frameworks in contrast to the founding 
philosophy of homogenization of the society and the promotion of a monolithic 
nationhood. The reason why the theory introduced by Mylonas cannot grasp my nuanced 
narrative of nationhood change is that he does not look at the cases in their continuity but 
rather provides a snapshot view of state policy changes in nation-building. However, I 
take three different cases in their continuity within the late Ottoman/modern Turkish 
context. Since Mylonas only pays attention to postimperial nationhood policies, his 
theory is less likely to grasp the dimensions of continuity and change in state policies 
toward nationhood across and within empires and nation-states. Since my comparative 
historical analysis covers cases across and within and pre- and postimperial contexts, it 
provides a larger picture. Moreover, in his own words, Mylonas also states that his study 
“focuses instead on explaining the initial selection of policies, not their successes or 
failures.”553 Although the scope of my research question does not include the 
success/failure dimension of nationhood policies, my analysis process traces three 
different cases of change in the same socio-political and historical context. Thus, my 
comparative case study along with diligent process tracing does not only look at the 
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initial selection of policies but considers nation-building as a continuous rather than a 
static process. Since I do not frame any policy change as ‘initial’ or ‘last’, I build my 
theoretical framework within the vicious cycles of continuity and change in state policies 
toward nationhood.  
Secondly, Mylonas black boxes the state and reduces it to a unitary actor in the 
international system, again with the basic assumptions of realist theory. Thus, his analysis 
neglects the intraelite competition within the state over the policies of nationhood. Yet, 
one should note that there is a continuous political competition among political elites 
over designing and implementing state policies toward nationhood. In all of my three 
cases, I have shown how political elites competed to consolidate their power within the 
state in order to either maintain the status quo or change it. For instance, while the 
military elites (the Janissaries) and religious elites (ulema) in the first half of the Ottoman 
Empire in the nineteenth century functioned as veto players against changing the status 
quo, the civilian bureaucratic elites who had had education and missions in the European 
context (Tanzimat reformers) were the ones who challenged the status quo institutions of 
the Ottoman Empire and introduced new political concepts and institutions for the 
empire, the most significant one being the project of Ottomanism. Thus, seeing like a 
state entails unpacking the state itself and observing the political competitions among the 
elites. Mylonas’ theoretical proposition is far from taking these state dynamics into 
account.  
Thirdly, Mylonas only gives agency to noncore groups as the ‘fifth column’ that 
cooperates with external powers in order to undermine the host state. This narrow 
security mindset in his analysis neglects the broader roles of the domestic nonstate actors 
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that can directly or indirectly involve in influencing the political elites’ policy choices. 
For instance, it was the Kurdistan Workers’ Party after the 1980s that transformed ‘the 
eastern question’—understood by the political elites and political activists in socio-
economic terms—into ‘the Kurdish question’ as an ethnic and cultural problem. The 
AKP’s Democratic Opening has directly targeted solving the ethnic problems generated 
by the PKK terrorism. Thus, nonstate actors can have agency in influencing the 
discursive capacities of the political elites and such agency may become a game changer 
in the elite competition for greater control of the state.  
Ayse Zarakol554 approaches the identity paradoxes of states through a lens of an 
International Relations scholar as well. In her cases of Turkey, Japan, and Russia, she 
brings a critique to the realist notions of security and introduces a psychological 
dimension of socialization among Western and non-Western states in the international 
system. Thus, she argues that the non-Western states such as Turkey, Japan, and Russia 
have historically been stigmatized by Western states with degenerative banners such as 
‘backward,’ ‘uncivilized,’ and ‘barbaric.’ Since these states seek respect and equal 
recognition in the international system, they align their domestic norms with the 
normative ideal of the international system at a given period in order to overcome 
external stigmatization. This is especially the case, Zarakol argues, when external shocks 
such as a major defeat in a war or state breakdown lead to domestic contestations over 
defining the identity of the state and the nation. In other words, Zarakol understands the 
states’ identity policy changes in a socio-psychological meaning of security understood 
by the political elites. Zarakol’s analysis differs from the theoretical proposition of 
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Mylonas in the sense that Mylonas understands security in different terms. However, 
neither Zarakol nor Mylonas gives sufficient agency to domestic nonstate actors. Zarakol 
also falls into the trap of a snapshot analysis of her cases without broader research on the 
continuity and change within each specific case such as Turkey. The other problem in 
Zarakol’s analysis is that she reduces policy change on an external shock.  
In addition to these IR perspectives to the identity policy changes of the state 
elites, Sener Akturk555 introduces a theory of ethnicity regime change by solely relying 
on domestic dynamics and thus taking the concept of state as completely isolated from 
the external world it is embedded in. According to Akturk, three conditions jointly 
become sufficient in state policy changes toward nationhood: 1) counter-elites; 2) new 
discourse; and 3) political hegemony. He states that “if ‘counterelites’ representing 
constituencies with ethnically specific grievances come to power, equipped with a ‘new 
discourse’ on ethnicity and nationality, and garner a ‘hegemonic majority,’ they can 
change state policies on ethnicity.”556 The major weakness in Akturk’s theory is that he 
does not explain where ‘new discourses’ of nationhood and ethnicity come from in the 
first place. In his analysis of the Turkish case in addition to Germany and Russia, for 
instance he argues that the Democrat Party in the 1950s was the first counter-elites 
against the Kemalist regime with hegemonic electoral successes (see Chapter 8). 
However, according to Akturk, the Democrat Party did not change Turkey’s nationhood 
policies because they did not have a new discourse although many Kurds electorally 
supported them. But Akturk does not explain why the Democrat Party did not have a new 
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discourse of nationhood in the first place. His theory cannot explain this because it is only 
inward-looking that assumes states and their political elites are completely isolated from 
the international political and social context. He also does not give agency to domestic 
nonstate actors in their potential of generating new discourses for the political elites. As I 
argued in Chapter 8, the Democrat Party did not have a new discourse of nationhood in 
the 1950s because of the restraints of the international Cold War context on the one hand 
and the absence of the “Kurdish question” in the national security agenda of the state 
elites on the other.  
Another weakness of Akturk’s theory, especially in the Turkish case, is that he 
frames political competition among the elites only in electoral means. Yet, a more 
attentive scholar of Ottoman/Turkish studies should pay attention to the civil-military 
relations and the centrality of state survival (Devletin Bekasi) in the zones of struggle for 
a hegemonic position in the state. A landslide electoral victory of a political party does 
not necessarily make that party the political hegemony since many military coups have 
shown otherwise in the Ottoman/Turkish political context. Reading the elite competition 
from an electoral struggle is a major misconception of understanding Turkey’s deeper 
state culture which incorporates the veto players beyond electoral politics such as the 
military and the judiciary. Overall, Akturk may be right in stating that the counter-elites 
with new discourses who attain a hegemonic position within the state are more likely to 
change the nationhood structure, but he fails to explain within which context such new 
discourses emerge. In order to do this, one needs to look at the international context on 




In conclusion, recent studies on state policy changes toward nationhood fail to 
provide a comprehensive picture in understanding the conditions within which such 
changes occur and to depict the underlying logic of the state elites in policy change. As 
my analysis is informed by continuity and change within and across three significant 
cases of late Ottoman/modern Turkish political context in longue durée fashion over the 
course of two hundred years, a nuanced understanding of the conditions under which and 
why the state elites are more likely to change their identity policies in relation to 
nationhood surfaces.  
In the Ottoman/Turkish political context, there is a pattern of the political elites’ 
quest for a ‘suitable’ and ‘appropriate’ identity for the populations they rule and speak 
for, especially since the Tanzimat reformers’ policy initiative of Ottomanism. If 
Ottomanism was the first paradigmatic shift in this quest which eliminated the 
institutional basis of the millet system of the empire, the Kemalists’ successful shift to 
and construction of monolithic Turkishness by eliminating the ‘Ottoman’ identity was the 
second paradigmatic shift in this quest. The AK Party era in contemporary Turkey and 
the so-called Democratic Opening is the third significant conceptual shift which 
ethnically diversifies Turkishness by placing Islam at the center of national identification.  
If one process traces these three cases of identity transformation, there is a 
common pattern of certain variables (under what conditions) that lead to nationhood 
change: 1) a favorable international context for change; 2) the influence of domestic non-
state actors in increasing the leverage for change; and 3) the anti-status quo elites 
controlling the state by eliminating the pro-status quo veto players. I frame these 
conditions as external necessities and internal opportunities. As the first two conditions 
  
237 
make change a necessity for the state, the third condition creates the opportunity for 
change. Thus, while the first two conditions make nationhood change contextually 
possible, the third condition makes it happen rapidly. In the absence of the first two 
conditions, the third condition becomes a null element because the anti-status quo elites 
build their discourses in relation to the first two conditions. Although the first two 
conditions may lead to a very gradual change without the third condition, the third 
condition functions as the tipping point and it makes change largely possible and rapid.  
Also, the first condition (international context) largely determines the direction of 
nationhood change (assimilation versus pluralism; legal exclusion versus legal inclusion). 
For instance, while the domestic Kurdish statehood threat led to the adoption of 
assimilation by the Kemalists in the 1920s, a similar threat led to more pluralist 
understandings of nationhood in the post-Cold War context since assimilation has 
become actus non grata (an unwelcome act). Yet, this does not mean that the state elites 
unconditionally adapt to the international normative and political system, but rather they 
vernacularize trending international discourses and practices for their own purposes and 
from their own standpoint. For instance, the AKP successfully framed the EU’s liberal 
multicultural discourses within the boundaries of Islamic or neo-Ottoman understandings 
of diversity.  
However, although these conditions articulate the approximate timing of 
nationhood change, they do not necessarily unpack the underlying logic of the state elites 
in adopting change. As I articulated nationhood change throughout the three cases, it 
becomes explicit that the metanarrative of the state elites in adopting change rather than 
the status quo in nationhood structure across the three cases is the ontological security of 
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the state. If Ottomanism was an antidote to the question of antistate rebellions (the 
Eastern Question) of the Ottoman Empire especially after the first successful separatist 
movement of the Greeks in 1832, the Kemalists’ monolithic Turkishness was an antidote 
to the question of the various internal rebellions such as the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 
as well as an anchor for the future of the Turkish question in Anatolia. Finally, the AK 
Party’s diversification of Turkishness with a broader attachment to Islam has been 
introduced to be an antidote to the PKK question in particular and the Kurdish question in 
general.  
When the Ottoman Empire entered into the nineteenth century with considerable 
relative weakness in relation to the rapidly advancing European states, state centralization 
and popular sovereignty as opposed to loose dynastic and monarchical rules and inter-
communal integration under the notions of fatherland were on the rise, especially due to 
the international dissemination of ideas and practices engendered by the French and 
American Revolutions. These practices and ideas were in fact game changers in the 
empires’ domestic and foreign affairs. As new institutions and tools of governance 
gradually emerged surrounding the notions of popular sovereignty, fatherland, and 
constitutionalism, these ideas and practices formed the toolbox of political and military 
contestation among states on the one hand and between state actors and their domestic 
rivals on the other. First, the Ottoman Empire tuned into ‘the Sick Man of Europe’ having 
the cancer of the ‘Eastern Question’ (see Chapter 6) and thus became a site of external 
intervention by other states such as Great Britain and Russia due to being a late-comer in 
the adaptation of the new rules of the game. Second, Serbian uprisings in 1804 and Greek 
independence in 1832 which were directly influenced by and seized opportunities from 
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the changing international context shook and shaped the new generation of the Ottoman 
ruling elites’ mindset. While the interconnectedness of the changing international context 
with the domestic antistate discourses made the traditional millet system a fault line and 
malfunctioning for the Ottoman state system, the rise and power consolidation of the 
mostly European-educated reformers  within the Ottoman state with the beginning of the 
Tanzimat (1839) led to the policy of Ottomanism in order to establish a common and all-
embracing Ottoman identity for different ethnoreligious communities of the empire.  The 
ontological security of the state was at stake for these new reformist elites.  
After World War I with the knockout defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the euphoria 
of Wilson principles and the crystalizing idea of nation-state as the new order of the 
international system increased the leverage of the various ethnoreligious communities’ 
quest for statehood as stated clearly in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 (see Chapter 7). The 
surrender-and-survive mentality of the Sultan and the Istanbul government not only 
detracted from the sovereignty of the state under the imperative of the Allied Powers but 
it also put the future existence of Turkishness in Anatolia at risk. In opposition to the 
Istanbul government, the Kuva-yi Milliye movement under the command of Mustafa 
Kemal came into being as a reaction to these changing political realities and raised its 
discourse of state and nation within this context. When Mustafa Kemal was able to 
control the state by eliminating all the veto players inside his movement and in Istanbul 
and harshly suppress any alternative claim-making uprisings such as the Sheikh Said 
rebellion in 1925, his cadres subtly and insightfully designed inclusive but monolithic 
Turkishness as the identity of the nation and state. This nationhood design was congruent 
with the Wilsonian idea of national sovereignty and national self-determination which 
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would ontologically secure the state both externally and internally.  
Similar to global trends around the world, post-Cold War Turkey has been a site 
of contestation between a state-imposed identity and the revival of counter-identities. As 
opposed to the Cold War political contestations within the meta-narratives of 
communism versus nationalism or communism versus capitalist democracy, identity 
politics has become the overarching site of contestation in world politics after the Cold 
War. The rise of ethnic nationalisms in Eastern Europe and Africa, indigenous activism 
and uprisings in Latin America, and minority rights discourses in the EU all revealed the 
global trend of identity politics. In Turkey, secular versus pious Muslim, Alevi versus 
Sunni, and Turkish versus Kurdish has been the contestation zones among state and non-
state actors. Perhaps the secularization and politicization of the Kurdish identity under the 
PKK insurgency have functioned as the primary rival to monolithic Turkishness since it 
has been a direct threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. Without 
doubt, this domestic antistate mobilization and discourse has risen and perpetuated in 
parallel with the post-Cold War international context. The founding cadres of the AK 
Party have been raised within this political context of the 1990s and built cross-cutting 
coalitions by incorporating liberals, conservatives, Kurds, and Turkish nationalists in its 
formative years of establishment. When the party gradually consolidated the state by 
eliminating the pro-status quo veto players such as the military and the judiciary, the 
Kemalist construction of monolithic Turkishness has been deconstructed since then by 
emphasizing ethnic diversity under the banner of neo-Ottoman communal harmony 
discourses. Yet, the AK Party’s intentions have been largely motivated by the ontological 
security of the state. Thus, unless reforms are introduced, the ontological security of the 
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state would be at jeopardy (see Chapter 8).   
Thus, in terms of revealing the logic of the state elites (the question of why) in 
changing the boundaries of nationhood across these three cases, I argue that the first and 
foremost motivation was the ontological security of the State. Normative aspirations or 
ideological motivations toward change were/are mostly pretexts for securing the state 
(Devletin Bekası). That being said, the metanarrative of this study is that the logic and the 
underlying motivation of the state elites in exclusion and inclusion of alternative identity 
groups into the state-defined nationhood are equivalent: that is the ontological security of 
the state. This does not necessarily mean that the state elites do not have any normative or 
ideational concerns in relation to their state’s acceptance and recognition within the 
international system, but such concerns are a means to an end, not an end in itself. The 
state elites’ ideas and interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive motivations.557 
Moreover, as the policy debates after the September 11 (9/11) attacks in the United States 
have shown, security versus liberty are often seen as zero-sum mechanism. As I have 
shown throughout this study, the state can grant liberty (in relation to identity claim-
making) in order to increase the (national) security of the state.  
In changing state policies toward nationhood, the political elites are primarily 
reactive to the external and internal political realities. It is particularly reactive to the 
existing and deteriorating domestic crises or problems such as antistate nationalist 
mobilizations, secessionism, or minority rights claim-making which to some extent 
restrict the states' internal and external sovereignty. However, the attempts of the state 
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elites to redefine the boundaries of nationhood through identity reforms are also proactive 
in order to prevent further deterioration of an identity crisis that would eventually become 
a direct threat to the survival and integrity of the state. Thus, the state is less likely to be 
primarily proactive since the state elites are less likely to initiate identity reforms unless 
an identity becomes a problem and a politically salient force. In other words, identity 
reforms of the state are first and foremost reactive especially after an identity question is 
securitized by the state. Without the securitization phase, states are less likely to act.  
There is a role for dynamism in the typology above which I developed and 
discussed in Chapter 3. In other words, the construction of such typologies can change 
over time as the relationship between the state and populace change. Historically, the 
direction of change seems to be from hierarchical and asymmetric nationhood structures 
toward the monolithic and hyphenated types. As the empires were gradually replaced 
with the nation-states, the formation of hierarchical nationhood declined. While most 
empires did not enforce assimilation and did not see ethnic diversity as a threat to the 
imperial community, the principle idea of nation-states has been homogenization and 
assimilation of diverse ethnic groups into a singular community. However, in the 
transition phase from empires to nation-states, establishing homogeneity mostly remained 
an ideal in which the minority questions in many nation-states have become the political 
and social problem of the twentieth century. Thus, “the very condition of identifying with 
a minority nationality in a state defined as the state of and for a majority nationality is by 
definition asymmetrical, and always involves asymmetries of power, position, and 
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perspective.”558 In other words, the formation and spread of the nation-state system in the 
twentieth century has led to the various nationhood structures between the types of 
asymmetric and monolithic.  
As the international norms have begun to be established around the human rights 
discourse beginning with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966, the 
leverage of the nation-states to repress and discriminate against minority ethnic groups 
has started to decline. This trend of human rights and later group rights especially after 
the Cold War has led to the spread of monolithic and hyphenated nationhood types. 
Today, minority and group rights are still a very highly contested issue although the 
forced assimilation policies of the twentieth century are in decline.559 Recognition 
demands of minority ethnic groups and their political mobilization around the counter-
discourses to the monolithic nationhood in the last few decades have also promoted 
hyphenated nationhood which I see as the inevitable outcome in states with ethnic 
minority questions. Thus, I would argue that hyphenated nationhood is likely to be the 
direction of change in the next couple of decades. Hyphenated nationhood (1) does not 
impose and force assimilation against the will of minority groups; (2) it recognizes the 
diverse ethnic identities with choices of self-identification (e.g., American or Mexican-
American); and (3) it does not put the survival of the majority identity into risk (such as 
the recognition of the Kurds in Turkey would not put Turkishness at risk of extinction). 
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Due to such characteristics, for policy implications, hyphenated nationhood seems to 
offer the best solution to the ethnic questions of nation-states in our contemporary 
political world, unless secessionism prevails.  
Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
Overall, I believe this study makes a contribution in three specific ways to the 
existing literature of ethnicity and nationalism, on the one hand and political change, on 
the other. The first contribution is conceptual: I introduced a new typology of nationhood 
structures that states can adopt (see Chapter 3). This ideal-type typology is built on the 
insufficiencies of the conventional civic and ethnic dichotomy. Since this dual dichotomy 
is mostly based on the nation-state system, my four axis typology introduces a more 
sophisticated variety of state policies toward nationhood that takes imperial and 
postnational forms of belonging (e.g., European Union) into account. I think this 
typology is generalizable in its ideal-type structure, which can describe different 
nationhood structures around the world.  
The second contribution is theoretical in the sense of demonstrating the conditions 
under which state elites are more likely to shift their nationhood policies from one 
nationhood structure to another within the typology I introduced. This policy change 
debate toward nationhood in relation to ethnicity and minorities are mostly explained in 
three ways: 1) as a result of minority group mobilization within the literature of social 
movements; 2) as a result of political elite change and political elites’ ideational change; 
and 3) as a result of external dynamics such as norm adaptation to a supranational 
institution. These explanations are mostly partial in the sense that they do not provide a 
more holistic approach which would take transnational, national, and local aspects into 
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account as a whole. However, my comparative historical analysis, which looks at 
nationhood policy changes in three different cases within their continuity and change, 
bringing the conditions of international context, domestic nonstate actors, and state elites 
together.  
The third contribution is more analytic in that it underlines the logic of the state 
elites in changing their policies toward nationhood. As many studies explain such logic 
based on a normative standpoint, I approach it from a realist standpoint. This is why I 
argue that the logic of the state elites in adopting either inclusionary or exclusionary 
policies is alike (i.e., the ontological security of the state). Depending on the internal and 
external context, the state elites decide whether to include or exclude certain groups 
within the boundaries of nationhood. This decision is driven by the motivation to secure 
the state. 
The major limitation of this study is the lack of more case studies that would 
demonstrate the patterns of nationhood change in different historical and geographical 
contexts. If more cases could be analyzed, the scope of my theoretical proposition could 
be strengthened. Although this study does not claim a generalizing argument in 
nationhood change over time, its theoretical discussion has depth and breadth to be 
applied in various different cases across time and space. A further research agenda entails 
such broadening of case studies based on the typlogical framework and theoretical 
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